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This thesis contributes to our understanding of executive compensation schemes in the United 
Kingdom (UK). On one hand, the study focuses on the effectiveness of long-term incentive 
plans (LTIPS) which has come under scrutiny in the recent past. On the other hand, it tests 
within various settings whether compensation contracts are designed optimally. It also looks in 
detail at the contractual features of long-term incentives which have received little attention in 
the literature to date. 
The first empirical chapter analyses the effect of firm performance on Chief Executive Officer/ 
Chief Financial Officer (CEO/CFO) pay by employing a sample of non-financial FTSE 350 
firms during 2010-2014. We test this association by differentiating between the impacts of 
short-term and long-term performance on short and long-term compensation. The short and 
long-term compensation components consist of cash (salary and bonus), equity (performance 
share plan, share option, matching plan and others) and total realized pay (salary, bonus and 
total equity vested) of CEO and CFO compensation. We also explore the effectiveness of LTIPs 
awarded to executives by examining the impact of different numbers, amounts and types of 
long-term plans on the long-term pay-performance responsiveness. The results indicate that 
CEO long-term pay, total realized pay and total remuneration are determined by a firm’s three-
year performance. These results also hold true for CFO but the relationship is not as strong as 
that for CEO. Also, for CEOs and CFOs, companies that use three or four separate LTIP plans 
award higher realized pay and total remuneration than companies that do not award any LTIP. 
However, for CEOs, companies that operate one, two or three plans in a compensation package, 
align the interests of CEOs with those of the shareholders. Basic plans in compensation 
packages tend to increase the pay-performance responsiveness. Within these LTIPs, the more 







CFOs, greater number or amounts of LTIPs correspond to higher total compensation and 
realized pay and greater pay-performance responsiveness. These findings suggest that higher 
grants encourage greater CFO effort, leading to higher equity vesting because of the attainment 
of performance targets. For CFO, the pay-performance responsiveness differs in number and 
amount of long-term incentives awarded than that of CEO. Finally, these findings remain 
consistent with the use of market adjusted TSR, further strengthening the conclusion of the 
research question. 
Next, we analyse the influences on and the effects of the choice of performance measure in 
CEO compensation contracts, for a sample of 3400 plans from 2007 to 2015. We investigate 
the link between the choice of performance measure and the volatility of earnings per share 
(EPS) and total shareholder return (TSR), taking into account four different performance 
categories, in that a firm may use either EPS or TSR, both, or neither. This allows us to utilize 
a comprehensive cross-section of plans and accounts for when both EPS and TSR are jointly 
employed. We find that EPS in combination with TSR is the most common performance metric 
employed by firms. The findings show that firms with higher EPS volatility and lower TSR 
volatility are more likely to choose TSR as a performance measure and that firms with higher 
EPS volatility are less likely to choose EPS alone; we argue that these results are in line with 
optimal contracting theory. Our results are robust to controlling for plan types, industry and 
time fixed effects. We control for the effect of the identity of the advising compensation 
consultant and also for industry on the category of performance measure, and find that some 
consultants, and some industries, have marked preferences for one measure over another. This, 
we argue, is an evidence of institutional isomorphism.  
The final empirical chapter analyses the effect of common shock on the selection of relative 







The results indicate that firms implement RPE based measures exclusively when a performance 
measure contains significant shocks which are common amongst peer companies and are 
consistent with the predictions of agency theory. These results are robust after controlling for 
the identity of the remuneration consultant and alternate proxies for common risk, for example, 
r-square and correlation. We provide a novel analysis of the breakdown of RPE characteristics, 
namely, different peer choices, threshold targets, and the equity vesting pertaining to these 
threshold targets by industry in compensation contracts as set by the firms. The findings reveal 
that firms are very distinct in their peer group selection and the choice of performance targets. 
Furthermore, we assess the relationship between common risk and the characteristics of the 
RPE. We identify that firms facing greater common risk tend to employ tougher performance 
targets in the shape of wider target spread and a lower percentage of equity vesting at the median 
and upper quartile threshold targets, where target spread is the difference between median and 
maximum performance required for equity vesting. Finally, we find that vesting percentages 
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The motivation for this thesis comes from major milestones that have affected the world of 
businesses in contemporary times. During the financial crisis of 2007-2008, Richard Fuld, Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and the chairman at Lehman Brother were awarded 500 million 
dollars, only four days prior to the bankruptcy, despite having announced that the firm had 
recently lost four billion dollars in the third quarter of 2007. There were controversies on the 
amount he was paid right after the bankruptcy was declared as well as disagreement on how 
much he was paid in total as compensation over the period 2000-2008. This led to the 
heightened involvement in understanding and questioning the structures around executive 
compensation schemes not only in the US but also globally. 
Within the UK context, as well, a few prominent cases have received extensive media coverage. 
For instance, the case of the 2003 shareholder revolt at GlaxoSmithKline which primarily 
focused on the pay package of its CEO Jean Pierre Garnier1 and later in 2008, there was a strong 
disapproval linked with the disclosure that Sir Fred Goodwin, the CEO of failed Royal Bank of 
Scotland received a pension entitlement of up to £30 million2. 
Similarly, during the last two decades, stock-based compensation has gained significant 
attention from the media, the general public, academia, and legislators. More recently, in May 
2017, MPs (Member Of Parliament) called on the government to ban the award of lucrative and 
                                                 
 
1 Jill Treanor (2012), GlaxoSmithKline chief's pay package more than doubles to £6.7m, The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/12/glaxosmithkline-chief-pay-andrew-witty   
[accessed on July 21, 2017].  
2 Richard Evens (2009), Sir Fred Goodwin: True cost of pension ‘is £30m’, The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/pensions/4861923/Sir-Fred-Goodwin-True-cost-of-pension-
is-30m.html 







complex share-based incentive schemes to the executives of UK firms.3 Additionally, 
shareholders have also shown their displeasure over the granting of long-term incentive plans 
(LTIPs), reflecting in the declining support of such approval.4 MPs also suggest a need to award 
simpler deferred stock option instead of LTIPs, which would only cash in later years, perhaps 
after their retirement. There have been ongoing discussions on the design of LTIPs, as they 
continue to grow in complexity. One compensation consultant,  Mercer argues that abolishing 
LTIPs is too prescriptive but a design of LTIPs and the way performance measures are linked 
to it needs careful attention. 
Higher levels of executive pay have been widely discussed worldwide. As an example, Murphy 
(2013) reports that median CEO compensation at S&P 500 firms has increased from $2.9 
million in 1992 to $9.0 million in 2011, signifying 4% growth p.a. for a period of 30 years. 
While in the UK, the average total pay of FTSE 100 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has risen 
by 13.6% per year, from an average of £1 million to £4.2 million for the period from 1998–
2010, far exceeding the 1.7% average annual increase in the FTSE 100 index.5 However, it is 
important to know whether executives are compensated to act in the best interest of 
shareholders. 
The UK has been a “pioneer in corporate governance reforms”, also, emphasizing the aspects 
of executive compensation regulation (Thompson, 2005). It has undertaken a series of corporate 
                                                 
 
3 See Christopher Williams (2017), MPs call for ban on complex incentive schemes in corporate governance 
crackdown, The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/04/04/mps-call-ban-complex-incentive-schemes-soon-possible/  
[accessed on July 21, 2017]. 
4 Nick Dawson (2017), LTIP-ing Point: Is This the End of Long-Term Incentive Plans?, Harvard Report. 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/12/ltip-ing-point-is-this-the-end-of-long-term-incentive-plans/ 
[accessed on July 21, 2017]. 
5 Executive remuneration: discussion paper (2011), Department for Business Innovation and Skills (“BIS”) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31660/11-1287-executive-
remuneration-discussion-paper.pdf  







governance reforms since the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 to ensure transparency 
as well as encouraging shareholders to play an active role in executive compensation. Following 
the UK, European and other countries have also established several regulations on executive 
compensation. For instance, even the US, with its historic approach to business-friendly 
corporate laws, has initiated “say on pay” regulation, while, as an example, some European 
jurisdictions like Germany and Switzerland6 have a binding shareholder vote on matters related 
to executive compensation and have initiated or have attempted to initiate executive-employee 
compensation ratio or salary caps. Moreover, in the US, the laws on governance are that a firm 
should adhere strictly according to the terms of the regulations and if firms do not comply, they 
will be penalized. However, in the UK, instead of firms being subject to mandatory compliance, 
the principle of “comply or explain” is applied to the corporate governance codes. This was put 
forward in the Cadbury Report as a Code of Best Practice in 1992 and gives freedom to firms 
to either comply with the governance codes’ principles or give a reasonable explanation if they 
fail to do so (Ndzi, 2014). 
The motivations of this study also comes from the rising interest in addressing agency problems 
surrounding executive compensation, along with widespread concerns whether the structure of 
compensation contracts is designed optimally. Extant literature on identifying a clear link 
between executive compensation and performance has primarily involved US firms (e.g. Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990; Mehran, 1995), whereas relatively, limited research has been carried out in 
the UK context (Ozkan, 2011).  Most importantly, this small body of research, by and large, 
has remained inconclusive in its results. Thus, the debate concerning executive compensation 
pertaining to higher levels of compensation is ongoing and calls for a further examination from 
                                                 
 
6 Executive Remuneration: European Corporate Governance Developments (2013), Willis Towers Watson. 
https://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/IC-Types/Technical-Regulatory/2013/Executive-Remuneration-
European-Corporate-Governance-Developments  







various perspectives. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse various components of executive 
compensation in investigating pay for performance association. To this end, this study analyses 
different definitions which are mentioned in the prior literature and also synthesizing a new 
variable, namely, ‘‘total realized pay’’. Total realized pay is the sum of salary, bonus, payouts 
from performance share plans and the value of options exercised. Despite the growing concern 
in this area, prior literature fails to consider a long-term measure of the firm performance.  
Nowadays, long-term incentives are frequently granted to the executives in the form of shares 
which vest after the attainment of performance hurdles. The last decade has seen a rapid shift 
in the landscape of long-term incentive plans and firms have started to grant multiple long-term 
incentive plans to ensure executives act in the best interests of shareholders. As discussed 
earlier, fuelled by the strong interest in the structure of executive remuneration and complexity 
in long-term incentives by various stakeholders, the question that has arguably spurred most 
academic interest is whether long-term incentive plans are effective in aligning managerial 
interests and shareholder wealth. To date, there has been no study which identifies the 
effectiveness of different numbers and amount of long-term incentive plans awarded to 
executives. 
In addition, there are widespread concerns about the effectiveness of contractual terms of CEO 
compensation. One of the key elements of contractual terms has been the selection of 
performance measure. However, in this regard, even the corporate governance codes in the UK 
do not make any recommendations on specific performance measures that firms should employ 
while assessing the performance of the company. Extant literature restricts its focus on how the 
volatility of performance measure impacts the pay-performance sensitivity (e.g., Sloan, 1993). 
However, it is silent on the determinants of the choice of performance measures for UK firms. 







consultants in aspects of compensation design. These are pertinent questions that need to be 
addressed in order to better understand this subject matter.  
Compensation consultants highlight that current practices of the UK firms are highly innovative 
in selecting performance metrics but this area needs further exploration. On the other hand, in 
the context of US, there are studies, albeit a few in number, that investigate the breakdown of 
mechanics of incentivization in compensation contracts of the US firms (De Angelis, 2015; Li 
and Wang, 2016). These studies also point out that limited disclosure and transparency restricts 
the availability of contractual terms, which has led many to question whether compensation 
contracts are designed optimally. Thus, the aim of this study is to understand and show detailed 
structure and mechanism of executive compensation schemes from the information available in 
directors’ remuneration section of the annual reports. 
Turning towards the different performance standards within the executive compensation 
packages which are tied to relative performance evaluation (RPE) and/or absolute terms, where 
RPE is measured relative to externally fixed benchmarks or different peer groups. On the other 
hand, absolute targets are measured based on fixed internal standards. Holmstrom (1982) 
asserts that an optimal incentive contract would insulate the firm from common shocks and 
provide a more informative measure by evaluating firm performance relative to its peers. 
However, prior literature has shown limited evidence on the use of RPE in compensation 
contracts (Antle and Smith 1986; Gibbons and Murphy 1990; Janakiraman et al., 1992; 
Aggarwal and Samwick 1999b; Rajgopal et al., 2006; Albuquerque 2009). One possible reason 
could be that there was limited disclosure during the time period of their analysis. These 
previous studies fail to consider the potentially vital contractual details of RPE contracts, such 
as characteristics of peer group, performance metrics, targets and their vesting levels. Directors’ 







disclosure and transparency in reporting executive compensation contracts, which in turn 
produce an increase in working papers on the subject of RPE provision, mainly in the US. 
Surprisingly, there exists only one published work carried out by Carter et al. (2009) for the 
single year 2004 in the UK context. At present, firms are much more sophisticated and 
innovative in the design of compensation contracts. Regarding this, studies in the area are far 
from conclusive and often incomplete. In this gap, we see an opportunity for additional 
research. Therefore, we have analysed the adoption and the characteristics of RPE along with 
their determinants, specific to the UK market. There are additional concerns on characteristics 
of RPE that are set in a manner such that they meet performance targets which leads greater 




This thesis contributes to the existing academic literature on executive compensation in several 
aspects. 
In explaining higher levels of compensation, this study employs four broad measures of 
compensation comprising of short-term compensation (cash compensation), equity pay, total 
realized pay (salary, bonus and total equity vested) and total compensation as relying on a single 
compensation variable (e.g. total compensation) could lead to a misleading interpretation of 
theoretical implications of the findings. Within the UK context, studies do not consider the 
actual payouts from equity compensation while analyzing pay for performance associations 
(e.g. Ozkan, 2011). This is the first time realized pay has been studied in the UK market. The 
growing complexity in the design of compensation contracts arises from varying number and 







effectiveness of different long-term incentive arrangements in strengthening the relationship 
between executive compensation and performance. 
Previous papers mainly focus on examining the impact of accounting or market-based volatility 
on the level of compensation and pay-performance association (e.g. Sloan, 1993), whereas we 
elaborate this relationship by looking at performance choices in the compensation contracts of 
UK firms. So far, none of the previous research has considered the impact of volatility on either 
earning or total shareholder return, both or neither. Also, limited research exists on the selection 
of performance measure in equity compensation. Mostly, the choice of performance measures 
has been analysed in the bonus contracts. Therefore, this study helps to elucidate the factors 
that go into determining the selection of Earnings per Share (EPS) and Total Shareholder Return 
(TSR) jointly, EPS and TSR individually, and neither EPS nor TSR. Additionally, the literature 
on executive compensation, globally, does not perform a detailed breakdown of EPS and TSR 
plan characteristics and relative benchmarks, nor have they examined targets and vesting 
percentages triggered at the median and upper quartile threshold in detail, to date. 
Consequently, to the best of our knowledge, the dataset used in this research is the most 
extensive and detailed in the context of analyzing incentive based contracts. 
Additionally, this study represents one of the first attempts to shed light on the scant literature 
of compensation contract complexity by classifying and analyzing the finer details of RPE 
characteristics by industry for UK firms. A stream of literature focusing on the adoption of 
relative performance conditions has not considered absolute measures nor have they analysed 
the characteristics of plans with relative performance conditions (e.g. Carter et al., 2009; Gong 
et al. 2011). We also investigate the determinants for selection of peer group categories and 
threshold targets and vesting levels pertaining to the median and maximum thresholds in RPE 







descriptive statistics of this study also provide exploratory evidence on detail breakdown of the 
broad index, sector and bespoke peers employed in relative performance evaluation (RPE) plans 
that were ignored in the prior literature. To this end, this study also extends the academic 
enquiry on RPE and analyses the effect of different characteristics of RPE on the percentage of 
equity that vests. 
 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows and has a thematic arrangement around 
executive pay-performance relationship, the choice of performance measures and the selection 
of relative performance evaluation. Chapter 2 presents in detail a discussion on the structure of 
executive compensation packages in UK firms. Alongside, the most compelling reports on 
corporate governance regulations concerning executive compensation are studied in tandem 
with their recommendations. The existing reports comprise of the Cadbury Report (1992), the 
Greenbury Report (1995), the Hampel Report (1998), the Combined Code (1998) and the 
Directors Remuneration Report Regulations (2002).  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of a theoretical perspective which has been used in the context 
of executive compensation matters and governance conflict. Next, this chapter sets out the 
literature review for the following three fields: executive compensation and performance 
relationship, the choice of performance measure, and the selection of relative performance in 
compensation contracts. The comprehensive review of theoretical perspectives along with 
research on prior studies lays a strong theoretical foundation towards the formulation of 
research hypotheses and an explanation for these findings. Further, this section aids in providing 







The second part of the thesis presents three empirical chapters related to the aspects of executive 
compensation.  
The first empirical study in Chapter 4 concentrates on the executive compensation package 
which has undergone considerable shifts and grown in complexity. In particular, this chapter 
distinguishes between the different components of executive compensation packages in order 
to provide a detailed understanding of the impact of firm performance on CEO/CFO pay. This 
chapter starts with the introduction and background information followed by the literature 
review on executive compensation, based on which we then formulate the research hypotheses. 
We follow this with discussions on research variables and present several models for the 
estimation. After the sample statistics, we discuss empirical results which test the association 
between pay and performance by employing broader measures of compensation and firm 
performance. The main data sources used in this chapter are the MEIS (data on executive 
compensation), DataStream, Fame and the Bloomberg. To determine the impact of different 
long-term incentive schemes in aligning executive interests and shareholder wealth, we interact 
three-year TSR with different numbers of LTIPs granted by the firm. We also interact TSR with 
the value granted within the different numbers of LTIPs and with the type of LTIP awarded by 
the firms to analyse pay-performance responsiveness after controlling for corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm-specific characteristics. In analysing these associations, we employ fixed 
effects model and conduct several robustness tests while employing market adjusted TSR as a 
measure of performance. 
The second empirical study in Chapter 5 focuses on performance metric employed in the 
construction of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation contracts. The first part of the 
chapter empirically investigates the explanation behind the selection of EPS exclusively, TSR 







utilizing multinomial logit model. Similar to the previous chapter, Chapter 5 starts with an 
introduction and background information. We apply optimal contracting theory as a basis of 
this empirical chapter. We review the literature and propose the hypothesis that greater volatility 
in market-based measure results in a greater likelihood of the selection of accounting based 
measure. As also, greater volatility in accounting-based measure results in a greater likelihood 
for the choice of market-based measure. This chapter continues by explaining the methodology 
and presenting sample statistics. Then, this continues by providing distribution of the 
performance criteria that are attached to different elements of long-term incentive schemes. The 
main data sources used in this chapter are the directors’ remuneration section of the annual 
reports, MEIS, DataStream, Fame and the Bloomberg. After discussions on empirical findings 
and testing the robustness of main results, the second part of the chapter continues by providing 
descriptive statistics on the breakdown of different types of EPS and TSR and comparator group 
employed to evaluate firm’s performance and the vesting percentages pertaining to minimum 
and upper quartile thresholds of TSR and EPS based measures. Following these descriptive 
statistics, we investigate how the detail of TSR and EPS performance target influence the actual 
payout. This allows us to analyse whether there exist certain norms and patterns in performance 
targets. Chapter 5 ends with a summary of empirical results and a discussion on findings from 
the descriptive statistics. The results of these investigations are expected to be of particular 
interest to policymakers, as well as, consultants and have been addressed as part of the 
recommendation in the thesis.  
Chapter 6 consists of the last empirical study where we concentrate on performance standards 
with a specific focus on the use of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts. 
We empirically explore the relationship between the common risk and the choice of relative 
performance evaluation in compensation contracts. This chapter starts with the introduction and 







we hypothesize that greater common shocks result in the selection of RPE plans. Then, we 
continue by discussing research variables, descriptive statistics of plans with relative conditions 
and the construction of the sample. Multinomial logit model has been utilized, by classifying 
firms into “RPE only”, “absolute only” and “absolute and RPE”. While documenting 
descriptive statistics, we note that firms vary in their selection of RPE characteristics: peer 
group selection, target spread, initial and upper quartile vesting in their relative based plans. 
Following these analyses, we investigate the impact of common risk on these characteristics of 
RPE. This chapter then focuses on analysing the extent to which these different characteristics 
of RPE affect the equity vesting. Chapter 6 ends with a summary of empirical results and a 
discussion on the implications of these results. 
We have a detailed description of how this research contributes to the already existing literature, 
yet some references can be found in the introduction section of each empirical chapter. 
Similarly, we provide a brief conclusion at the end of each empirical chapter, a more detailed 
discussion and an overall conclusion in Chapter 7, which additionally, outline the possible 








2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORTS AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
REMUNERATION CONTRACTS 
The development of corporate governance regulations has its roots in the corporate scandals 
that came to surface in the late 1980s and early 1990s, such as the collapse of the BCCI bank 
in 1991. Thereafter, in order to gain the confidence of investors, these regulations have focused 
not only on the overall corporate governance, but also the transparency and accountability of 
executive pay and on internal governance structure for the formation of executive compensation 
packages. The corporate governance codes consist of Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury 
Report (1995), the Hampel Report and the Combined Code (1998), the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) and the 2013 Reforms.7 
 
2.1 The Development of Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration in the UK 
2.1.1 Cadbury Report 
The Cadbury Report was published in 1992 and aimed to improve corporate governance by 
outlining the responsibilities of the board of directors. This Report specifies the Code of Best 
Practice that a company needs to follow in order to meet the highest standards of operations 
(Clarke, 2007). It also concentrates on aspects of auditing and financial reporting that the firms 
should adhere to, if listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In this regard, it is the firm’s 
board of directors’ responsibility to provide an accurate account and statement about its 
financial position. This Code of Best Practice is based on the “comply or explain” principle. 
                                                 
 
7 Although there are many reports around executive compensation and corporate governance, the scope of this 
chapter has been defined by those published reports which have been widely discussed and considered to be 
influential. However, the other reports which are not discussed and falls outside the scope of thesis are: Turnbull 







This is characterized by the voluntary compliance by firms where the firms are expected to state 
whether they comply with the Code provisions and also explain reasons in case of its non-
compliance. The adoption of such an approach would be considered as best practice. 
The Cadbury Report recommends that the board of directors hold regular meetings, aim towards 
decentralization of power and authority, and if the CEO also holds the position of the chairman 
then it is recommended that there is provision for clear allocation of responsibilities for 
balanced power and authority in the company.8 The Code also emphasizes on increasing the 
number of non-executive directors (NEDs). These NEDs should exercise greater independence 
when making decisions and should not have any vested interests except the fees and their 
shareholdings in the company.9 Concerning the fees, the Code outlines that it should explicitly 
reflect the time during which NEDs committed their services to the company.10 The Code 
furthermore recognizes the vital role played by institutional investors in a company and 
encourages them to make sustained contacts with the executives of the company for the 
exchange of opinions on performance, strategy, and the overall management quality. Also, the 
institutional investors should make proper use of their voting rights in matters related to the 
board. 
The Cadbury Report offers some guidance on executive compensation. It was also the first 
instance that proposed the transfer of responsibility from executives to the remuneration 
committee for setting the levels of their own compensation; therefore, recommending that firms 
                                                 
 
8 See paragraph 4.9 of The Committee on the Financial Aspect of Corporate Governance (1992), Report of the 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.  
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf  
[accessed on 21 May, 2016]. 
9 See paragraph 4.12 of The Committee on the Financial Aspect of Corporate Governance (1992), Report of the 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.  
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf  
[accessed on 21 May, 2016]. 







with no remuneration committee (RC) should form one, such that it comprises mainly or wholly 
of NEDs, making it less easy for executives to intervene (Girma et al., 2007). Also, the 
membership of the RC should be published in the annual report.11 Further, the Report 
recommends the disclosure of the total compensation of directors as well as the chairman and 
of the top paid director. Additionally, providing separate figures of salary and performance-
based components and a justification of the basis on which this performance is assessed is 
required too.12 Lastly, as per the Report, future service contract of executives should not exceed 
more than three years without the approval of shareholders.13 
 
2.1.2 Greenbury Report  
Greenbury Report was published in 1995 by Sir Richard Greenbury and addresses the growing 
concerns over executive compensation schemes. The Greenbury Report incorporates a Code of 
Best Practice on director’s remuneration. It outlines the disclosure criteria for executive 
compensation, linkage of rewards to performance and the responsibilities of the remuneration 
committee. 
The Greenbury Report emphasizes on some areas which were already highlighted by the 
Cadbury Report. The former Report tasks the responsibility to RC in setting executive 
compensation which should mainly consist of NEDs in order to attain greater level of 
independence.14 The report further highlights that service contracts and notice period for 
                                                 
 
11 See paragraph 4.42 of The Committee on the Financial Aspect of Corporate Governance (1992), Report of the 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.  
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf  
[accessed on 21 May, 2016]. 
12 Ibid, para. 4.40. 










company directors should not exceed a maximum period of one year.15 In accordance with the 
notice period, the board in conjunction with the remuneration committee should terminate the 
contracts of all non-performing directors of the company for reasons of better governance. 
Further, it recommends that the structure of executive compensation is to be a mix of base 
salary, annual bonuses, share options and long-term incentive plan.16 The remuneration 
committee should prepare a report to the shareholders on behalf of the board that specifies how 
firm’s performance is measured, how executives’ rewards are related to it, how performance-
based pay (bonus/LTIP) is linked to short/long-term objectives, and over time how the firm has 
performed in relative terms.17 The report should be published in the firms’ annual account. 
The Greenbury Report also sheds light upon the need to link executive rewards to tougher 
performance conditions, instead of executives receiving awards for a mere increase in the share 
price which could be due to inflation or general market-wide movements.18 Also, it is the first 
to mention that firms should use comparator groups in measuring relative performance.19 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) conducted an analysis in 1999 on the firm practices after the 
implementation of the Greenbury report in 1995 and concluded that most firms complied with 
this regulation only in their broadest terms, while a handful provided a finely detailed 
reporting.20 This suggests that firms disclose compensation practices differently. This could be 
                                                 
 
14 See paragraph 4.8 of The Committee on the Financial Aspect of Corporate Governance (1992), Report of the 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.  
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf 
 [accessed on 21 May, 2016]. 
15 See paragraph 7.13 of The Directors Remuneration: The Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard 
Greenbury (1995), Greenbury Committee. 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/greenbury.pdf  
[accessed on September 21, 2016]. 
16 Ibid, para. 6.14. 
17 Ibid, para. 6.19. 
18 Ibid, para. 6.38 
19 Ibid, para. 6.39. 
20 Department of Trade and Industry, Monitoring of Corporate Governance Aspects of Directors’ Remuneration 
(1999), PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060214022110/http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/pwcrep.pdf 







partly due to the Greenbury Report not establishing a standardized format concerning this. 
Moreover, the RC reports to shareholders on the remuneration policy but it does not require 
approval of shareholders in setting this up, also giving the RC flexibility on the information 
they disclose. 
 
2.1.3 Hampel Report and the Combined Code 
The Hampel committee was established in 1995 and chaired by Sir Ronald Hampel. It endorses 
corporate governance as an important tool for the prosperity of the business. It reviews and 
reforms some of the recommendations and policy statements outlined in the previous two 
reports. However, the Committee also proposed that the recommendations of Cadbury, 
Greenbury and Hampel should be included in a single Code of Corporate Governance. 
As such, the Hampel Report provided a list of boardroom principles that companies should 
adhere to. For instance, the board should be efficient in producing reliable information in a 
timely manner and should have at least one-third of non-executive directors on it.21 The role of 
chairman and CEO are different positions and preferably should not be held by the same 
individual. However, if these two roles are given to the same individual then this needs to be 
justified.22 Further, it also highlights the benefits of shareholder activism to a company. At the 
time when the report was published only a few shareholders attended the AGM but the more 
the number of attendees, the more meaningful the AGM becomes, possibly holding directors to 
become more accountable towards the shareholders. Moreover, the AGM is one of the 
                                                 
 
21 See paragraph 3.14 of The Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report (1998), The Report of the 
Committee on Corporate Governance. 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/hampel.pdf  
[accessed on September 21, 2016]. 







opportunities for small shareholders to be updated on activities of the company that involves 
their immediate presence and thus it would be good practice to have presentations concerning 
the same, with a scope for question and answer sessions for a more direct interaction with the 
shareholders.23 
Hampel Report stresses the use of fixed pay for non-executives and suggests that if firms find 
it useful to provide incentive compensation in the form of firm’s shares, they should do so, but 
refrain from making it a universal practice.24 The Report does not suggest additional refinement 
in the Greenbury Report concerning performance-based pay of executive directors.25 However, 
the report hints toward simplification of disclosure of compensation packages which may 
become too complex for a general audience.26 Additionally, as firms merely make a statement 
in the annual report concerning their compliance with the Code, without providing full 
disclosure of details of firm’s practices in achieving the provisions of the Code, from the 
perspective of the shareholders it may become merely a box-ticking procedure.27 
Concerning the Combined Code which was published in 1998, now the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (UKCGC), this was revised in 2003, later updated in 2016 and contains many 
of the recommendations already stated in the Combined Code (Petrin, 2015) and has therefore 
not been considered as this falls outside the remit of the present thesis. The Combined Code 
establishes the aspects of corporate governance practices. It covers issues related to the 
management and operations of the company, including the board of directors, the remuneration 
packages for the board members and executives, and accountability as well as audit. In this 
                                                 
 
23 See paragraph 5.14 of The Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report (1998), The Report of the 
Committee on Corporate Governance. 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/hampel.pdf  
[accessed on September 21, 2016]. 
24 Ibid, para. 4.8. 
25 Ibid, para. 4.7. 
26 Ibid, para. 4.16. 







regard, the role of the board should operate in such a way that it matches the goals and objectives 
and contributes towards firm enhancement. The board should consist of an equal ratio of 
executives and non-executives and should provide accounts of the company that reflects its 
financial position. The board should undertake the responsibility of setting up an audit 
committee to play a role in revising the company accounts (Alregab, 2016). It also encourages 
a continuous dialogue with its shareholders to understand their concerns. In addition, the Code 
also tasks institutional shareholders with the responsibility of making use of their voting rights.  
According to this report, executive compensation packages are to be designed in a manner that 
they attract, motivate, and retain talented executives while avoiding excess pay that outweighs 
the value of the services delivered. To align executives’ interests with shareholders, it is vital 
for a firm to proportionally allocate the performance-based element of pay.  
 
2.1.4 Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 
Prior to 2002, the previous codes in the Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel Reports focused less 
on the disclosure requirements concerning executive compensation in comparison to Director’s 
Remuneration Report (DRRR), which made this disclosure requirement more stringent. DRRR 
aims to strengthen the link between pay and performance and improve transparency in setting 
executive compensation. Consequently, the disclosure of pay arrangements became more 
rigorous, as well as detailed, aiding the public and investors to get a better insight into executive 
compensation matters (Petrin, 2015).  
DRRR had to go through an internal audit before being approved by board of directors and 
shareholders. In fact, it was necessary for all quoted firms to disclose remuneration reports of 







performance over a five-year period. In addition to the information of RC role and their 
membership, it demonstrates compensation policy, year on year change in executive 
compensation, pension entitlements, base salary, and grants of share options and LTIPs of each 
individual director and termination payment.28 Moreover, the report specified that the directors’ 
remuneration report had to be verified by the company’s external auditors. By doing so, 
investors and shareholders can evaluate whether the executives met the performance criteria as 
specified in their plan or not. Lastly, shareholders pass a non-binding say-on-pay vote, 
demonstrating whether they approve the remuneration report or not (Petrin, 2015). Taken 
together, these regulations are quite nuanced with regards to executive compensation schemes. 
 
2.1.5 2013 Reforms 
The disconnect in pay and performance relationship which led the UK Government to introduce 
a more stringent framework, taking effect from October 1, 2013, applies to public quoted firms 
(Petrin, 2015). In fact, it is noteworthy that these said insufficiencies were aggravated by the 
2007 recession. 
These reforms made several recommendations, but of interest, here, is the Three-part Director’s 
Remuneration Report. The company’s reporting on remuneration needs to be divided into three 
different parts. The first part is related to the annual statement with a personal reflection from 
the chairman of the remuneration committee. The annual statement summarizes key decisions 
made by firm directors concerning their remuneration as well as accounting for any substantial 
changes. Secondly, the report requires all public limited liability firms to provide a detailed 
                                                 
 
28 See The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002), the ‘2002 Regulations’, amending the Companies 
Act 1985.  
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20021986.htm 







account on the implementation of the remuneration policy and the compensation awarded to 
the directors of the firm that appears in the annual report (Mallin, 2010). In addition, 
remuneration report for directors should contain information on each element of the 
remuneration package. Although it was already stated in the 2008 Regulation29, it was 
reinforced in the 2013 Regulation that firms must provide a single remuneration figure for each 
individual director.30 This should be displayed in the table and break down of the components 
consisting of salary, benefits, pensions, annual bonuses, equity compensation from achievement 
of performance targets and realized amount from LTIPs. Finally, the last part comprises of the 
remuneration policy of the directors as approved by the firms’ shareholders.31 
 
2.2 Executive Compensation Structure 
Executive compensation contracts play a vital role in attracting, motivating, and retaining 
executives. It is important to analyse the structure, as a well-designed compensation contract is 
considered to be important for the long-term success of the company. These contracts consist 
of fixed and variable components and involve the following elements of executive 
compensation: base salary, annual bonus, share options, performance share plans, matching, 
benefits-in-kind, and pension. 
                                                 
 
29 See the section 2.4 of the brief by Tim Edmonds and Andrew Clark (2017), Banking executives' remuneration 
in the UK - Parliament UK, House of Commons Library. 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06204#fullreport  
[accessed on June 21, 2017]. 
30 See for more details on the Schedule 8 of the 2008 Regulation 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1981/schedule/made  
[accessed on June 21, 2017]. 







2.2.1 Base Salary 
Base salary is a fixed element in the executive compensation contract. It is usually paid monthly 
and reviewed, in most cases, annually. The previous literature argues that salary is a 
fundamental cash component for attracting talented executives (Murphy, 1999; Solomon, 
2007). The amount of salary could be influenced by labour market forces and individual 
differences, such as age and experience. Since other elements of compensation are awarded as 
a percentage of salary, for instance, annual bonuses and the equity component of the 
compensation, this makes salary a crucial component of the compensation as a rise in base 
salary will also correspond to an increment in other components of executive compensation.  
In recent years, there has been a shift in the structural composition of executive compensation 
packages. As reported by Ferri and Maber (2013), in 2005, on an average, 47% of the UK total 
compensation comprised of equity pay as opposed to 50% of the total compensation which was 
made up of base salary in 2007, as shown by Conyon et al. (2000). This indicates that over time 
firms place greater emphasis on the equity component of the compensation. 
 
2.2.2 Annual Bonus 
The bonus is one of the variable components of the compensation contracts and is awarded to 
executives annually, either in the form of cash payments or deferred shares or both. Like other 
incentives, it is calculated as a percentage of salary and is designed to compensate executives 
after meeting pre-specified short-term performance targets, which are usually based on 
financial yardsticks, such as profit, cash flow, return on assets (ROA) or individual performance 
targets established for that year. Sometimes operational yardsticks are also present in bonus 







customer satisfaction, as shown in the prior literature (Conyon and Sadler, 2001; Mallin, 2007; 
Sapp, 2008 etc). Therefore, it indicates that bonuses may include individual performance targets 
along with group performance targets. Unlike the salary element of executive compensation, 
bonuses are payments conditioned upon prior-achieved performance, as opposed to the future 
performance (Kim and Nofsinger, 2007). In 2011, more than 95% of firms included bonus 
contracts in their compensation packages, in contrast to 53% in 2007, as indicated by Bruce et 
al. (2007). This sheds light upon the proposition that the elements of compensation packages 
have undergone a considerable change. 
 
2.2.3 Equity Compensation 
2.2.3.1 Share Options 
The grant of share options is usually limited to senior executives but may be extended to other 
employees of the firm. They give a right to executives (employees) to buy shares at a fixed 
price for a pre-specified term. Executive options typically vest three years after the grant date 
based on achievement of performance targets. Generally, an option expires between three to ten 
years from the grant date, after which the executive can no longer exercise the option. The 
majority of UK companies select ten-year option terms. Other important features of these 
options are that they are non-tradable and are terminated once executives leave the company, 
thus incentivizing them to retain their affiliation with the company. When reward vests, 
executives simply receive the difference in market price on the exercise date and the strike price 
as determined on the grant date. 
In the 1970s, share option schemes were introduced in the UK which gained much popularity 
between the late 1980s and early 1990s (Lee et al., 2007). Pre-1995, the award of executive 







choice. Previous studies have shown that executives take actions that lower exercise prices in 
order to maximize the value of options on the day of exercise, hence, conventional time-based 
options can be engineered (Bebchuk et al., 2002). Share options offer a risk-free opportunity as 
executives do not make any loss on a fall in share price but they gain with an increase in the 
share price. However, recent corporate governance reforms worldwide place a greater emphasis 
on share options to be subject to tougher performance conditions. Moreover, firms use different 
terminologies for share options such as stock options, performance options, and executive share 
option schemes (ESOs) as seen in annual reports. All different forms of long-term incentives 
are granted to achieve long-term goals and objectives of the company. 
 
2.2.3.2 Performance Share Plans 
Performance share plans (PSPs), also known as nil-cost options, are options on the company’s 
stock with a zero-strike price which pay cash on the day they are exercised. Firms rarely 
construct PSPs in the form of cash reward and are mostly awarded in the form of shares. These 
shares are provided to executives after fulfilment of certain performance criteria as mentioned 
in their compensation contracts, which typically last for three years and are frequently updated 
on a rolling basis. In PSPs, unlike share options, participants benefit from the whole value of 
award not just the difference, since the exercise price is zero. Thus, PSP award valuation is 
calculated as the multiplication of firm’s share price and maximum potential of share that 








LTIPs are more commonly referred to as performance share plan32 and have gained popularity 
following the Greenbury Report recommendations. One of the main reasons behind the 
introduction of LTIPs was due to the absence of performance condition or sometimes lack of 
rigorous performance conditions in share options. Presently, in annual reports, the term “long-
term incentive plan” is used in a much broader sense for all types of equity plans and is not just 
restricted to performance share plans only. As an example, the firm Britvic, in 2012, awarded 
share options under the category of LTIPs. Other different terminologies for performance share 
plans are executive incentive plans, condition shares, restricted stock shares, executive 
incentive plans, and performance share awards (PSA). 
Long-term incentives encourage senior executives to improve long-term performance, by doing 
so, also enhances shareholdings in the company. Occasionally, executives are awarded one-off 
equity payments such as recruitment, retention or turnaround payments. 
 
2.2.3.3  Share Matching Plans 
Share matching plans, also known as co-investment plans are those in which executives invest 
part of their annual bonus in shares and if long-term performance conditions are met after three 
years, they receive a multiple of their initial investment in the form of shares. For some firms, 
this deferral is compulsory rather than voluntary. For example, in a “2:1” share matching plan, 
an additional grant of 200,000 shares is awarded on top of the initial deferral of 200,000 shares. 
This is conditioned on achieving performance targets. 
                                                 
 
32 See the paper by Kendon, Benns, and Sharman, Long Term Incentive Plans and Deferred Bonus Plans (UK), 
Bird & Bird. 
https://www.twobirds.com/~/media/pdfs/expertise/employment/employment-incentive/long-term-incentive-
plans-and-deferred-bonus-plans.pdf 








Benefits-in-kind consists of health insurance, club memberships, colleague discount, car 
allowance, private use of jet, and other kinds of indirect benefits. Another example of 
executives’ benefit could be when they are reimbursed for the distance or time travelled 
between their home and office. Usually, benefits-in-kind form a small proportion of executive 
compensation package, nonetheless, forming an important element for a company to be 
competitive in order to acquire talented executives. 
 
2.2.5 Pension 
Pension is mostly dependent upon the base salary component (which could build up over time 
or with bonuses) and encourages executives to work hard, alongside fulfilling the firm’s 
objective to retain their executives, as it is not received until his/her retirement, thus motivating 
the executives to stay longer in the firm. Like other elements of compensation, an increase in 
base salary will, therefore, have an implication for the pension in the following years. Pensions 
have gained much popularity recently, partly due to the general increase in amount and also due 
to cases of very generous pension payments awarded to the outgoing executives of failed firms. 
For example, the outgoing CEO Martin Winterkorn at Volkswagen got a pension pot of €28.6 
million despite the scandalous revelation of the company rigging emissions tests.33 While in the 
UK, the Royal Bank of Scotland announced a loss of £24.1 billion but still awarded its CEO a  
                                                 
 
33 Alan Tovey (2017), Departed VW chief Martin Winterkorn could get £22m payoff despite scandal, The 
Telegraph.  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/11887750/Departed-VW-chief-Martin-Winterkorn-
could-get-22m-payoff-despite-scandal.html   







lump sum of £650,000 pension funds.34                  
                                                 
 
34 Emily Garnham (2009), Failed RBS boss keeps quiet over his £650k pension, Sunday Express. 
http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/86523/Failed-RBS-boss-keeps-quiet-over-his-650k-pension  







3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
As one type of popular area in corporate governance, the topic of executive compensation is a 
complex, constant work in progress and attracts numerous researchers. In this chapter, we 
review the significant body of empirical work in the field of executive compensation. Secondly, 
we provide an overview of theoretical frameworks which aid in explaining the association 
between executive compensation and firm performance and the way in which firms set specific 
contractual terms in the executive compensation package. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Perspective on Executive Compensation 
In the last few decades, various theoretical perspectives have been developed which have sought 
to establish an appropriate mechanism in the formation of executive compensation or presently, 
the way these theoretical perspectives explain the existence of a certain type of compensation 
structure in various settings. These theories consist of agency theory, managerial power theory, 
and tournament theory. 
 
3.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory has had a huge impact on the finance and economics literature for many decades 
(Muth and Donaldson, 1998) and has also been studied in the context of corporate governance, 
predominantly, executive compensation (Ross, 1973). Shareholders own the company and 
managers work as agents to run the company on shareholders’ behalf. There exists an 
information asymmetry as shareholders cannot monitor agents’ activities directly and the 







company since they are experts in their respective fields. Like other individuals, CEOs tend to 
pursue objectives that increase their own well-being. Consequently, this divergence of interests 
between executives and shareholders gives rise to an agency issue. 
Post-1970s, the application of agency theory in compensation setting became popular with a 
greater focus on information symmetry between the principal and the agent.35 Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) contend that this information symmetry causes contradictory motivations 
between the principal and the agent and that the issue of “separation and control” might be 
settled by writing appropriate contracts which comprise of stock-based compensation as well 
as effective monitoring. Later, Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggest that firms should devise 
contracts that assist in mitigating agency problems. They also contend that “how to pay” is a 
much bigger issue than the magnitude of pay. Agency theory focuses on closely tying the 
reward to actual or perceived firm performance. Firms seek to design optimal compensation 
policies that retain, attract, and motivate executives and aim to align executive interests with 
that of the shareholders (Conyon, 2006).  
 
3.2.2 Managerial Power Theory 
An alternative theory proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) is the 
managerial power perspective. They contend that the process of compensation setting has 
strayed from the arms-length bargaining to rent extraction and the responsibility of this lies 
upon the shoulders of managers who hold key positions in the company. Although agency 
theory views performance-based pay as a key mechanism to solve agency problems, the 
                                                 
 
35 Note: The literature has largely focused on information symmetry between the principal and the agent for the 
disparity between the information that is accessible to these parties. However, another potential reason maybe that 







managerial theory proposes that it creates further problems. This could be partly because agency 
theory ignores the powerful position occupied by the executives that control the sources of the 
organisation. Managerial power theory can take several other forms, for example, the influence 
of CEOs on the selection of easy performance targets, etc. The influence of CEO and other 
executives, directly or indirectly on the compensation committee, or on the board, is another 
important aspect in explaining executive compensation matters. In other words, board and 
remuneration committee aids in forming such compensation schemes that are favourable to 
executives. The manager power view also implies that levels of pay are too high and 
compensation contracts are designed poorly. 
According to managerial power theory, the amount of rent extraction is the value of pay in 
excess of what executives would receive under a scheme that maximizes the shareholders’ 
value. An example of rent extraction is when firms offer stock option grants to the executives 
which do not strongly link pay to performance. This enables executives to reap windfall gains 
for a mere increase in share price that is due to fluctuation in market or sector in which the firm 
operates. 
Managerial theory believes that both internal and external directors of the firms have some 
hidden agenda to serve managerial interests as opposed to those of shareholders (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2005). This thought process stems from the day to day relationships between executive 
directors on the board. The authors also point out that directors manipulate compensation 
contracts in ways that lead to higher managerial pay. By doing this, it is expected that their own 
compensation will also rise. Much of the extant literature on pay and performance has been 
analysed mainly from amongst these opposite strands of perspectives, either agency or 







3.2.3 Tournament Theory 
Over time Tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) has gained much popularity in the area 
of executive compensation. It emphasizes on rank order compensation schemes and offers an 
effective way for the principal to evaluate and motivates managers when their efforts are 
unobservable. In this context, prior empirical studies have focused the performance of the firm 
resulting from the tournament. Some studies (Frederickson, 1992; Hannan et al., 2008) find that 
tournaments are an effective way to reduce risk to managers when some risks are common 
among all managers. This results in higher level of managerial effort in the tournament as 
opposed to individual schemes, such as fixed pay. Thus, in these tournament based incentive 
schemes, executives are awarded higher compensation for relative performance as opposed to 
absolute performance.  
 
3.3 Empirical Literature  
The literature on executive pay is vast and the empirical studies selected for the general 
literature in this thesis are not exhaustive but each empirical chapter of the thesis also provides 
a specific literature to the topic of the respective chapter. Therefore, the following paragraphs 
focus only on the general background, noteworthy studies, and the recent trends of research on 
executive compensation. 
 
3.3.1 Discussions on Pay for Performance Relationship 
Executive compensation is one of the most extensively analysed research areas in the field of 
corporate governance. At the core of the majority of theoretical and empirical studies lies the 







performance. Although, the incentive system in the UK is much stricter and transparent, yet it 
is more complex than that in the US. However, it is noted that a large corpus of literature has 
more generally focused on the US.   
Prior studies have also been carried out for countries other than the UK and US (Kaplan, 1994a; 
Kato, 1997 in Japan; Kaplan, 1994b, 1999 in Germany; Izan et al. 1998 in Australia; Zhou, 
2000; Sapp, 2008 in Canada; Duffhues and Kabir, 2008 in Netherland; Cao and O’Halloran, 
2012 in Ireland). For example, Kato (1997) reports a positive link between executive 
compensation and firm performance, measured by ROA, of 154 large Japanese firms. Whereas, 
Kaplan (1994a) finds a negative relationship between pay and performance for Japanese firms. 
Another research by Kaplan (1994b), consistent with his findings in Japan, reports a negative 
association between pay and performance for German firms in the 1980s. On the other hand, 
Zhou (2000) shows a positive association between executive compensation and company 
performance for 755 Canadian firms over the years 1991-1995. The author employs total 
compensation as a measure of salary, bonus, the value of stock options and long-term incentive 
plans granted during the year. Izan et al. (1998) do not show any significant link between firm 
performance and executive compensation for Australian firms. Their results remain robust 
within different specifications of compensation model (i.e. “changes” versus “level”). On the 
other hand, Duffhues and Kabir (2008) find a negative pay and performance relationship for 
750 Dutch firms in the transportation, manufacturing and financial industries. Their study 
indicates that executives receive awards which they do not actually deserve. However, the 
results of their study contradict with the argument that executives are awarded for adding 
shareholder value. These research studies identify a mixed evidence of a relationship between 
executive pay and firm performance. The findings of these studies suggest that trend of pay-
performance responsiveness may be company specific, as well as prone to be impacted by the 







corporate governance characteristics and executive compensation transparency could be 
influential factors in explaining these results.  
Turning towards US firms, one of the most influential studies that shed light on the association 
between executive compensation and performance for these firms is by Jensen and Murphy 
(1990). They find a statistically positive significant relationship between pay and performance 
and show that CEO wealth changed by $3.25 for every $1000 increase in shareholder wealth 
for US firms. Leonard (1990) studies 439 large US companies from 1981 to 1985. His results 
show that a firm which grants equity incentives such as traditional stock options tends to 
increase the ROE of the company and the companies that award bonuses in their compensation 
plans perform better than those that do not incorporate bonus schemes in their compensation 
contracts. However, the authors do not control for any corporate governance variables in their 
investigation. 
Mehran (1995) examines the structure of executive compensation structure for 153 
manufacturing US firms across the years 1979 to 1980 by employing OLS estimation. The 
measures of executive compensation comprise of the percentage of total compensation which 
is equity-based and the percentage of total compensation in the form of salary and bonuses. 
However, the author uses return on assets and TSR as proxies for firm performance. Mehran’s 
(1995) result shows a significant positive association between equity-based compensation and 
firm performance. The author also points out that the manager’s aim for more structural 
compensation, in order to bear less personal risk, is the manager’s preference of cash pay over 
equity-based pay.  
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) study 1500 large US firms from 1993 to 1996 by employing 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. Their results provide support for the existence of the 







between total shareholder return and total compensation (measured by salary and bonus), as 
consistent with the findings in Deckop’s (1998) study. The results by Sigler (2011) also show 
a positive relationship between pay and performance for 280 US firms after the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. However, unlike Aggarwal and Samwick’s (1999a) study, Sigler (2011) uses total 
compensation as a measure of salary, bonus and stock gains. The latter also employs sales, firm 
size and return on equity (ROE) as explanatory variables, and points out that the firm size is the 
most dominant factor in determining the level of CEO compensation. The results of this study 
are congruent with the findings of Sridharan (1996), who observes CEO base salary to be 
positively related to sales growth, the value of assets, and firm size.  
In the UK context, Main et al. (1996) are the first to investigate the equity component of the 
compensation for a sample of 50 companies during the periods 1983 to 1989. The authors find 
that an inclusion of share options in executive compensation packages increases pay-
performance sensitivity, leading to a reduction in agency problems. During the period of their 
research analysis, share options were the only available element of the equity compensation. 
Other studies in the UK context, carried out by Gregg et al. (2005), Gregg et al. (2012), Conyon 
and Peck (1998) find little evidence of the existence of a pay-performance relationship.  
However, these researchers employ only the cash element of CEO compensation. In an 
unpublished study, Gregg et al. (2005), analyses the pay-performance relationship for large UK 
companies from 1994 to 2002 by employing fixed effect regression method. Their study finds 
a weak significant relationship between compensation and total shareholder return while 
employing a single compensation measure as a sum of salary, bonus and pension. These results 
are consistent with agency theory and with those of Conyon and Peck (1998) and Conyon and 
Sadler (2001) which show a statistically weak relationship at the 10% level between pay and 
performance for UK companies. Gregg et al. (2012) investigate the impact of cash-plus-bonus 







encompassing the global financial crisis. The authors also argue that although the level of CEO 
pay is higher in financial firms, there is no significant difference in pay-performance sensitivity 
for financial and non-financial firms. 
Later on, Ozkan (2011) investigates the impact of previous year stock returns on CEO 
compensation from 1999 to 2005 by employing fixed effects regression model. The author uses 
cash compensation as a measure of salary and bonus and finds a positive significance only with 
the cash component of the compensation. The results also show significant evidence of the link 
between firm performance and total direct compensation (the sum of base salary, bonus, and 
granted value of LTIPs and options as their compensation measure). The author does not 
consider performance condition and vested value of LTIPs, having only made assumptions 
about the performance targets that ought to be achieved in the future. 
Over time, the literature on executive compensation has sought to examine the impact of 
corporate governance characteristics on the level of compensation or controlling for corporate 
governance mechanisms. Among this latter group, key studies include Conyon (1997) that 
investigates the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on director compensation of 213 
large UK firms between 1988 and 1993. The author employs chair duality and existence of 
remuneration committee as corporate governance variables and shows little evidence of the role 
of corporate governance mechanisms in shaping executive compensation. Sapp (2008) focuses 
on pay-performance relationship of top five executives for a set of 400 Canadian firms from 
2000 to 2005, and finds out that the board of directors and different types of shareholders 
influence the level and the structure of the executive compensation, although the author does 








More recently, Conyon (2014) studies the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and executive compensation for S&P 500 and S&P Mid-Cap companies. The 
analysis shows that board of directors and remuneration committees are independent in the 
establishment of executive compensation packages. Concerning executive compensation, on an 
average, it is positively related to the size of the firm and company performance. The author 
states the option as the most widely used component of equity compensation. There has also 
been a shift from granting fixed elements of pay towards the granting of riskier elements of pay 
namely, performance-based/equity pay. Ozkan (2007) focuses on the UK market between the 
years 2007 and 2008 and investigates how the corporate governance characteristics, such as 
board size and institutional ownership, influence level of CEO compensation. The study finds 
that the board size is positively linked with the level of compensation, whereas the percentage 
of institutional ownership has a negative impact on the level of compensation. 
Despite the widely-held perception on the disconnect between executive compensation and firm 
performance, until now in this regard, little attention has been paid in defining several measures 
of executive compensation and firm performance. As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, in the 
1990s several reports such as Cadbury (1992) and Greenubry (1995) focus on attracting 
attention towards issues surrounding corporate governance and consequently have led to 
various reforms which have improved the transparency in the executive remuneration. Since 
then there has been an advancement in linking stock options or shares to performance targets. 
These incentive mechanisms have been implemented after decades of effort to bridge this 
disconnect.  
Different from time conditioned share options, options which are contingent upon performance 
are also referred to as performance-vested stock options (PVSOs). The use of performance-







shareholders. There has been disquiet concerning incentive effects of performance-vested stock 
options. Gerakos et al. (2005) argue that firms merely grant PVSOs to lessen investor’s concern 
and that an adoption of PVSOs with achievable performance criteria will not deliver additional 
incentives. In contrast, as pointed out in its Global Best Practice 2006 for ‘‘Corporate 
Performance Management’’, PWC supports the use of the performance-vested equity grants in 
compensation contracts. Since the mid-2000s, the literature that has emerged includes in its 
investigations, whether the adoption of long-term incentive component is effective in aligning 
executives’ interests and shareholder wealth, for example, as analysed by Buck et al. (2003) 
and Kuang and Qin (2009). Buck et al. (2003) show that the adoption of LTIPs reduces the pay-
performance sensitivity, while Kuang and Qin (2009) analyze only PVSOs and document that 
its introduction strengthens the association between pay and performance in aligning 
executives’ interests and shareholder wealth, for example, as analysed by Buck et al. (2003) 
and Kuang and Qin (2009). Buck et al. (2003) show that the adoption of LTIPs reduces the pay-
performance sensitivity, while Kuang and Qin (2009) analyze only PVSOs and document that 
its introduction strengthens the association between pay and performance. The drawbacks of 
both the studies are that they only look at single components of equity compensation and use 
the performance period of one year, LTIPs, however, being three-year plans. The studies will 











3.3.2 Discussions on Performance Choices in Compensation Contracts and Optimal 
Contracting 
Agency theory has emerged as being very crucial to accounting and finance literature in the last 
thirty years and has been examined mainly to differentiate conflicts of interest and incentive 
problems. There exists a strand of literature that focuses on studying various aspects of the 
agency problem in executive compensation setting, amongst which is the use of accounting 
measures (Holmstorm, 1979, 1982). 
Interestingly, agency theory does not specifically mention the selection of accounting or 
financial performance metrics in a compensation contract, but the theory can be employed to 
determine properties of accounting or finance variables for assessing the agent’s performance. 
Among academics as well as in the corporate world, the relative merits on which market-based 
measure versus accounting measures are to be selected is still debatable. The greater prevalence 
of the use of stock prices as a market-based measure has been observed since the 1990s. 
Initially, price-based measures are mainly used in incentive contracts and over time, firms have 
started to employ accounting based measures in compensation contracts. By way of illustration, 
Larcker (1983) finds that only twenty-five firms use accounting-based plans in CEO 
compensation contracts, while Kumar and Sopariwala (1992) find only sixty-two companies 
that incorporate plans with accounting performance conditions attached. Kaplan and Norton 
(1992) develop a non-financial measure technique known as a “balanced scorecard” in 
compensation contracts, which employs various performance measures with different relative 
weights, unlike the specific use of total shareholder return, return on investments or earnings. 
Later studies have charted the introduction of non-financial measures in bonus contracts, for 







their study was that they restrict their analysis to bonus contracts, thus, excluding the equity 
component which forms the major element of the compensation package.    
Holmstorm (1979) proposes the “Informativeness principle” which states that any performance 
metric with high signal quality in revealing CEOs actions should be included in the 
compensation contract. In reality, if markets are efficient and firms have all the necessary 
information that is known to the market, the use of stock-based measure should be redundant 
in compensation contracts. This validates the property of optimal contracting framework. 
According to the informativeness principle, information on accounting earnings are not only 
useful because investors care about earnings but also because it improves contracting, as these 
reveal the actions of managers beyond what stocks measures fully capture.  
Theoretically, accounting or even non-financial measures are mainly introduced to filter 
common noise in compensation contracts. For example, Ittner et al. (1997) have examined the 
adoption of financial or non-financial performance measures in bonus contracts of US firms. 
Their results show that the selection of non-financial measures is an increasing function of noise 
in financial performance measures. On the other hand, the most widely recognized reason that 
led to the use of earning metrics is that earnings reflect components which are under the direct 
control of the management (O’Byrne, 1990; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
Banker and Datar (1989) state that even if CEOs make decisions in the best interest of the firm, 
if the performance measure is noisy, it restricts the ability to have the same impact of what the 
performance measure should have been without the noise. Therefore, less weight placed on 
noisy performance measure will increase the strength and the value of an incentive contract. On 
the other hand, the lesser the noise is, the more accurate and consistent the performance measure 
becomes (Franco-Santos, 2007). Empirical studies test agency theory predictions in 







accounting or market-based measure. Sloan (1993) examines the role of accounting measures 
in salary and bonus components of the compensation and documents that the use of earnings in 
a compensation pay setting will tend to shield compensation from market fluctuations in stock 
prices. The author also suggests that if the stock price is a relatively noisy element, then 
compensation will be more sensitive to earnings than stock returns. 
Lambert and Larcker (1987) investigate the relationship between pay and performance by 
applying agency framework and analyze whether accounting or market measures are considered 
to be more informative to shareholders. The results indicate that weight assigned between the 
market-based measure and accounting measure is a function of noise in these two performance 
measures, where the noisier the accounting based measure is, the lesser is the weight of the 
accounting measure. Additionally, growth firms tend to place more weight on market-based 
measures. For the measure of compensation, the author employs salary and bonus component 
which the authors believe to be 80 percent of the executive compensation. These studies note 
that both these performance measures are related to changes in CEO cash compensation only.  
De Angelis and Grinstein (2015) provide the details of performance criteria in US equity-based 
grants for the year 2007 only. The research findings indicate that there exists significant 
variance in the choice of performance measures employed by firms and we can also infer from 
their empirical results that firms opt for performance measures which are more informative of 
CEO actions. Furthermore, growth firms and businesses with complex structure prefer to 
employ market-based measures over accounting-based measures. 
Turning towards the choice of performance measure, so far in the UK context, there are three 
studies covering this aspect. Conyon et al. (2000) present a breakdown of performance 
measures linked to CEO stock options only. Their study ignores other components of equity 







and Zakaria (2012) provide details of EPS and TSR performance targets. For EPS, they consider 
minimum performance threshold target only. While for TSR performance measure, they 
provide very little details of the relative benchmark to TSR and do not provide any details of 
threshold performance required. These studies also ignore the vesting criteria pertaining to these 
thresholds.  
Firms are increasingly employing non-financial key performance indicators (KPIs) in their 
bonus contracts.36 In addition to financial-based measures in LTIPs, some firms have also 
started to employ KPIs in these equity plans. Traditional performance measures such as TSR 
or EPS influences stockholders since they own companies’ shares. KPIs such as employee 
health, safety and environment are very important for stakeholders over the long term since 
they are critical to the success of the organization and indicates whether or not the organization 
is on track towards its stated objectives. 
 
3.3.3 Discussions on RPE-based Contracts 
In devising compensation contracts, targets can be set in relative or absolute terms. Relative 
performance is measured against an externally-derived benchmark and absolute performance is 
measured on the basis of set internal standards. During performance benchmarking, if firms 
select absolute measures, this process can be classified as “fixed benchmarking” and requires 
little data. In contrast, relative benchmarking has greater data requirements as it involves 
appropriate peers to evaluate the relative performance of the company. Firms employ 
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compensation, CFA Society 2014. 
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performance targets to assess agents’ performance as they provide critical information 
concerning managers’ behaviour and also grant rewards for higher firm performance. 
As discussed earlier in Section 3.2.1, agency theory postulates that firms can strengthen the 
interest alignment between executives and shareholders by tightening the relation between 
executive compensation to firm performance. However, if the performance of the company is 
assumed to be influenced by external shocks, then it restricts the ability of CEOs to maximize 
shareholder wealth as firms are exposed to economy-wide shocks which CEOs cannot directly 
control. The contract may not be optimal if the performance of the company is correlated with 
either market or sector performance. Thus, the firms’ use of absolute measure will merely 
compensate or penalize executives for general market-wide movements (Camara, 2001). 
Holmstrom (1982) proposes that an optimal compensation scheme would shield the manager 
against external shocks by measuring agent’s performance relative to its peers. Therefore, the 
use of RPE protects from market-wide movements and exogenous shocks which influence the 
performance of the firm and its peers, thereby, strengthening the link between compensation 
and firm performance. 
As discussed earlier in Section 2.1.4, Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulation (DRRR) 
requires a detailed reporting on executive compensation matters. As part of this requirement, 
presently, firms disclose comprehensive information on executive compensation packages. 
Also, firms display peers selected for the purpose of performance benchmarking in their annual 
reports, reporting the returns on their own shares for the last five-year period, together with the 
comparative data on market and industry returns, over the same period. 
In comparison to UK firms, since 2006, Security Exchange Commission (SEC) requires US 
firms to disclose the presence of RPE and peer choices in their annual reports. Before these 







compensation against peer group performance. As an example, a pioneering study by Antle and 
Smith (1986) analyses US firms and infers the use of RPE indirectly from negative coefficient 
on peer performance while regressing executive compensation on both peer and firm 
performance by using an implicit approach. This negative coefficient on peer performance 
indicates that the remuneration committee filters market-wide performance wholly (or partly) 
out of executive compensation (Rajgopal et al., 2006). Gibbons and Murphy (1990) also show 
evidence supporting the presence of RPE with use of shareholder returns as a performance 
metric. The authors report that the changes in executive pay are more likely to be assessed 
relative to market movements instead of firm’s industry. Studies on RPE use market peers to 
account for RPE use by performing implicit tests (e.g. Hall and Liebman, 1998; Garvey and 
Milbourn, 2003) and some use the implicit approach to detect RPE presence by employing 
industry peers (e.g. Janakiraman et al., 1992; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Garvey and 
Milbourn, 2006), while, some other studies employ both industry and market peers together 
(Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999b; Gibson and Murphy, 1990; Rajgopal et al. 2006). Of these 
studies, only Antle and Smith (1986), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Janakiraman et al. (1992) 
and Rajgopal et al. (2006) find support for the presence of RPE in compensation contracts. 
Albuquerque (2009) employs industry-size peers to measure peer performance and detects 
support for RPE use from the S&P 1500 firms. However, the author finds weaker evidence of 
RPE use when peer performance is based on peer groups from S&P 500 index and two digits 
SIC codes. One criticism of much of the literature on RPE, as also pointed by Dikolli et al. 
(2013), is that previous studies which test implicit RPE usage may have made measurement 
errors due to incorrect assumptions by selecting wrong peer groups for the detection of RPE or 
have shown biases in their selection of peer groups (e.g. industry or market peer groups). Since 
they use these various potential peer groups, instead of the actual peer groups which may differ 







Another major weakness of this approach is that it does not give an indication of percentage 
number of firms using relative performance and thus it remains unclear how many firms utilize 
RPE in the sample. Some of these studies use salary and bonus as a dependent variable (e.g. 
Barro and Barro, 1990; Janakiraman et al., 1992) in their analysis. This is clearly erroneous 
since firms mostly employ RPE in the equity component of the compensation.  
Only a few studies undertaken previously focus on the explicit approach in detecting RPE, 
where regulatory filings are directly observed. Murphy (1999) analyses a sample of 177 large 
US firms contained in the survey by Towers Perrin in 1997 and documents that 28.8% of firms 
employ RPE in annual bonus contracts. In another study, Bannister and Newman (2003) 
examine 163 US firms in the Fortune 250 Index in 1992-1993 and indicate that the firms’ use 
of RPE in compensation contracts is not widespread as only 45 firms out of 163 (28%) 
incorporate RPE based contracts. The authors also find that the use of RPE is positively 
associated with greater monitoring and stakeholder concern on executive pay and performance. 
Whereas, Gong et al. (2011) report greater frequency and indicate that 38% of the US S&P 
1500 firms in 2006 employ RPE in compensation contracts. Carter et al. (2009) investigate the 
use of RPE in 129 UK firms in 2002 and report that around 50% of firms do not employ RPE 
in their performance-vested equity grants. Carter et al. (2009) and Gong et al. (2011), in addition 
to showing the percentage of firms that employ RPE using explicit approach, look at the 
determinants of firm’s use of RPE and non-RPE. So far, these are the two main studies in the 
context of firm’s use of RPE. However, in contrast to Gong et al. (2011), Carter et al. (2009) 
show little empirical evidence that the common shock plays a role in the decision to use RPE. 
In a recent working paper, Black et al. (2016) use explicit disclosure to perform an implicit test 
to detect RPE for S&P 500 firms. They analyze the relationship between pay and firm 







non- RPE subsample by identifying implicit RPE using two-digit SIC peers, and industry/size 
quartile peers for the single year 2006. Their research findings show implicit evidence of RPE 
in RPE sub-sample using both peer groups. Their results also detect RPE presence in non-RPE 
firms using industry/size quartile peer groups only and argue that firms do not comply with the 
regulation in disclosing RPE. However, this is less of an issue in the context of UK firms since 
firms disclose the selection of RPE and comparator groups in their annual reports. After the 
introduction of mandatory SEC disclosure, the use of RPE has been investigated in several 
ways. In another working paper, Gao et al. (2017) investigate contractual features such as 
performance horizon and choice of multiple plans of S&P 500 industrial firms. Their study 
concludes that the selection of RPE and longer performance horizons can filter noise from 
market-based measures. In the US, the length of performance horizon varies in equity grants, 
however, in the UK, long-term incentives are usually three-year plans and their length does not 
vary. Thus, performance horizon does not impact the choice of RPE in UK compensation-
setting.  
Along with the decision to use RPE, the characteristics of RPE are also very important. One of 
the important characteristics is the selection of peer group in relative performance evaluation 
purposes, which has received less attention. Lewellen et al. (1996) investigate the influence of 
prior firm performance and corporate governance characteristics on the degree of bias in the 
selection of index and industry peer group for financial reporting practice. They conclude that 
industry and peer-company stock return benchmarks selected by the company are downward 
biased. In this way, the firm of interest can place themselves in higher percentile ranking, thus, 
indicating a bias in the peer selection process.  
Besides, the risk sharing benefits from the adoption of RPE in compensation contracts, 







further suggests that the selection of RPE peers should be such that RPE firms and peer firms 
should both have an equal probability to win, given equal levels of effort (Lazear and Rosen, 
1981). If the selection of peers is inappropriate, it could result in diluting RPE benefits.  
In order to shield executives from external shocks, the selection of peer group should be based 
on their ability to share greater common risk with the RPE firm. Gong et al. (2011) also analyse 
only those firms which select custom peer groups, therefore, ignoring firms which pick sector 
and index peers. To capture the common risk exposure of potential peers, their study looks at 
similarities in industry membership, index membership, and sub-index membership to that of 
an RPE firm. They do not take into consideration the performance criteria attached to these 
RPE plans in their analysis. The results of their study conclude that firms select RPE peers 
which belong from the Same_SIC2, S&P 1500 and have similar characteristics, which is in line 
with the efficient contracting theory. However, they also find evidence of self-selection bias as 
firms select such peers which have lower expected future stock returns. 
 
3.3.4 Brief Reflection of the Relevant Literature 
The literature review undertaken in previous sections displays that although there exists a body 
of literature on executive compensation, there are voids in the understanding of the design of 
long-term incentives and effectiveness of these incentive schemes in the UK.  
Firstly, all the studies reviewed in the literature so far in examining the relationship between 
pay and performance have taken cash compensation, measured by the sum of salary and bonus, 
and the equity compensation as the prime measure of compensation in their investigations. In 
their valuation of equity compensation, these studies only include the granted value of equity 







compensation. The equity grant is the maximum incentive opportunity (sometimes adjusting 
the probability of vesting), whereas, the vesting amount refers to the actual payout from equity-
based pay which has been awarded to the executives after the attainment of performance 
criteria. It is impossible to estimate the true value of awards that will vest in the future. In the 
existing literature, only Conyon (2014) employs the vested value of equity grants in their 
empirical model to analyse US firms. Most of the research that we have discussed has only 
considered short-term performance in analyzing pay for performance relationship. Evidently, 
therefore, there is more scope in the UK to analyze the link between different elements of 
executive pay and measures of firm performance. Only limited studies extensively focus on 
LTIP plans, Buck et al. (2003) and Kuang and Qin (2009), which, however, yield inconclusive 
results to exhibit its effectiveness. This leaves an opportunity for potential research into whether 
adopting LTIPs in a compensation package align managerial and shareholder interests by 
strengthening the association between pay and performance across various settings. 
Secondly, much of the extant literature investigates the impact of accounting or market-based 
measure on the relationship between pay and performance. These studies argue that firms 
should not select volatile performance measures since they make the relationship between pay 
and performance insensitive. However, the studies do not empirically test whether the volatility 
in accounting or market-based performance measures influences the selection of performance 
metrics. Additionally, concerning the choice of performance measures and their targets in long-
term incentive plans, research in the UK has been thinner and more limited and has, to date, 
explored restricted datasets, with sample periods ending in 2003. Therefore, future research 
should concentrate on examining the design of compensation contracts in detail, including the 







Thirdly, based on the review of the literature, a handful of non-UK based studies are mostly 
derived from the US data to detect RPE using implicit techniques in compensation contracts. 
The mixed results and lack of empirical evidence for RPE use can be attributed to incorrect 
model assumptions and misspecification in the implicit approach. Only very recently, the mode 
of research on RPE has changed and started to examine the explicit use of RPE by using annual 
reports. Only two studies use explicit methods for US and UK firms which investigate the 
determinants of choice between RPE and non-RPE firms for a single year only. Consequently, 
more research is needed in the UK that accounts for explicit use of RPE by using a large dataset. 
Some recent studies use the explicit method to detect the implicit presence of RPE and others 
analyze a selection of individual firms who are selected to be in RPE pool. These studies employ 
the US dataset and are yet unpublished as they are quite current- 2016, 2017, suggesting that 
the literature on explicit RPE is still under research. Also, presently the characteristics of RPE 
are fully observable in annual reports and have advanced in the past few years. Yet, only limited 
studies thoroughly analyze RPE characteristics. Thus, future research should examine the 
characteristics of RPE and analyze their determinants. All these extensions will elaborate the 







4 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LONG-TERM INCENTIVES IN ALIGNING 
INTERESTS BETWEEN EXECUTIVES AND SHAREHOLDERS 
4.1 Introduction 
A vital role of corporate governance is to alleviate the misalignment of interests between 
executives and shareholders which mainly arise from the separation of ownership and control. 
Owing to corporate global scandals, such as Enron or WorldCom that have surfaced since 2001, 
the issue of executive compensation has been in the spotlight ever since. Media and politicians 
mostly tend to pay attention to higher levels of pay, while stakeholders of the firm and 
regulatory authorities tend to focus on whether compensation is sufficiently linked to executive 
performance (Alregab, 2016). There has been considerable reform initiatives which attempt to 
make the board more independent in their decision-making process. From the analysis of the 
reports in Section 2.1, these reform initiatives suggest that institutional owners should have 
control over matters related to executive compensation. 
Further, we reviewed the Greenbury Report (1995) in Section 2.1.2, which suggested that firms 
should employ performance contingent long-term incentive plans for their executives. 
However, the enforcement of Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (DRRR) in 2002 
aim towards enhancing transparency and disclosure on fixed and variable components of 
compensation. Therefore, this disclosure provides an opportunity for researchers to conduct 
analysis on features of long-term incentive arrangements for UK firms. It also helps public and 
investors to understand the various components of executive compensation packages.  
As discussed in Section 2.2, long-term incentive plans usually consist of performance share 
plans, share options, and share matching plans. These shares vest only after performance criteria 
are met over a period of time. Vesting time is referred to as the time before restrictions are lifted 







lapsed for UK firms; in comparison, however, a greater number of US firms still grant 
incentives which are conditional upon the time lapsed. Moreover, UK firms have adopted long-
term incentive schemes much before the US firms and the vesting of shares occurs only after 
three years, once the plan has been devised (Tower Perrin, 2005).  
The grant of long-term incentives serve two objectives: firstly, it ensures that the interest of 
executives and firm’s shareholders are aligned. Secondly, it encourages executives to maximize 
their effort and enhance shareholder wealth (Pepper et al., 2013). The key metric which 
influences the outcome is pay-performance sensitivity. It measures the degree of interest 
alignment between executives and shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Firth et al., 2007). 
Pepper et al. (2013) also report that LTIP accounts for around 38% and 33% of total earnings 
of executives in the FTSE 100 and FTSE mid-250, respectively. This suggests that the 
introduction of LTIPs in compensation packages has become more prevalent. Despite this 
popularity, there has been disquiet among multi-institutions on how successful LTIPs actually 
are in achieving these two objectives and their benefits. This disquiet has been reinstated in the 
academic enquiry by Buck et al. (2003). A greater focus on linking equity-based pay to firm 
performance has resulted in the innovation of the design of LTIPs which has eventually led to 
greater variations in compensation practices (Bruce et al., 2005). Though, how effective the 
introduction of these long-term incentive schemes has been, is an issue which is yet to be 
explored. 
In prior literature, greater focus has been given to compensation of CEO. The main reason 
behind it is that CEO equity incentives are much bigger than that of CFO. Considering the fact 
that CFO acts as an agent of CEO, it would be interesting to analyse how the pay-performance 
relationship holds for CFO. A greater grant of number and value of long-term incentive plans 







compensation which is more than that of CFO, thus, leading CEO to be less risk-averse than 
CFO. Although the value of performance-based shares awarded to CEO and CFO within the 
same company differs, the performance criteria on which these shares vest remain similar, 
making it interesting to investigate pay for performance association for both CEO and CFO.  
Our study analyses a sample of 237 non-financial firms of UK FTSE 350 Index from 2010 until 
2014 (excluding financial services and investment trusts). The broad conclusions of the study 
are as follows: firstly, the level of executive compensation has increased significantly between 
2010 and 2014 for both CEOs and CFOs. Secondly, the structure of executive compensation 
has also changed; whereby a shift in the landscape of executive compensation from granting 
base pay towards granting of stock options and performance share plans has been noticed. The 
results show that there exists a positive link between previous year’s total shareholder return 
and different components of CEO pay except for equity pay. The findings are similar in the 
case of CFO as well. However, there exists a positive link between all components of CEO/CFO 
pay and long-term firm performance. 
This chapter makes several contributions. It is the first in investigating pay-performance 
relationship for CFOs. Additionally, we contribute to the literature by making a clear distinction 
between different measures of firm performance and executive compensation (realized pay, 
equity pay, and total remuneration) in ways that existing studies have not considered as yet. 
Finally, we examine the impact of various numbers and amount of LTIPs granted on the pay-
performance relationship. To date, there is no concrete evidence provided in the previous 
literature towards examining the pay-performance sensitivity of different LTIPs.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: in Section 4.2, literature is reviewed and 
hypotheses are proposed. In Section 4.3, the impacts of corporate governance and control 







data and sample statistics, Section 4.6 focuses on empirical results while Section 4.7 shows the 
results of the robustness tests undertaken. Finally, Section 4.8 provides the conclusion and 
implication of the results derived. 
 
4.2 Related Literature and Development of the Hypotheses 
As reviewed in Section 3.2.1, two broadly competing models, the managerial power theory and 
the agency theory are used to examine executive compensation results. In keeping with the 
agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) advocate that executives’ reward structure should 
be constructed in such a way that it is positively associated with firm performance. However, 
it is also noted that this positive association is not always achievable due to the problems arising 
as part of the conflicts in the interests that separate the ownership and control in the company 
(Conyon et al., 2000). 
Managerial power theory challenges the agency theory perspective by asserting that the 
executives occupy the most powerful position in a company and this provides sufficient 
discretion to set contractual terms without intervention and generates generous pay schemes 
(Bebchuk et al., 2002). Further on, Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that the building block of 
managerial power approach is the “pay camouflage”, where pay packages are constructed in 
such ways that appear to be complex and opaque, therefore making these packages different 
from the optimal contracting view of the agency theory. Agency theory stresses the need for 
the agents to maximise shareholder wealth in order to achieve higher rewards.  
Based on the above argument, the following hypotheses shall be tested: 
Hypothesis 4.1: A higher level of company performance positively affects CEO/CFO 







Turning towards long-term incentives, their stated purpose is to prevent executives from getting 
undeserved profits and to influence managers to make decisions that are in the best interest of 
the shareholders. One of the first research studies in analysing long-term incentive plans has 
been carried out by Buck et al. (2003). The authors analyse how the use of LTIPs in a 
compensation package influence the pay-performance sensitivity for UK firms from 1997 to 
1998. The results of their study indicate that firms which employ LTIPs award higher absolute 
pay to executives, while pay-performance sensitivity reduces in comparison to firms which do 
not award LTIPs. LTIPs are three-year plans and were introduced in 1995, but the sample 
analysed by Buck et al. (2003) was from 1996 and employ one-year performance. These are the 
shortcomings of their study. The authors also state that in isolation, LTIPs have a mechanical 
relation with performance conditions attached to the company’s share price. 
Kuang and Qin (2009) study whether traditional or performance-vested stock options lead to 
greater interest alignment with shareholders by increasing their wealth for UK firms. They 
consider only stock option as an element of equity compensation and their results show that 
pay-performance sensitivity increases with the use of performance-vested stock options over 
traditional time-based options. Similar to Buck et al. (2003), the limitation of this study is that 
they fail to consider three-year performance in examining the pay-performance sensitivity. On 
the other hand, Cao and Halloran (2012) explore whether Irish companies which adopt LTIPs 
perform better than others. The authors find no evidence of a relationship between the adoption 
of LTIPs and firm performance. 
Presently, equity grants have performance conditions attached to them and these designs vary 
depending upon the objectives of the company. If LTIPs consist of multiple performance 
measures, it is difficult to assess how challenging these performance measures are. Opponents 







performance conditions are either too demanding or undemanding. In this present study, we 
take into account all the components of long-term incentive plans (options, performance share 
plans, matching plans and others) in our analysis. In the past, most researchers like Buck et al. 
(2003) employed the expected or granted value of long-term incentive plans in their equity 
valuation. We include the actual vested value (also called, payout) from share options, 
performance shares, and matching plans in our study which will be discussed in Section 4.4.1. 
Next, the focus will be on the complexity in the design of executive compensation contracts. 
For example, in 2010 Reed Elsevier operates four long-term incentive plans with performance 
conditions that have different vesting scales attached to them. LTIPs awarded by them, as usual, 
vest after three years and include one performance share plan, one share option plan and one 
matching plan. 
For the matching plan, namely, the Reed Elsevier Growth Plan, each performance measure- 
EPS, TSR, and return on invested capital (ROIC)- vests on one-third of the total after attainment 
of performance targets. For TSR, due to the global nature of Reed Elsevier’s business, a 
comparator group from different relative market indices (FTSE 100 for Sterling, Euro next for 
Euro and S&P 100 for U.S Dollar Comparator Group) has been included. TSR performance of 
Reed Elsevier should be above the median performance in order to trigger a minimum reward 
that will result in 30% of the equity vesting. In order for the executives to achieve the maximum 
reward of a 100%, TSR performance should be in the upper quartile, relative to the comparator 
group of companies as defined above. When shares vest, the restrictions are lifted on 
executives’ ownership. However, the minimum threshold target for EPS absolute growth is 5% 
and for ROIC is 10%, while maximum threshold targets are 9% for EPS absolute growth and 







For the share option plan to vest, the adjusted EPS growth should be between 6% for minimum 
threshold and 8% for the maximum threshold. Nonetheless, for both the plans discussed above, 
there is a straight line vesting between these minimum and maximum thresholds which depend 
on the level of growth. Lastly, for the LTIP plan, the performance condition puts an equal 
proportion on EPS and TSR. TSR is benchmarked relative to Eurozone and S&P 100 
comparator groups and EPS has a similar condition to that of share options.  Considering the 
various equity plans, comparator groups and performance measures, the design of 
compensation packages of Reed Elsevier becomes more complex in nature. 
Since LTIPs are three-year plans, it would be reasonable to consider a performance of three 
years which would reflect a more robust picture of pay for performance relationship. There 
exists the possibility that the firm which operates a greater number of components in the LTIPs 
has performance targets that might not be based solely on increasing shareholder value. 
In the past, managers have received higher rewards with minimal effort but with an adoption of 
long-term incentives, more effort is required to achieve higher compensation, else the 
performance targets will be missed. This practice is in line with agency theory as it aligns the 
interests of executives with that of shareholders (Kuang and Qin, 2009). So, the firms which 
grant a greater number of LTIPs achieving these performance targets will result in a higher 
compensation than the firms which grant a lesser number of LTIPs. 
Additionally, Cao and O’Halloran (2012) argue that LTIPs could also provide opportunities to 
tilt the compensation package in the executives’ favour which may lead to managerial rent 
extraction. Also, the company which grants greater value of equity compensation to their 
executives reflects an influence of CEO power over the pay setting process. Therefore, such 
schemes may be used to camouflage CEO power from public scrutiny over the design of 







Buck et al. (2003) document that the presence of LTIP award in a compensation package 
reduces the pay-performance sensitivity. This raises a doubt about the effectiveness of long-
term incentives and motivates us to investigate whether the presence of various long-term 
incentive plans influences the pay-performance responsiveness. Pay-performance 
responsiveness measures the percentage responsiveness of pay to a percentage change in 
performance. LTIPs are granted to solve agency problems and within LTIPs, if an increase in 
shareholder wealth leads to an increase in compensation, it solves the agency problem. The 
presence of a negative or insignificant relationship will show that managers use incentives in 
their own favour, implying the prevalence of managerial power perspective. Overall, this makes 
it interesting to analyse how LTIPs influence the pay-performance sensitivity.  
Based on the discussion above, the acceptance of hypothesis 4.2 will be consistent with the 
principal-agent theory. 
Hypothesis 4.2: The greater the number of long-term incentive components granted to 
executives in a compensation package, the stronger the pay-TSR performance responsiveness. 
There has been a decrease in the use of share options since the mid-2000s. The current practice 
is for firms instead to grant performance share plans in their compensation contracts (Main, 
2010; Conyon et al., 2010). As can be seen from the descriptive statistics of Zakaria (2012), 
both options and PSPs employ a mix of EPS and TSR as the performance measure. However, 
TSR is more popular among PSPs. Thus, the inclusion of performance share plans can lead to 
greater pay-performance responsiveness than it would for share options. 








4.3 Effects of Corporate Governance and Control Variables on the Level of 
Compensation 
In this section, we also control for and are interested in examining the corporate governance 
mechanisms to analyze whether they have explanatory power in explaining the level of 
compensation. According to prior literature, weaker corporate governance mechanisms have an 
influence on the magnitude and the composition of executive compensation (Sigler, 2011). 
Following Sapp (2008) and Ozkan (2011), in terms of corporate governance controls, we use 
the following variables- board size, non-executive directors, chair duality and institutional 
ownership. 
Board Size 
Prior empirical studies document that the size of the board impacts its ability to control and 
monitor the firm activities (Sigler, 2011). Yermack (1996) argues that smaller boards are 
considered to be effective than boards with a greater number of directors. Smaller boards 
process information quicker and enhance communication level among top management and 
executives in a firm (Zahra et al., 2000).  
Previous studies show a positive association between board size and CEO compensation (e.g. 
Guest, 2010; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2010). This association can be explained from large 
boards that do not play an effective role, thereby hindering efficient monitoring, communication 
and decision making which results in greater CEO compensation. On the other side, it has been 
argued that large boards are valuable since it brings on board the expertise and knowledge of 
the board members. Also, there exists literature which finds negative or no effect of board size 
on the level of compensation. For example, Firth et al. (2007) show that there exists a negative 







positive impact of board size on one of the important components of compensation, namely, 
equity compensation (Mehran, 1995; Core et al. 1999; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). 
Chair Duality 
Traditionally, both in the US and in the UK, it was common for CEOs to be also the chairman 
of the board. Core et al. (1999) argue that CEO-chair duality enhances greater executive control 
in determining the level and the structure of their executive compensation. In this context, 
previous studies show mixed results. The findings from the studies by Conyon (1997) and 
Conyon and Peck (1998) indicate that there is no significant association between chair duality 
and managerial compensation. Whereas, Brick et al. (2006) conclude that firms where CEOs is 
also chairman of the board, they receive greater total compensation. 
Non-executive directors 
Although non-executive directors are part of the board, they do not have any active involvement 
in the day to day operations of the business. However, they are considered to play an effective 
role in monitoring activities of the company to protect shareholders’ interests and solve agency 
problems. Concerning empirical evidence, however, literature does not provide us with a 
consistent conclusion on whether a greater percentage of non-executives on the board 
influences the levels of compensation. For example, Sapp (2008), Fahlenbrach (2009) and 
Guest (2010) find a negative association between non-executive directors and the level of 
executive compensation. Similarly, Mehran (1995) indicates that boards with greater 
percentage of non-executive directors are awarded a lesser cash compensation but a greater 
equity compensation. This result suggests that non-executives provide a monitoring role by 
awarding greater equity compensation as it aligns the interests of shareholders with those of 







is an insignificant association between percentage of non-executive directors and cash 
compensation, signifying non-executive directors do not provide an effective monitoring role. 
CEO/ CFO Age and Tenure   
CEO tenure is the number of years they have served in the company. Hill and Phan (1991) 
argue that the longer CEO tenure is, the more they get paid. Also, Janakiraman et al. (2010) and 
Allgood et al. (2012) find a positive association between tenure and compensation. The latter 
suggests that this positive association reflects CEO entrenchment. CEO tends to gain more 
power as their tenure in the company lengthens which also results in their ability to influence 
the pay setting process. Devers et al. (2007) suggest that age is an important proxy for 
experience and is directly associated with CEO compensation. Watson (1994) finds age to be a 
significant determinant for CEO compensation in non-financial firms.  
Ownership structure 
In prior literature, for ownership structure, the researchers tend to employ shares owned by 
institutional investor as a proxy. The presence of institutional owners is believed to be vital to 
corporate governance practices in terms of the level as well as the structure of executive 
compensation (Ozkan, 2011). They are considered to be effective monitors due to their greater 
ownership within the company. Following Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Sapp (2008), this 
variable is used as one of the indicators of corporate governance quality. 
Firm Size 
Firm size has received greater attention in the literature on executive compensation. As firm 
size increases, the complexity of the organization also increases. Due to a competitive labour 
market for executives, this enables the large firms to attract more talented CEOs to be employed 







(2010) and Gregg et al. (2012) indicate that firm size is an important determinant in explaining 
executive compensation. Previous studies employ market capitalization as a proxy for firm size 




In our study, we employ several different measures of executive compensation. Base pay is the 
fixed amount received for the financial year. Bonus is the amount paid for the financial year 
inclusive of any deferred element (provided there is no performance requirement on release) 
and is paid in either cash or shares. Total short-term pay includes base salary and annual bonus 
amount. Equity compensation or long-term performance-based pay is measured as the granted 
value of performance shares, option grants, granted value of matching plans, vested value of 
performance share plans, exercised value of options, and vested value of matching plans. Total 
remuneration includes total cash plus the granted value of long-term incentives for that financial 
year. 
Total realized pay is a measure of the sum of base pay, bonus and the vested value of long-term 
incentives (options, performance share plans, matching plans and others that are vested for the 
financial year). In MEIS’ database, the granted value of stock options is valued at 25% of the 
exercise value. This method is also followed by (Core et al., 1999; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 
2009). Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) study option valuation using the Black-Scholes 
method and the method described above shows a positive correlation of 0.97, as also observed 
by previous researchers (Lambert et al., 1993; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998). Berrone and 
Gomez-Mejia (2009) show almost identical results while using two different estimation 







the vested values of share options and PSPs are the actual shares figures which have been 
exercised or given to executives after the actual attainment of the performance conditions.  
Performance Variables 
We employ market-based measure to investigate the relationship between compensation and 
firm performance. For this, we analyse both long-term and short-term stock returns; we measure 
long-term stock returns as previous three-year returns to shareholders from Datastream Return 
Index, which includes dividend reinvested, provided by Datastream. However, for short-term 
performance, it is the previous one-year return (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Conyon and Sadler, 
2001). The performance variable is lagged one year as compensation will be influenced by the 
performance of the previous year (Ozkan, 2011; Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  
In our model, we also consider a three-year shareholder return to analyse its impact on the level 
of equity pay, total remuneration, and total realized. The objective of this study is to shed light 
on the relationship between CEO/CFO compensation and firm’s short term and long-term 
performance for FTSE 350 UK companies. 
Plan Types 
Long-term incentives are awarded in different forms such as share options, matching plans, 
performance share plans, etc. For a plan, specific dummy, we exclude short-term incentive 
plans or bonuses, since they are not categorized as long-term plans. We also exclude one-off 
LTIPs, for example, turnaround plans, acquisition plans, retention plans and plans for the 
recruitment purpose. Rarely, firms offer five-year plans that are initially for three years, but 
once the three years have lapsed, the LTIP can be further extended to another two years. 
However, these have been excluded from our sample as they do not reflect the value of 







not provide sufficient information on long-term incentive plans. Lastly, for the purpose of this 
study, companies which grant shares with zero exercise price are labelled under the “share 
options” category in annual reports. Similar to Zakaria (2012), we too classify them under 
performance share plans category. 
Control Variables 
As discussed earlier, corporate governance variables used in this study consist of the sum of the 
top 4 institutional ownership, which is the number of institutional shareholders who own more 
than 5% of the company’s common shares. CEO chair duality is when the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board. Board size is the number of directors on the board. The percentage of 
non-executives is the total number of non-executive members on the board. Lastly, firm size is 
measured by market capitalization (Kuang and Qin, 2009). 
 
4.3.2 Model Estimation 
To explore the link between compensation and performance, we use multivariate analysis after 
controlling for corporate governance mechanisms and firm-specific variables. Firstly, we test 
the association between the level of compensation and short-term firm performance. The link 
between compensation and long-term firm performance is also studied. Subsequently, we 
examine the impact of different number of LTIPs on pay-performance responsiveness. Finally, 
we explore the pay-performance responsiveness in different types of plans. Following Murphy 
(1999) and Gregg et al. (2012), we take a log for the compensation variable which is our 
dependent variable, since it helps us to interpret the pay-performance elasticity.  
We estimate the following model in order to investigate how firm performance influences the 








𝐿𝑛 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 =         
                                  𝛼 +   𝛽1  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1→𝑡  +  ∑ ƴ𝑗  𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑗=1   +
                                  𝑛  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1 + ԑ 𝑖,𝑡                                                                                           (4.1) 
i is the transcript for the firms while t is for the time period. ɛit is the error term and the 
dependent variable “Compensation” consists of total short-term pay, equity pay, realized pay 
and total pay.  
The coefficient of firm performance (𝛽1) measures the pay performance elasticity. From an 
agency perspective, a higher level of company performance is positively associated with future 
pay. So, we expect the coefficient of firm performance to be positive and significant.  
Model 2 
𝐿𝑛 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛿1𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑇𝑆𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−3→𝑡 + 𝐵1 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 1  𝑖,𝑡−3 +
                                           𝐵2 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 2  𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝐵3 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 3  𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝐵4 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 4  𝑖,𝑡−3+ 
                                           𝐵5  𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 1 𝑖,𝑡−3𝑇𝑆𝑅 𝑖,𝑡−3→𝑡 + 𝐵6 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 2 𝑖,𝑡−3𝑇𝑆𝑅 𝑖,𝑡−3→𝑡 + 
                                           𝐵7 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 3 𝑖,𝑡−3𝑇𝑆𝑅 i,𝑡−3→𝑡 + 𝐵8 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 4 𝑖,𝑡−3𝑇𝑆𝑅 𝑖,𝑡−3→𝑡 +
                                          ∑ ƴ𝑗  𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1 + ԑ 𝑖,𝑡   (1.2) 
ɛit is the error term and the dependent variable “Compensation” consists of total remuneration, 
total realized pay, and long-term pay. Since long-term incentives are three-year plans, we use 
3-year lag for a number of long-term incentives granted by the company. For example, any 
LTIP award granted in 2007 will only vest in 2010.  
To investigate pay performance responsiveness within the different number of plans, initially, 
we assign dummies to represent the different numbers of long-term incentives granted by the 







1.2. Including these dummies will give an indication whether there are different pay levels 
within different long-term incentive plans. To test the existence of pay-performance 
responsiveness, we create four dummy interaction variables between each LTIP plan and three-
year shareholder returns. Lastly, we also investigate the incentive strength within different 
number of long-term incentives by taking the natural logarithm of value of long-term incentives 
granted. A higher positive value corresponds to greater importance of amount awarded to 
CEO/CFO. 
The regression model can be expressed as follows: 
Model 3 
𝐿𝑛 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛿1 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑇𝑆𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−3→𝑡 +
                                              𝐵2 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑃𝑆𝑃 𝑖,𝑡−3 +  𝐵3 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑖,𝑡−3 +
                                             𝐵4  𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑃𝑆𝑃 𝑖,𝑡−3𝑇𝑆𝑅 𝑖,𝑡−3→𝑡 + 𝐵5 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑖,𝑡−3𝑇𝑆𝑅 𝑖,𝑡−3→𝑡 +
                                             ∑ ƴ𝑗  𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛a𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑗=1    + 𝑛  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + ԑ 𝑖,𝑡     (1.3) 
Lastly, to test the existence of pay-performance responsiveness within the type of plans, in 
Model 2, we replace the dummy number plans with dummy type plans. Therefore, “Dummy 
plan PSP” is defined as 1 if the company grants only performance share plans in their 
compensation contract and zero-otherwise. The dummy for option is also constructed in a 
similar way. Also, we create a dummy interaction between each type of plan and three-year 
shareholder return. Our alternative hypothesis predicts that higher pay-performance 
responsiveness is associated with the use of PSPs rather than for options. As seen in the study 
by Zakaria (2012), PSPs mostly have TSR performance condition attached to them in 
comparison to share options. The use of PSP could be employed as a proxy for presence of TSR 







Following previous studies on CEO compensation, we include firm and time fixed effects. In 
our estimation, standard errors are robust to clustering at the firm level. In the strand of 
corporate governance literature (e.g. executive compensation models), there are concerns over 
endogeneity, so by taking lags of the explanatory variable, this problem in the regression models 
can be minimized (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Some researchers argue that not only 
performance influences compensation but also the compensation is a motivating factor for the 
executive to perform in the future. So, there is a two-way relationship between compensation 
and performance; however, as we consider one year lag for the performance measures we can 
minimize this issue. 
 
4.4 Data  
4.4.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction 
The initial sample of executive compensation consists of 237 firms of UK FTSE 350 Index 
from 2010 to 2014 (excluding firms from financial services and investment trusts). 
Additionally, to be included in a regression, a firm must have valid data on total shareholder 
return for three years- i.e. if the LTIP plan has been implemented in 2007, then we consider 
firm performance from 2007 to 2010, as that effects the compensation/LTIP vested value for 
the year 2010. Similarly, for LTIP awarded in 2008, we consider the performance from 2008 
to 2011 and so on, each year after plan implementation until 2011. Thus, we consider three-
year performance and valid data on corporate governance variables in our analysis, therefore, 
resulting in the final sample to be reduced and unbalanced with 225 firms for the CEOs and 
223 firms for the CFOs. 
The data used in this study has been gathered from various sources. For instance, compensation 







manually collected data, where information was unavailable on the MEIS database from annual 
reports. Information, concerning the numbers, types, and value of LTIPs granted by firms from 
2007 to 2011 and whether these granted LTIPs were active in each of these years, has been 
hand-collected from the firms’ annual reports. The data on institutional ownership has been 
collected from Fame. Similar to Ozkan (2011), institutional ownership is measured as the sum 
of holdings of the top four institutional investors. Data for board size and chair duality has been 
collected from Bloomberg database. However, we obtained stock price and other financial data 
from Datastream based upon their FY values. Following Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Ozkan 
(2011), we use Datastream’s Total Return Index which reflects a stock’s growth in value 
assuming all dividends are re-invested. 
 
4.4.2 Sample Statistics 
Panel A of Table 4.1 presents the trends in the level of components of CEO compensation. The 
mean and the median value of CEO base salary increase from 2010 until 2014. On the other 
hand, the mean CEO short-term pay increases from £1,207,600 in 2010 to £1,347,542 in 2014 
and the total compensation from £1,845,479 in 2010 to £2,439,548 in 2014. The average value 
of equity pay increases from £939,460 in 2010 to £1,432,964 in 2014. Furthermore, the largest 
increase is in the average value of realized pay from £1,296,123 in 2010 to £2,038,142 in 2014. 
A possible explanation for this might be that over time firms have started to achieve the 
performance goals as specified in their compensation contracts. 
Panel B of Table 4.1 shows different components of CFO compensation from 2010 to 2014. 
We observe an increase in the mean and median values of CFO base pay. For the CFO, the 
largest increase has been in the average and median value of total compensation from 







average value increases from £786,214 to £1,273,896. Also, there is a small increase in short-
term pay from £705,703 to £719,382. We also observe that mean and median value for CFO 
age increases from 50 to 51 from 2010 until 2014, while an average value for CFO tenure is 
more or less 6 years.  
Panel C of Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics for components of CEO and CFO 
compensation within different numbers of long-term incentives awarded by the company. As 
shown in the table, firms which operate multiple long-term incentives differ significantly in the 
ways they compensate their CEOs and CFOs. The average value of CEO (and CFO) total pay 
increases from £1,941,436 (£1,193,436) to £6,997,678 (£3,119,818). It is noted that the 
companies which operate two, three or four long-term incentives award higher realized pay by 
15%, 29% and 34%, respectively. 
Panel E of Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for board size, the sum of top 4 institutional 
ownerships, age and tenure of the CEO. As can be seen from the table, the median value for 
board size is 9 and the mean value is close to 9 for each year which is consistent with Ozkan 
(2007). However, there is not much variation in the average institutional ownership during our 
sample period. The average age of CEO is around 52 and CFO is around 50. While, on an 
average, for our sample period, the tenure of CEO is more or less 7 years, whereas, the average 
tenure of CFO is around 6 years. Finally, the average % of non-executive directors range from 
55.5% to 57.3%. 
Panel F of Table 4.1 reports that the mean value of three years TSR varies for our sample period 
and the mean ranging from 0.21 to 0.63 but there exists less variation in one year TSR of the 
company. 
In Panel G of Table 4.1, we discuss correlation matrix of main independent variables used in 







Turning towards other control variables, we find very low correlations (Panel G of Table 4.1). 
Furthermore, we present an evaluation of the variance inflation factor (VIF) in Panel H of Table 
4.1. Multicollinearity is not likely to be a problem in our multivariate test because no VIF 










Panel A: The descriptive statistics of components of CEO Compensation (Pounds) 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Base Salary (£)      
Mean 563,267 575,212 595,045 584,643 604,158 
Median 522,800 517,566 533,000 527,000 543,000 
      
Bonus (£)      
Mean 718,380 645,366 630,705 636,725 634,893 
Median 500,000 501,404 433,500 465,500 604,158 
      
Short Term Pay (£)        
Mean 1,207,600 1,158,252 1,255,178 1,309,722 1,347,542 
Median 1,000,000 1,040,920 1,113,500 1,157,000 1,293,018 
      
Equity Pay (£)      
Mean  939,460 1,180,521 1,696,440 1,642,955 1,432,964 
Median  516,978 752,243 968,292 1,023,114 1,047,638 
      
Realized Pay (£)      
Mean 1,296,123 1,635,151 2,018,496 2,037,154 2,038,142 
Median 1,100,000 1,266,373 1,418,752 1,494,677 1,523,211 
      
Total Pay (£)      
Mean  1,845,479 2,173,139 2,686,979 2,655,696 2,439,458 











Panel B: The descriptive statistics of components of CFO Compensation (Pounds) 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Base Salary (£) 
     
Mean 363,119 373,576 374,442 381,408 401,521 
Median 326,000 340,000 344,000 357,500 386,110 
 
     
Bonus (£) 
     
Mean 346,617 373,576 317,319 322,954 317,861 
Median 292,500 305,206 253,000 289,720 308,000 
 
     
Short Term Pay (£) 
     
Mean 705,703 735,885 690,134 693,374 719,382 
Median 617,000 655,495 594,463 630,000 710,666 
 
     
Equity Pay (£) 
     
Mean  487,996 584,921 829,249 833,773 860,031 
Median  303,211 310,287 471,920 529,998 639,226 
 
     
Realized Pay (£) 
     
Mean 786,214 1,010,051 1,196,986 1,128,793 1,273,896 
Median 659,213 803,169 819,501 872,200 941,000 
      
Total Pay (£)      
Mean 1,062,704 1,386,209 1,570,582 1,529,118 1,583,531 













Panel C: CEO and CFO compensation within different number of long-term incentives 
awarded (Pounds) 
 
Variable Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 
Base Salary (£) 
    
CEO 556,073 607,549 714,061 981,833 
CFO 360,338 394,226 455,840 581,500 
 
    
Bonus (£) 
    
CEO 519,586 632,625 850,420 988,500 
CFO 307,203 355,628 403,913 608,155 
     
Short Term Pay (£)  
    
CEO 1,077,753 1,231,929 1,506,773 1,970,333 
CFO 649,220 745,138 859,392 976,440 
 
    
Equity Pay (£) 
    
CEO  1,068,767 1,784,975 2,736,854 5,027,344 
CFO 599,298 822,616 1,840,030 2,192,858 
 
    
 
Realized Pay (£)     
CEO 1,448,453 2,215,911 3,628,373 5,237,313 
CFO 889,541 1,149,597 2,113,304 2,938,108 
     
Total Pay (£)     
CEO  1,941,436 2,985,804 4,822,604 6,997,678 









Panel D: Descriptive statistics on average number of active long-term incentive plans 
granted three-years before the compensation is awarded 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
      






Panel E: The descriptive statistics of board size, % of 4 largest institutional ownership, % of 




2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
       
Board_size Mean 8.9 8.9 9.1 9.1 8.8 
 Median 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 
4_largest_institutional % Mean 31.6 30.3 31.6 31.6 29.1 
 Median 28.3 27.9 28.1 28.1 26.6 
Market_cap Mean 20.9 21.1 21.3 21.5 21.6 
 Median 20.8 20.9 21.1 21.3 21.4 
Non_exec % Mean 55.5 55.8 56.2 57.1 57.3 
 Median 55.2 55.6 56.2 57.0 57.2 
CEO Age Mean 51.8 51.7 52.4 52.4 52.7 
 
Median 51.5 51.0 52.0 53.0 52.0 
CEO Tenure Mean 7.1 7.1 7.5 7.3 6.7 
 
Median 6.0 5.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
CFO Age Mean 49.0 48.8 49.2 49.7 50.8 
  Median 48.0 49.0 49.0 50.0 51.0 
CFO Tenure Mean 5.0 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.6 
 











Panel F: The descriptive statistics of financial performance of the firm 
 
 
Variable  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
       
TSR (1 year) Mean 0.37 0.07 0.21 0.33 0.27 
 
Median 0.30 0.04 0.21 0.29 0.26 
TSR (3 year) Mean 0.21 0.87 0.74 0.76 0.63 
 





Panel G: Correlation Matrix of Main Independent Variables 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Age 1 
      
 
(2) Tenure 0.29*** 1 
     
 
(3) CEO_chair_dual 0.07** 0.07** 1 
    
 
(4) Board_size 0.07** -0.08** 0.00 1 
   
 
(5) Non_exec % -0.02 -0.10*** 0.02 -0.10*** 1 
  
 
(6) 4_larget_institutional % 0.02 0.11*** 0.02 -0.08** -0.05 1   
(7) Market_cap 0.09*** -0.15*** 0.06 0.35*** 0.15* ** -0.19*** 1  
(8) TSR 0.01 0.06* -0.03 -0.05** -0.01 0.10*** 0.02 1 
 
Panel G reports the correlation matrix of the main independent variables. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 

















Panel H: VIF Test Results 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
Age 1.15 0.866 
Tenure 1.19 0.843 
CEO_chair_dual 1.01 0.987 
Board_size 1.36 0.734 
Non_exec % 1.09 0.914 
4_larget_institutional % 1.07 0.938 
TSR 1.03 0.971 
Market_cap 1.38 0.725 
   
Mean VIF 1.16 
 
 
   
4.4.3 Panel Data-Fixed Effects Model 
The panel data has been used by previous studies on executive compensation, e.g. Ozkan 
(2011), who implemented panel data analysis between the periods 2007-2012, testing 
performance variables on compensation variables. Also, similar to other executive 
compensation studies (e.g. Conyon, 2014; Brick et al., 2006), this study employs fixed effects 
since it removes individial-specific unobserved effects.37 The sample consists of firms with 
varying sizes, so there is a chance of the existence of differences amongst these firms that 
consist of management quality and the firm’s organizational structure. In this case, the fixed 
effect estimator is applied to test the relationship between compensation and performance in 
order to allow for this unobserved heterogeneity, as each firm has a different strategy on 
executive compensation and a different style of management. By applying the fixed effect 
approach, the estimation helps to remove much of the error variance that is due to the distortions 
                                                 
 
37 Note: In order to select between the fixed effects and random effects estimator, we conduct the Hausman test 







arising from the individual differences between groups that come from the omitted variables or 
the unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with the regressors. 
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, we analyse the association between the level of compensation and firm 
performance after controlling for corporate governance mechanisms. The results in Panel A of 
Table 4.2 demonstrates that short-term firm performance is significantly related to all 
components of CEO compensation, except for equity pay. In Column 3, the coefficient for total 
shareholder return is 0.102 and statistically significant at 1% level in determining realized pay. 
This estimate implies that CEO will receive an increase of 1.02% in realized pay for a 10 
percentage point increase in total shareholder return. However, 10 percentage point increase in 
total shareholder return has immediate 0.2% increase on CEO short-term pay. One possible 
explanation for this result is that short-term pay is also sensitive to short-term firm performance 
since it includes the elements of bonus, which are directly associated with one year performance 
condition. The study by Bruce et al. (2007) which employs short-term pay as a proxy for 
executive compensation and finds coefficient of a similar magnitude. Overall, these results are 
consistent with the findings of Gregg et al. (2005) and Ozkan (2011). 
The results in Column 3 of Table 2 (Panel A) reveal that the coefficient on firm performance is 
insignificant and positive in explaining equity compensation. A possible explanation for this 
result is that since equity compensation contains components which are associated with three-
year firm performance, so a one-year performance, alone, will not determine the level of equity 
compensation. Taken together, these results strongly indicate that financial indicators of FTSE 
350 firms impact the level and structure of the compensation, except for equity compensation. 







compensated for adding to the success of the firm and this is consistent with the findings of 
Core et al. (1999) and Brick et al. (2006). The adjusted R2 of the regression is 73% for short 
term pay, 63% for equity pay, 72% for total compensation and 73% for total realized pay, 
showing higher explanatory power for all model specifications. 
Turning towards a discussion on control variables, market capitalization has a significant and 
positive impact on equity pay, realized pay, and total pay. These findings are in line with 
Conyon and Murphy (2000). However, the magnitude of the coefficient on market 
capitalization in determining equity pay is the greatest. Usually, large firms have a complex 
structure of executive compensation with a greater capacity to granting higher incentive 
compensation to retain talented CEOs than smaller firms. CEO tenure influences all elements 
of CEO compensation, suggesting that CEOs who stay longer in the company get paid more 
since they have greater control and power. Also, the size of the coefficient on tenure is greater 
when we use equity pay as a dependent variable. These results are consistent with those of 
Allgood et al. (2012) and Janakiraman et al. (2010). However, there exists an insignificant 
relationship between components of CEO pay and CEO duality. Untabulated results reveal that 
very few firms engage in chair duality. The CEOs in firms with chair duality are not awarded a 
higher pay than firms where CEO is not the chairman of the board. This finding is congruent 
with the results of Conyon and Peck (1998) but different to that of Core et al. (1999). 
The results also show that there exists an insignificant relationship between components of 
compensation and board size. These findings are contrary to those of Firth et al. (2007), who 
find a negative association between compensation and board size, implying that boards play an 
effective role in monitoring executive compensation. We also note from the results that the 
coefficient of top 4 institutional ownership concentration is negative and significant in 







solely concerned about components of CEO pay which include performance-based elements 
and are open to manipulation. While the presence of institutional investors has no impact on 
short-term pay, a greater concentration of institutional owners monitors only specific 
components of CEO compensation. Overall, this finding is consistent with the previous 
empirical evidence reported by Ozkan (2007) and Hartzell and Starks (2003), who find that 
institutional shareholders are active and their greater concentration leads to lower levels of 
compensation. Concerning percentage of non-executive directors, the coefficient is negative 
and significant with all measures except for short-term pay. This implies that firms with greater 
non-executive directors on board offer lower levels of equity pay, realized pay and total pay. 
These results are consistent with that of Mehran (1995) but contrary to Ozkan (2007) and Frank 
et al. (2001). 
The first three columns in Table 4.2 of Panel B report the association between components of 
pay and long-term firm performance. Since LTIPs are three-year plans, we use three year TSR 
to study its impact on the level of equity pay, realized pay, and total pay. The results indicate 
that there is a significant relationship between components of compensation and long-term firm 
performance but the magnitude of the coefficients on shareholder returns varies for different 
elements of CEO compensation. Additionally, equity pay, realized pay and total pay are 
positively related to long-term performance and statistically significant at 1% level. However, 
the coefficient on long-term shareholder return is higher in determining equity pay. The results 
in Column 1 of this Table show that a CEO will receive an increase of 2.01% in equity pay for 
a 10% increase in three-year shareholder return; while 10 percentage point increase in three-
year shareholder return corresponds to 1.23% increase in realized pay. These findings are in 
line with the principle-agent theory, showing that executives are compensated to act in the best 







Additionally, in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4.2 (Panel B), we also include an interaction of long-
run performance (three-year TSR) with a number of long-term incentives granted by the 
company. We note that the coefficients on Dummy plan 2 × TSR and Dummy plan 3 × TSR 
are positive and statistically significant at 1% level, indicating that firms which grant greater 
number of plans strengthen the link between pay and performance. 
In realized pay specification, adjusting for logarithms, the coefficient on Dummy plan 2 × TSR 
tells us that, on an average, 10 percentage point increase in TSR will bring 1.44 % increase in 
realized pay, which is less than 1.86 % increase, due to the presence of three long-term incentive 
plans in compensation contracts.38 The coefficient on Dummy plan 1 × TSR is also statistically 
significant at 10% level. This higher pay-performance responsiveness in firms which operate 
two and three plans suggest that imposing greater performance conditions encourages greater 
CEO effort. 
Conversely, the coefficient on Dummy plan 4 × TSR is negatively significant. A possible 
explanation for the negative existence of pay-performance responsiveness is that companies 
which offer four LTIPs have too many performance conditions attached that are not solely based 
on increasing shareholder value. Hence, CEOs work towards achieving too many performance 
targets which might effect the performance of the company. Consequently, an increase in 
compensation is negatively associated with total shareholder return. Irrespective of whether we 
use realized pay or total pay as a proxy for compensation, in companies offering one, two or 
three plans, CEOs are awarded greater compensation for adding three year’s shareholder return. 
From the results, we observe that coefficient on dummy plans are statistically significant in 
                                                 
 
38 Note: In order to find pay-performance responsiveness for firms which operate 2 plans, we only use coefficient 
of Dummy_plan_2*TSR (0.144) and do not add the coefficient of TSR (0.016) because it is statistically 








determining the components of CEO compensation. The companies which use two or three 
long-term incentives award a higher realized pay and total pay than companies which do not 
include long-term incentives in their compensation contracts.  
Turning now to the incentive strength of the number of long-term incentive plans, Panel C of 
Table 4.2 shows that there exists strong evidence that higher incentives granted within two and 
three plans strengthen the link between realized pay and firm performance. These results remain 
consistent when using total pay as a dependent variable. Overall, these results lead us to suggest 
that for CEOs, the number of plans is equally motivating as the value of incentives within one, 
two and three plans being offered by the company. 
Now, we attempt to explore the pay-performance responsiveness within the type of plans (i.e. 
stock options and performance share plans). In order to explain pay-performance 
responsiveness, we include an interaction between total shareholder return and performance 
share plans dummy granted by the company. The dummy interaction for share option is also 
constructed in a similar way. In Column 1 of Table 4.2 (Panel D), results show that the 
coefficient on Dummy PSP × TSR is significant at 5% level and it also shows 10 percentage 
point increase in TSR corresponds to 1.46% [i.e., 10 × (0.054+ 0.092) %] increase in realized 
pay when PSPs are included in compensation contracts. Whereas the coefficient on Dummy 
Option × TSR is positive but statistically insignificant in determining realized pay. Thus, the 
presence of PSP induces CEO to put greater effort that will lead to alignment between CEO 
and shareholders interest. One possible explanation for this is that since TSR, as a performance 
condition, is more commonly employed in PSPs, this leads to an increase in pay-performance 
sensitivity. Also, analyzing the strength measurement, the positive significance of ln (Value 
PSP) implies that PSP compensation leads to larger pay-performance responsiveness relative 







We can conclude that not all companies that offer a higher number of LTIPs are compensated 
for adding shareholder wealth. Overall, our results are consistent with agency perspective, 
showing that the adoption of long-term incentives aligns executives’ interest with that of the 
shareholders. Although CEOs receive higher compensation in firms which grant four plans, 
their awards are not aligned with the shareholders’ interests. These could be a way to make the 
remuneration package appear more complex and challenging from an external perspective or, 












Panel A: CEO compensation as a function of corporate performance at previous interval (t-
1→t) 
 
This table represents the estimation of results for components of CEO compensation against short-
term firm performance (one-year return to shareholders), board size, % of non-executive directors, 
% top 4 largest institutional ownership, CEO chair duality, CEO age, CEO tenure and market 
capitalization. The dependent variable consists of (1) short-term compensation (2) equity pay (3) 
realized pay (4) total pay, expressed in the natural logarithm of their values. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variable Short term Pay Equity Pay Realized Pay Total Pay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 12.936*** 5.489* 9.452*** 12.186*** 
 (0.49) (3.24) (1.48) (1.14) 
Age 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.006 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tenure 0.011** 0.044*** 0.032*** 0.019*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO_chair_dual -0.165 0.283 -0.075 -0.051 
 (0.22) (0.43) (0.18) (0.14) 
Board_size 0.032 0.062 0.05 0.019 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Non_exec % -0.004 -0.008** -0.007** -0.005* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
4_largest_institutional % -0.001 -0.004** -0.004*** -0.003** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln_market_Cap 0.055 0.194*** 0.095** 0.051** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) 
TSR 0.023`** 0.003 0.102*** 0.073** 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
R-squared 0.81 0.76 0.81 0.81 
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.63 0.73 0.72 
Fixed firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 










Panel B: CEO compensation as a function of corporate performance at previous interval (t-
3→t) 
 
This table represents the estimation of results for different components of CEO compensation 
against long-term firm performance (three-year return to shareholders), board size, % of non-
executive directors, % of top 4 largest institutional ownership, CEO age, CEO tenure, chair duality 
and market capitalization. The dependent variable consists of (1) equity pay (2) realized pay (3) 
total pay (4) realized pay (5) total pay, expressed in the natural logarithm of their values. 
 
Variable Equity Pay 
Realized 
Pay Total Pay Realized Pay Total Pay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 6.39*** 8.921*** 5.571*** 10.932*** 5.362*** 
 (1.53) (1.38) (0.62) (1.32) (0.31) 
Age 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.006 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Tenure 0.031** 0.035*** 0.012*** 0.032*** 0.011*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
CEO_chair_dual 0.403 -0.033 0.021 -0.072 -0.038 
 (0.47) (0.16) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10) 
Board_size 0.056 0.047 0.011 0.043 0.021 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Non_exec % -0.005** -0.005** -0.002* -0.006** -0.002* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
4_largest_institutional % -0.005* -0.005*** -0.001** -0.004*** -0.001* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln_market_Cap 0.301** 0.127*** 0.079*** 0.116* 0.040*** 
 (0.13) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) 
TSR 0.201*** 0.123*** 0.092*** 0.016 0.014 
 (0.0) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) 
Dummy_plan_1    0.105** 0.044*** 
    (0.05) (0.01) 
Dummy_plan_2    0.198*** 0.082*** 
    (0.06) (0.01) 
Dummy_plan_3    0.453*** 0.268*** 
    (0.11) (0.02) 
Dummy_plan_4    0.526*** 0.201*** 
    (0.11) (0.02) 
Dummy_plan_1 × TSR    0.062* 0.072** 
    (0.03) (0.03) 
Dummy_plan_2 × TSR    0.144*** 0.065*** 
    (0.05) (0.03) 
Dummy_plan_3 × TSR    0.186** 0.055** 
    (0.08) (0.02) 
Dummy_plan_4 × TSR    -1.445** -0.395** 
    (0.61) (0.16) 
R-squared 0.78 0.79 0.84 0.80 0.87 
Adjusted R-squared 0.67 0.69 0.77 0.72 0.81 
Fixed firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 










Panel C: Multivariate model examining the effectiveness of number of plans for CEO at 
previous interval (t-3→t) 
 
This table represents the estimation of results for components of CEO compensation against long-
term firm performance (three-year return to shareholders), board size, % of non-executive 
directors, % of top 4 largest institutional ownership, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO chair duality, 
granted value, CEO value plan 1, value plan 2, value plan 3, value plan 4 and market capitalization. 
The dependent variable consists of (1) realized pay (2) total pay, expressed in the natural logarithm 
of their values.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. ***, 




Realized Pay Total Pay 
 (1) (2) 
 
Constant                
10.534*** 5.245*** 
 (1.31) (0.30) 
Age 0.007 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Tenure 0.034*** 0.012*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
CEO_chair_dual -0.072 -0.050 
 (0.17) (0.06) 
Board_size 0.048 0.011 
 (0.04) (0.01) 
Non_exec % -0.004** -0.002** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
4_largest_institutional % -0.004** -0.001* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln_market_Cap 0.115* 0.039*** 
               (0.06) (0.01) 
TSR -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
Ln_value_grant 0.033*** 0.014*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
Ln (Value_plan_1) × TSR 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln (Value_plan_2) × TSR 0.012*** 0.005*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln (Value_plan_3) × TSR 0.021*** 0.008*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
Ln (Value_plan_4) × TSR -0.002*** -0.010*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
R-squared 0.80 0.86 
Adjusted R-squared 0.72 0.80 
Fixed firm effects Yes Yes 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes 









Panel D: Multivariate model examining the effectiveness of type of plans for CEO 
 
This table represents the estimation of results for total compensation against long-term firm 
performance (three-year return to shareholders), board size, % of institutional ownership, % of top 
4 largest institutional ownership, age, tenure, chair duality, granted value, dummy option, dummy 
PSP, value option, value restricted stock share and market capitalization. The dependent variable 
consists of (1) realized pay (2) total pay (3) realized pay (4) total pay, expressed in the natural 
logarithm of their values. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 Variable Realized Pay Total Pay Realized Pay Total Pay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 10.964*** 5.501*** 10.773*** 5.384*** 
 (1.53) (0.32) (1.58) (0.33) 
Age 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Tenure 0.036*** 0.013*** 0.036*** 0.013*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
CEO_chair_dual 0.145 0.159 0.144 0.151 
 (0.53) (0.97) (0.53) (0.96) 
Board_size 0.049 0.009 0.047 0.010 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Non_exec % -0.007** -0.002* -0.008** -0.003* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
4_largest_institutional % -0.003** -0.001** -0.003** -0.001* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln_market_Cap 0.122* 0.040** 0.112* 0.034** 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) 
TSR 0.054** 0.030*** 0.059*** 0.027*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Dummy_PSP -0.009 -0.012   
 (0.03) (0.02)   
Dummy_Option 0.013 0.013   
 (0.10) (0.04)   
Dummy_PSP × TSR 0.092** 0.033***   
 (0.04) (0.00)   
Dummy_Option × TSR 0.081 0.033   
 (0.10) (0.03)   
Ln_value_grant   0.040*** 0.017*** 
   (0.01) (0.00) 
Ln (Value_PSP) × TSR   0.007*** 0.003*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln (Value_Option) × TSR   0.006 0.002 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
R-squared 0.80 0.86 0.80 0.86 
Adjusted R-squared 0.70 0.79 0.71 0.80 
Fixed firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Turning to the discussion on CFO pay, the results presented in Panel A of Table 4.3 tests the 
effect of short-term firm performance on the level of CFO short-term pay, equity pay, realized 
pay, and total pay after controlling for corporate governance variables. The findings indicate 
that the coefficient on TSR is positive and significant in determining short-term pay, realized 
pay and total pay except for equity pay. This result is consistent with that of Conyon (2014), 
who also employs three-year TSR for US firms. However, these regression results infer that a 
CFO will receive an increase of 0.5% in realized pay for a 10-percentage point increase in total 
shareholder return. Similar to the findings of CEO results, there is an insignificant association 
between equity compensation and short-term firm performance. Taken as a whole, these results 
reflect that there is an influence of firm performance to the level and structure of the CFO 
compensation, thereby, supporting the principal-agent theory. 
The results in Panel A of Table 4.3 also show that there exist insignificant associations between 
board size and components of CEO pay. These findings suggest that bigger boards do not play 
a monitoring role in the design of compensation contracts. Contrary to this, greater institutional 
ownership concentration leads to lower levels of equity pay, realized pay and total pay for CFO. 
These results imply that institutional owners show their concern on those components which 
include performance-based elements. Similar to our findings for CEO tenure, there exists a 
significant association between CFO tenure and the four components of pay, implying that 
CFOs that stay longer in the firm receive higher levels of compensation. We note that greater 
percentage of non-executive directors on board have a negative impact on equity pay, realized 
pay and total pay. In contrast to CEO findings, these results are statistically significant at 10%. 
This weak statistical evidence suggests that greater percentage of non-executive directors on 
board show a greater concern for the levels of CEO pay when compared to the results for that 
of CFO. However, we do not find any significant association between CFO age and the four 







age is an important determinant of the components of compensation. However, his study does 
not exclusively analyse for CFO, rather, it considers all executives on the board. 
Finally, the coefficients estimate for market capitalization, which is a proxy for firm size and 
are positive and significant in determining all components of pay except for short-term pay. 
These results are in line with the findings of Conyon and Murphy (2000). Usually, large sized 
companies have a complex structure of executive compensation and grant more LTIPs than 
small-sized firms. Large sized firms are in a better position to attract more talented CFOs due 
to their greater capacity to pay. In turn, these talented CFOs will potentially enable the 
achievement of targets leading to greater LTIPs vesting, resulting in increased CFO realized 
pay, too. 
Columns 1-3 of Table 4.3 (Panel B) show the effect of long-term performance on the level of 
CFO equity pay, realized pay, and total pay. However, three-year total shareholder returns have 
a positive and significant effect in determining equity pay, realized pay, and total pay at the 5% 
significance level.  
In Column 1, the coefficient for total shareholder return is 0.036 and statistically significant at 
10% level in determining equity pay. This estimate implies that CFO will receive an increase 
of 0.36 in equity pay for a 10-percentage point increase in total shareholder return. Although 
there exists a positive association between these, the magnitude of coefficients on shareholder 
return is much smaller for CFO in contrast to that of CEO, thus, suggesting that the relationship 
between compensation and performance is stronger for CEO than that of CFO. This might be 
due to since CEO holds higher position, therefore, firm places greater focus on the level of CEO 
compensation. Overall, these findings lend support to the principal-agent model which asserts 







Next, in Columns 4 and 5, we investigate the impact of the number of LTIPs granted on pay-
performance responsiveness. We include four dummies in order to differentiate between the 
firms which grant long-term incentives relative to the firms which do not grant any LTIPs 
(reference category). We find that the coefficients on Dummy plans 3 and 4 are high and 
statistically significant in determining realized pay and total pay. Additionally, we include an 
interaction between total shareholder return and the number of long-term incentive plans 
granted by the company. The coefficients on Dummy 3 plan × TSR and Dummy 4 plan × TSR 
show that in companies which grant three or four plans, there exist greater interest alignment 
than those that do not offer LTIPs. However, the pay-performance responsiveness in companies 
that offer one or two plans is not significantly different from those that do not grant any LTIPs. 
Furthermore, in Column 4, for pay-performance responsiveness within four plans, the 
coefficient of Dummy 4 plan interaction with TSR shows that a 10-percentage point increase 
in TSR will lead to 1.94% increase in CFO realized pay. In contrast to this result, the pay-
performance responsiveness is weaker in firms which offer three plans. As discussed, previous 
studies which take into account the equity component of compensation have only considered 
the granted value of compensation as opposed to the vested value of equity compensation in 
order to analyse pay and performance relationship or pay-performance responsiveness. Unlike 
these studies, we employ total pay as well as realized pay, to get better insight into the 
association between pay and performance.  
Next, we examine the incentive strength of different long-term incentives. The results presented 
in Panel C of Table 4.3 show that the pay-performance association further strengthens with the 
greater amount awarded within the company that offers three or four LITPs. The association 
between pay and performance for number of LTIPs and amount within these plans for CFO 







plans, which possibly has greater number of performance conditions will encourage greater 
CFO effort. Thus, higher components in LTIPs will align CFO reward with shareholders’ 
interests to a greater extent. These results are consistent with our hypothesis and support agency 
theory that the higher the amount granted within long-term incentives, the higher is the pay-
performance responsiveness. 
In Column 2 of Table 4.3 (Panel D), in contrast to CEO, the presence of share options in CFO 
compensation contracts is not associated with pay-performance responsiveness. However, the 
interaction between dummy PSP and TSR shows that 10-percentage point improvement in TSR 
results in an increase of 0.63%. This relationship further strengthens as the rewards become 
more valuable, as shown in Column 3 of Table 4.3 (Panel D). Taking the results of CEO and 
CFO together, we can conclude that there exists greater pay performance responsiveness when 
PSPs are adopted in compensation contracts, strengthening the interest alignment, relative to 
the use of stock options in compensation contracts; such convergence of interests between 
CEO/CFO and shareholders stimulates firm performance. 
 
4.6 Robustness Check 
In this section, the previous results are subjected to a variety of robustness tests, all of which 
are available in the Appendix to Chapter 4. Having already employed realized pay as a proxy 
of compensation to investigate the pay-performance relationship and pay-performance 
responsiveness in numbers and types of plans in our main results, we also employ market 
adjusted TSR to analyze its impact on component of pay. We find that the short-term firm 
performance positively impacts the compensation of CEO and CFO, except for equity pay. 
However, there exists positive association between components of pay and long-term firm 







performance responsiveness of number of plans and their strength within these plans, the results 
from the market adjusted TSR also remain robust to original findings and show that for CEO, 
the firms operating up to three plans, the greater the number and value of plans, the greater is 
the pay-performance responsiveness. However, for CFO, the greater the number or value of 
LTIPs granted, the higher is the total compensation and realized pay and greater pay-













Panel A: CFO compensation as a function of corporate performance at previous interval (t-1→t) 
 
This table represents the estimation of results for different components of CFO compensation against 
short-term firm performance (one year return to shareholders), board size, % of non-executive directors, 
% of top 4 largest institutional ownership, chair duality, CFO age, CFO tenure and market capitalization. 
The dependent variable consists of (1) short-term pay (2) equity pay (3) realized pay (4) total pay, 
expressed in the natural logarithm of their values.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 Variable Short term pay Equity Pay Realized Pay Total Pay 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 14.440*** 0.215 8.923*** 10.501*** 
 (0.92) (2.48) (0.82) (1.55) 
Age 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tenure 0.013** 0.054*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CEO_chair_dual 0.088 0.524 0.242 0.270 
 (0.09) (0.35) (0.40) (0.24) 
Board_size 0.011 0.091 0.039 0.036 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) 
Non_exec % -0.001 -0.003* -0.003* -0.004* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
4_largest_institutional % -0.002 -0.006** -0.004** -0.002* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln_market_Cap -0.060 0.072*** 0.052*** 0.041* 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
TSR 0.063** 0.003 0.051* 0.032* 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.029) (0.018) 
R-squared 0.76 0.72 0.71 0.75 
Adjusted R-squared 0.67 0.58 0.61 0.63 
Fixed firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 










Panel B: CFO compensation as a function of corporate performance at previous interval (t-
3→t) 
 
This table represents the estimation of results for different components of CFO compensation against 
long-term firm performance (three-year return to shareholders), board size, % of non-executive 
directors, % of top 4 largest institutional ownership, CFO age, CFO tenure, chair duality, CFO 
Dummy plan 1, Dummy plan 2, Dummy plan 3, Dummy plan 4 and market capitalization. The 
dependent variable consists of (1) equity pay (2) realized pay (3) total pay (4) total realized pay (5) 
total pay, expressed in the natural logarithm of their values.  
 
Variable 
Equity Pay Realized Pay Total 
Pay 
Realized Pay Total Pay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 0.924 3.784*** 4.796*** 4.045*** 4.890*** 
 (1.56) (0.52) (0.35) (0.39) (0.39) 
Age 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Tenure 0.026*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.009* 0.009*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
CEO_chair_dual 0.23 0.132 0.189 0.223 0.171 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.15) (0.26) (0.14) 
Board_size 0.022 0.000 0.021 0.049 0.019 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
Non_exec % -0.002 -0.004* -0.001* -0.004* -0.002* 
 (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
4_largest_institutional % -0.003*** -0.004** -0.002** -0.004* -0.001** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln_market_Cap 0.098*** 0.061*** 0.043*** 0.066*** 0.034** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
TSR 0.036* 0.054** 0.031** 0.009 -0.029 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.013) (0.02) (0.05) 
Dummy_plan_1 
 
  0.109 0.098** 
 
 
  (0.08) (0.05) 
Dummy_plan_2 
 
  0.173*** 0.107*** 
 
 
  (0.06) (0.03) 
Dummy_plan_3 
 
  0.276*** 0.196*** 
 
 
  (0.07) (0.05) 
Dummy_plan_4 
 
  0.378*** 0.289** 
 
 
  (0.11) (0.14) 
Dummy_plan_1 × TSR    0.045 0.082 
    (0.05) (0.05) 
Dummy_plan_2 × TSR    0.074 0.003 
    (0.05) (0.06) 
Dummy_plan_3 × TSR    0.111** 0.050** 
    (0.05) (0.02) 
Dummy_plan_4 × TSR    0.194* 0.081** 
    (0.11) (0.03) 
R-squared 0.71 0..78 0.79 0.70 0.82 
Adjusted R-squared 0.65 0.69 0.70 0.58 0.73 
Fixed firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Panel C: Multivariate model examining the effectiveness of number of plans for CFO at 
previous interval (t-3→t) 
 
This table represents the estimation of results for different components of CFO compensation 
against long-term firm performance (three-year return to shareholders), board size, % of non-
executive directors, % of top 4 largest institutional ownership, CFO age, CFO tenure, CEO chair 
duality, granted value, value plan 1, value plan 2, value plan 3, value plan 4, and market 
capitalization. The dependent variable consists of 1) realized pay 2) total pay, expressed in the 
natural logarithm of their values. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variable Realized Pay Total Pay 
 (1) (2) 
 
Constant                4.296*** 5.073*** 
 (0.27) (0.43) 
Age 0.002 0.004 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Tenure 0.009** 0.009*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO_chair_dual 0.234 0.171 
 (0.27) (0.14) 
Board_size 0.052 0.020 
 (0.04) (0.01) 
Non_exec % -0.004* -0.002* 
 (0.002) (0.00) 
4_largest_institutional % -0.004* -0.001** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln_market_Cap 0.054*** 0.026* 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
TSR 0.026 0.017 
               (0.02) (0.01) 
Ln_value_grant 0.010*** 0.009** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln (Value_plan_1) × TSR 0.004 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln (Value_plan_2) × TSR 0.003* 0.002* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln (Value_plan_3) × TSR 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln (Value_plan_4) × TSR 0.019*** 0.018*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R-squared 0.69 0.83 
Adjusted R-squared 0.79 0.73 
Fixed firm effects Yes Yes 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes 










Panel D: Multivariate model examining the effectiveness of type of plans for CFO 
 
This table represents the estimation of results for CFO total compensation and total realized pay 
against long-term firm performance (three-year return to shareholders), board size, % of non-
executive directors, % of top 4 largest institutional ownership, age, tenure, chair duality, dummy 
Option, dummy PSP, value option, value restricted stock share and market capitalization. The 
dependent variable consists of (1) realized pay (2) total pay (3) realized pay (2) total pay, expressed 
in the natural logarithm of their values. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variable Realized Pay Total Pay Realized Pay Total Pay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 5.112*** 5.749*** 5.003*** 5.610*** 
 (0.54) (0.43) (0.56) (0.38) 
Age 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Tenure 0.014** 0.013*** 0.012** 0.013*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
CEO_chair_dual 0.238 0.201 0.234 0.194 
 (0.27) (0.16) (0.26) (0.15) 
Board_size 0.051 0.020 0.051 0.020 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Non_exec % -0.004** -0.002* -0.004* -0.002* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
4_largest_institutional % -0.004** -0.002** -0.004* -0.001** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln_market_Cap 0.062** 0.065** 0.054*** 0.026* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
TSR 0.031 0.020 0.021 0.030 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dummy_PSP 0.008 0.024   
 (0.05) (0.03)   
Dummy_Option 0.075 0.002   
 (0.08) (0.07)   
Dummy_PSP × TSR 0.063*** 0.020**   
 (0.02) (0.01)   
Dummy_Option × TSR -0.099 -0.014   
 (0.08) (0.05)   
Ln_value_grant   0.011*** 0.009** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln (Value_PSP) × TSR   0.003*** 0.002** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln (Value_Option) × TSR   -0.005 -0.002 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
R-squared 0.80 0.86 0.80 0.86 
Adjusted R-squared 0.70 0.79 0.71 0.80 
Fixed firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 








The current chapter studies different measures of CEO/CFO compensation in analyzing pay for 
performance relationship for a sample of FTSE 350 firms (minus financial companies). In 
contrast to previous UK studies, we employ a total realized pay which is the sum of base salary, 
bonus and payouts/vested amount from LTIPs. As equity part of the compensation runs for 
three years, we use three-year shareholder return to determine the impact on equity pay, total 
pay, and realized pay. This chapter takes into account the effect of different numbers, amount, 
and types of long-term incentive plans in analysing pay-performance responsiveness. 
Additionally, we provide a novel contribution to the existing literature by analyzing CFO 
compensation, since prior literature predominantly focuses on CEO compensation. In our 
analysis, we control for several corporate governance variables such as chair duality, age and 
tenure, top 4 institutional ownership, board size and percentage of non-executive directors. 
Our results show that components of CEO/CFO compensation are determined by long-term 
firm performance. However, there also exist positive associations between previous year’s total 
shareholder return and components of pay except for equity pay. This finding suggests that 
equity pay (long-term pay) is only determined by longer-term firm performance of three years. 
We also observe that among all components of compensation, the magnitude of the coefficient 
on three year shareholder return is higher in determining equity pay. This is because equity pay 
includes the vested values from equity grants which are directly linked with performance. 
Hence, these results are consistent with the principal-agent model. However, we also find that 
CEO/CFO tenure is statistically significant in explaining measures of compensation. We also 
document that non-executive directors and institutional investors actively monitor the equity 







The results of this study will help to lessen the concern of blockholders and institutional 
investors about executives receiving higher levels of compensation and that this pay should be 
adequately linked with firm performance. For CFO, the companies that use three or four long-
term incentives give higher realized pay and total remuneration than companies that do not 
award long-term incentives. For CEO, our results indicate that companies which operate one, 
two and three plans in compensation contracts, there exists greater pay performance 
responsiveness than firms which do not offer any long-term incentive plan. This relationship 
further strengthens the association between pay and performance if greater amount of incentives 
are granted within these LTIPs. Furthermore, different performance conditions attached to the 
compensation which are not solely based on total shareholder return can be a possible cause of 
the negative existence of pay-performance responsiveness within companies which operates 
four LTIPs. It is also possible that companies tilt the design of compensation package so that it 
appears more complex but is, actually, not quite efficient. For CEO, the companies that operate 
two or three plans provide a higher level of compensation than firms which do not operate any 
LTIPs. For CFO, the greater the components in compensation package are, the higher the pay-
performance association. Lastly, for CEO as well as CFO, adopting performance share plans in 
compensation contracts leads to a greater alignment between executives and shareholders’ 
interests. The pay-performance responsiveness is stronger for CEO than that of CFO. Finally, 









APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
Variable Definition 
This table provides a detailed description of the construction of all the variables used in this 
chapter. 




Natural logarithm of fixed amount received by both CEO and CFO for 
that financial year 
 
Bonus Natural logarithm of amount paid to CEO and CFO for the financial 
year inclusive of any deferred element (provided there is no 
performance requirement on release) 
 
Short-term Pay Natural logarithm of total cash value received from first two pay 














Natural logarithm of the granted value of performance shares, option 
grants, grant value of matching plans, vested value of performance 
share plans, exercised value of options, and vested value of matching 
plans. Total remuneration includes total cash plus the granted value of 
long-term incentives for that financial year 
Natural logarithm of the sum of base pay, bonus and the vested value 
of long-term incentives (options, performance share plans, matching 
plans and others that are vested for that financial year) 
Natural logarithm of short-term pay plus the granted value of long-term 
incentives (options, performance share plans, matching plans and 












Independent Variables Definition 
 
CEO/ CFO Age 
 
Age of CEO and CFO  
 
CEO/ CFO Tenure 
 
 
The number of years, respectively, served in these positions  
4_largest_institutional % The percentage ownership held by the top-four institutional investors 
 
Non_exec % Percentage of number of non-executive directors over total number of 
directors 
 













Value_plan (1, 2, 3, 4) 
Natural Logarithm of the Stock’s Market Capitalization; i.e. the product 
of the price per share and the number of shares outstanding at the end of 
financial year, expressed in thousands of pounds 
 
Dummy plan 1 is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm 
operates one long-term incentive plan in CEO/CFO compensation 
contract, zero otherwise. Similarly, for Dummy plan 2, it works as 
follows: if the company rewards two long-term incentives, it takes the 
value of 1 and zero-otherwise. The other two Dummy plans 3 and 4 are 
similarly constructed. 
 
The value of awards within the dummy plans 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively, 














Table A. 4.1: Hausman Test 
In order to select between the fixed effects and random effects estimator, we conduct the 
Hausman (1978) test. Its null hypothesis states that the error terms are not correlated with the 
independent variables, implying that the random effects estimator is the more efficient 
alternative (Greene, 2012).  
E. 1 Hypothesis test 
Null hypothesis: Random-effects model is appropriate 
Alternative hypothesis: fixed effects model is appropriate 
Based on the results if null is rejected, then the alternative hypothesis or fixed effects model 
would be preferred over random effects model. 
The Hausman test results 
The Hausman test results Test: Ho: difference in coefficients 
not systematic  
chi2(22) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)  
              = 50.02 
Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
 
where b is the vector of fixed effect estimate, and B is a vector of random effect estimate. The 
null hypothesis is that the difference in coefficients is not systematic. This implies that that 
there is no correlation between heterogeneous effects and the explanatory variables. When 
random effect is valid, the difference in test statistics between random effect and fixed effect is 







random and fixed effect will have a large difference and the test statistic will be different from 
zero, thus rejecting the null hypothesis. 
According to the above table, the p-value for the Hausman test is less than 1% which indicates 
that random effects are not appropriate and that the fixed effects should be estimated, instead. 
Therefore, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis and the use of fixed effects model is 
favoured over the use of random effects model. Thus, we estimate our pay-performance model 







Table A. 4.2: Robustness test:  Impact of Market adjusted TSR (1 year) on components of CEO 
pay 
  
For simplicity, we only report results of our main variables (TSR). The dependent variable consists of 
1) short-term compensation (2) equity pay (3) realized pay (4) total pay. Standard errors are clustered at 




 (1) (2) (3) (4)     
TSR 0.031* 0.002 0.089** 0.062*     
  (0.016) (0.059) (0.039) (0.036)     
 
 
Table A.4.3: Robustness test:  Impact of market adjusted TSR (3 years) on components of CEO 
pay 
 
For simplicity, we only report results of our main variables (TSR and their interactions with numbers 
and value of plans). The dependent variable consists of (2) equity pay (3) realized pay (4) total pay. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) 
TSR 0.060** 0.112*** 0.086** 0.025 0.039 0.041 0.012 
 (0.028) (0.010) (0.040) (0.061) (0.028) (0.021) (0.008) 
Dummy_plan_1 × TSR    0.129* 0.056   
    (0.067)) (0.037)   
Dummy_plan_2 × TSR    0.099** 0.053**   
    (0.046) (0.024)   
Dummy_plan_3 × TSR    0.110** 0.055**   
    (0.070) (0.025)   
Dummy_plan_4 × TSR    -2.185** -0.605**   
    (0.935) (0.256)   
Ln (Value_plan_1) × 
TSR 
     0.007* 0.001* 
      (0.003) (0.000) 
Ln (Value_plan_2) × 
TSR 
     0.012*** 0.004*** 
      (0.002) (0.001) 
Ln (Value_plan_3) × 
TSR 
     0.021*** 0.102** 
      (0.005) (0.014) 
Ln (Value_plan_4) × 
TSR 
     -0.002* -0.001** 









Table A.4.4: Robustness test: Impact of Market adjusted TSR (1 year) on component of CFO Pay 
 
For simplicity, we only report results of our main variables (TSR). The dependent variable consists of 
1) short-term compensation (2) equity pay (3) realized pay (4) total pay. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)     
TSR 0.067** 0.032 0.041** 0.029*     




Table A.4.5: Robustness test:  Impact of market adjusted TSR (3 years) on components of CFO 
pay 
 
For simplicity, we only report results of our main variables (TSR and their interactions with numbers 
and value of plans). The dependent variable consists of (2) equity pay (3) realized pay (4) total pay. For 
simplicity, we only report results of our main variables (TSR). Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)  
TSR 0.037* 0.043** 0.027** 0.010 0.030 0.023 0.012 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.061) (0.060) (0.015) (0.013) 
Dummy_plan_1 × TSR    0.089 0.054   
    (0.059) (0.042)   
Dummy_plan_2 × TSR    0.086* 0.045   
    (0.049) (0.063)   
Dummy_plan_3 × TSR    0.126** 0.076*   
    (0.051) (0.042)   
Dummy_plan_4 × TSR    0.231** 0.120*   
    (0.101) (0.057)   
Ln (Value_plan_1) × 
TSR 
     0.004 0.000 
      (0.003) (0.000) 
Ln (Value_plan_2) × 
TSR 
     0.002* 0.003** 
      (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln (Value_plan_3) × 
TSR 
     0.008*** 0.009*** 
      (0.001) (0.000) 
Ln (Value_plan_4) × 
TSR 
     0.022*** 0.021*** 







5 THE CHOICE OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES, TARGET SETTING AND 
VESTING LEVELS IN UK FIRMS CEO COMPENSATION CONTRACT 
5.1 Introduction 
There have been widespread concerns not only on excessive levels of CEO pay but also on the 
mechanics of incentivization. Prior to the 1990s, the vesting of stock options and restricted 
shares were time-dependent. As noted in Section 2.1.2, in 1995 the Greenbury Report 
recommended that UK firms should incorporate rewards dependent upon the firm performance, 
in preference to traditional time-vested options and restricted stock shares. Successive versions 
of corporate governance code have resulted in the shift of the landscape for long-term incentive 
plans, to strengthen interest alignment between executives and shareholders. Since 2002, UK 
firms have been required to disclose the components of their long-term incentive plans and the 
performance targets attached to the compensation contracts as per the Directors’ Remuneration 
Report Regulations 2002 (DRRR, 2002) and other corporate governance codes as reviewed in 
Section 2.1.2. 
The executive compensation literature has generally focused on examining the association 
between executive compensation and firm performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004 and Ozkan, 2007). Even though, as Murphy (1999) notes, the type of 
performance measure forms an integral part of compensation structures, along with the levels 
of target setting, only a limited number of studies have analysed these contractual terms (e.g. 
Gao et al., 2017; De Angelis and Grinstein, 2015 and Li and Wang, 2016), and whether 
contracts are designed optimally is still a matter of debate. Additionally, we observe a paradox: 
while there is greater transparency within annual reports as to the details of their remuneration 







and their effects in terms of how the detail of the contractual terms affect actual payout are not 
well understood by investors or the general public. 
This chapter contributes to the debate by drawing on a novel dataset whose richness and breadth 
provides the opportunity to examine the current landscape of long-term incentive plans and 
their features. While most studies have examined the US firms, research on executive 
compensation in the UK has made a limited survey of performance measures and targets with 
sample period for these studies ending in 2003 (e.g. Conyon et al., 2000; Pass et al., 2000 and 
Zakaria, 2012).  
This chapter makes a number of contributions to the global literature on the contractual terms 
of executive compensation. First, we document a wider array of performance categories 
employed in CEO compensation contracts than previous studies. Secondly, we provide novel 
details on vesting levels pertaining to minimum and maximum thresholds of EPS performance 
measures. Thirdly, we provide new detail on the different relative benchmarks and the use of 
outperformance plans which trigger vesting when market-based performance measures are set 
beyond the upper quartile percentile ranking (i.e. in the highest quintile). In a new analysis, we 
show how the choice of performance benchmark affects how many plans vest and attain 
minimum and maximum thresholds in actuality. We uncover evidence that some peer groups 
and benchmarks are easier to beat than others, suggesting that managers could have an influence 
in the selection of “soft targets”. Fourthly, for accounting-based performance measures, we 
present new detail on the breakdown of different types of EPS and relative targets, and examine 
their influence on actual vesting, and show again that the formulation of the EPS target has a 
substantial influence on actual vesting. Finally, we perform a novel empirical analysis on the 
effect of EPS and TSR volatility on the performance choices made by firms in CEO 







remuneration advisor. In this, we extend the analysis to consider plans which use both EPS and 
TSR simultaneously as performance measures, and also those which use neither EPS nor TSR, 
categories which together make up more than half our sample, but which all previous studies 
have neglected to consider, opting instead for a simplistic EPS vs TSR dichotomy. We find 
evidence in line with optimal contracting theory as firms select performance measures which 
are less volatile in nature and our findings also indicate that some remuneration advisors have 
a clear preference for some performance measures over others. The descriptive statistics show 
that there exists significant variation in the design of compensation contracts. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides an overview of the 
underlying literature and hypothesis development. Section 5.3 provides an overview of the plan 
structure. In Section 5.4, we discuss the methodology of our research. Section 5.5 presents the 
data analysis and empirical results of the model. Section 5.6 focuses on the detailed design of 
compensation contracts. Section 5.7 provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
5.2 Theory, Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
The separation of ownership and control represents a classical principal-agent problem 
as management tends to pursue activities that increase their own well-being. Optimal 
contracting theory views stock-based compensation as a key corporate governance mechanism 
that mitigates or aligns the divergent interests of management and shareholders of the company. 
Compensation schemes ought to be designed in such a way as to serve this objective, and firms 
ought to seek more sophisticated ways of tying executive compensation to firm performance. 
Hence, optimal contracting theory predicts that firms should incorporate all performance 








The Association of British Insurers (ABI), now merged with IVIS, in 1996 published guidelines 
on the framework of long-term incentives, which promote the following principles39: 1) 
Performance targets should be challenging and linked to corporate performance, 2) 
Performance targets should be transparent and subject to disclosure, and 3) Performance in 
long-term incentives should be measured relative to an appropriate peer group or other relevant 
benchmarks. Interestingly, neither agency theory nor the ABI guidelines specifically mention 
to employ certain performance measures in compensation contracts, but the theory can be 
applied to determine the properties of suitable metrics in order to evaluate executive’s 
performance. Hence, this study will seek to determine how firms use different performance 
metrics in order to align executives' interests with those of shareholders. 
 
5.2.1 Related Literature 
5.2.1.1 The Development of the Study of Performance Measures 
In examining the history of the construction of executive compensation contracts, we observe 
that the first generation of performance contracts predominantly utilised market-based 
measures, while subsequent development has seen the wider introduction of accounting-based 
measures, and a greater sophistication in the levels and mechanisms of vesting of the rewards. 
We also see a move towards much greater transparency and disclosure in executive pay-setting. 
As an example, previous studies show that the firms use accounting measures to evaluate firms’ 
performance when designing compensation contracts (Larcker, 1983; Kumar and Sopariwala, 
1992). While others report the introduction of non-financial measures in compensation 
                                                 
 
39 Note: Presently, ABI guidelines is part of the Investment Association. 
https://www.ivis.co.uk/guidelines  







contracts (Ittner et al., 1997; Kaplan and Norton, 1992). Later on, the study of executive 
compensation has moved into examining the pay-performance relationship. A number of 
studies (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Gregg et al., 2012 and Conyon and Peck, 1998) describe 
the use of the financial and accounting performance measures in examining the pay-
performance relationship. 
As reviewed in Section 3.3.2, the usefulness of accounting metrics has been discussed by earlier 
researchers, for example, Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1993).  Sloan (1993) analyses 
the cross-section variation in sensitivity of executive remuneration to stock price and earnings 
firm performance. The author concludes that earnings play a vital role in shielding executive 
compensation from market fluctuation in equity pay. However, the results of Lambert and 
Larcker’s (1987) study conclude that US firms place more weight on market performance 
measures when accounting performance measures are more volatile. 
Until the reforms brought in by the DRRR in 2002 and Security Exchange Commission (SEC) 
in 2006, the disclosure of details of executive compensation contracts was limited in the UK 
and the US respectively, however, annual reports now provide much greater transparency. 
Previous research which found a prevalence of non-financial measures in executive 
compensation may, therefore, have been employing an implicit rather than an explicit approach 
(Davila and Venkatachalam, 2004). 
Since then, researchers have started to hand-collect compensation data on US firms, for 
example, Kim and Yang (2010) examine performance metrics in annual bonus contracts during 
2006-2009, Bettis et al. (2010) study 983 US equity-based grants with performance contingency 
from 1995 to 2001, and De Angelis and Grinstein (2015) analyse the performance criteria in 







The only comparable UK study for the present analysis is that of Zakaria (2012), who presents 
a breakdown of performance measures into options and restricted shares for UK firms for the 
single year 2002/2003. The study provides a breakdown of performance targets into EPS and 
TSR measures. We extend this study by taking into account all elements of equity compensation 
including matching plans and also analyzing the breakdown of minimum and maximum 
threshold targets required to achieve minimum and upper quartile vesting, neither of which are 
captured by Zakaria (2012). In addition, our empirical analysis includes companies which 
employ EPS and TSR measures in combination. We consider this to be an important 
methodological advance since this latter category accounts for over 45% of the firms in our 
sample.  
 
5.2.1.2  The Problem of Volatility in Measuring Management Effort 
Holmstrom (1979) formulates the theory of the optimal contact under the moral-hazard 
problem, and develops the “Informativeness Principle”, that any performance measure that 
reveals information about the level of effort provided by an agent (CEO) should be included as 
a performance metric. He further shows the negative relationship between the noise present in 
a performance measure and its usefulness in a compensation package. Further, Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999b) conclude that CEO pay becomes less sensitive to performance as TSR 
volatility increases. High pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) evidences a greater alignment 
between the interests of shareholders and executives. PPS is, therefore, the responsiveness of 
pay to the change in company performance.  
Firms should choose performance measures that strengthen the link between pay and 
performance in an executive compensation package. Consequently, CEOs should prefer a less 







their level of reward, leading them to make more effort. Hence, optimal contracting theory 
assists the empirical design of the performance measure, stating that it should not be noisy and 
insensitive to managerial actions. 
Over time, one accounting measure, namely, earnings, has become predominant as a 
performance metric in incentive contracts. One possible explanation is that earnings figures are 
more under the direct control of management (Sloan, 1993; O’Byrne, 1990; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). By contrast, stock prices are affected by market factors which are outside 
the control of management. In a working paper, Chemmanur et al. (2010) highlight how 
management can manipulate earnings per share, and show that firms repurchase shares from 
the market in order to meet EPS targets. An increase in stock repurchases will decrease the 
number of shares in the market, hence, an increase in EPS can be engineered.  
Until the 1980s, the use of accounting performance measures was considered to be the only 
remedy to the issue of volatility in share prices, making market-based measure an unreliable 
indicator of management effort. Firms' use of market and accounting-based measures have been 
observed by Murphy (1999) and Pass et al. (2000). However, in the last two decades, it has 
become increasingly common to use comparator groups within TSR measures in order to 
identify and reward relative outperformance and factor out fluctuations which are due to overall 
market movements. Holmstrom (1982) conducts a pioneering study in measuring relative 
performance evaluation (RPE), focusing on the need to remove common risk within 
compensation packages by using the share price relative to a peer group of companies within 
the same industry or market. RPE in compensation contracts enables common uncertainties to 
be filtered out and provides more efficient schemes (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). 
More recently, Li and Wang (2016) explore the relationship between volatility and the choice 







Their results show that firms are more likely to choose those performance metrics which are 
less volatile in nature. 
 
5.2.1.3 Hypotheses 
In light of the above, we formulate the following research hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5.1 a: The higher the volatility of the market-based (TSR) measure, the greater the 
likelihood of choosing an accounting-based measure (EPS) only. 
Hypothesis 5.1 b: The higher the volatility of the accounting-based measure (EPS), the greater 
the likelihood of choosing a market-based measure (TSR) only. 
 
5.2.1.4  Isomorphism in Executive Compensation Contracts 
The separation of ownership and control can affect the manager's choice of action that 
potentially influences the wealth of a company's shareholders; efficient contracts should, 
therefore, be designed in such a way that greater manager-shareholder interest alignment can 
take place (Conyon et al., 2009). However, other constraints and influences inform the 
construction of executive contracts: in its simplest form, companies are liable to copy existing 
practice, and compensation consultants may diffuse the adoption of certain pay practices to 
other firms, as they may tend to recommend similar structures to a number of different clients. 
Additionally, executives may bring with them their own expectations of how contracts should 
be structured, drawing on their own experience-based standard as developed through service 
on other boards.   
More formally, the literature of institutional theory addresses these using a discourse of 







Three different forms of isomorphism have been identified: mimetic, coercive and normative. 
Mimetic isomorphism exists when firms follow what other firms are doing in the absence of 
clear guidelines (Porac et al, 1999; Zajac and Westphal, 1995). Normative isomorphism exists 
when firms follow standard procedures owing to the influence of common personnel, for 
example, when executives moving from one board to another leads to common practices being 
introduced (O’ Reilly et al, 1988; Perkins and Hendry, 2005). Coercive isomorphism arises 
from regulations or codes of conduct forcing the adoption of certain pay-performance practices 
(Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006). In regard to executive compensation, we, therefore, suspect 
that all three forms of isomorphism may be involved. 
 
5.2.1.5  The Structure of Compensation Contracts 
While the above notes studies focusing on the pay-performance relationship for UK and US 
firms, fewer studies have looked at the detailed structure of compensation contracts, and here, 
most research has focused on US firms. Murphy (1999) conducts an analysis on the pay 
practices of US firms, looking at the level and structure of incentive contracts in terms of shares 
and options employed by the firm within different industries, but does not detail the breakdown 
of these performance measures. The US pay-setting process is both less transparent and less 
complex compared to the UK, which makes the research of executive compensation in the UK 
potentially more informative. 
Pass et al. (2000) analyse the breakdown of options and long-term incentives for 150 large 
companies in the UK, and note that there has been a rapid increase in the use of long-term 
incentives. Further, they recommend that firms should operate TSR based schemes and 
benchmark it with appropriate index. Their study does not shed light on vesting percentage at 







5.2.1.6  The Role of Compensation Consultants 
With an increase in the complexity of equity-based pay, the role of the compensation consultant 
has become crucial as they are considered experts with technical knowledge on the design of 
compensation packages (Bender, 2011). It has become a widespread practice in US and UK 
firms to hire compensation consultants to advise on the design and implementation of 
compensation packages. Conyon et al. (2009) report that the majority of firms in the FTSE 350 
Index hire two consultants, with one consultant providing data services and the other providing 
advice on remuneration packages. Most firms use compensation consultants to gain a 
perspective on industry-wide compensation practices and those of their competitors. It is 
possible that as consultants devise new innovative compensation designs, pay-performance 
practice becomes similar across their clients they advise. Hence, this represents an example of 
normative isomorphism. Since there is an increase in the number of long-term incentive 
arrangements in the market, practices will tend to evolve and solidify. 
Usually, a remuneration committee will seek independent advice from a remuneration 
consultant on the design of their compensation packages. The consultant further assists 
remuneration committees in determining the structure and level of compensation, and the 
performance measure to be applied.  
However, little is known about the factors that influence the actual choice of performance 
measure. One potential explanation is that firms select specific performance metrics based on 








5.3 Executive Compensation Plan Structure 
5.3.1 The Dataset 
Our sample consists of 400 UK with largest market capitalization, from 2007 to 2015. Data on 
executive compensation contracts comes from the commercial MEIS database, supplemented 
by hand-collected data from annual reports for 2007 to 2010. To ensure data integrity, MEIS 
data was verified by checking against hand-collected annual reports.  
We study a total of 3400 long-term incentive plans. Many of these plans are inactive and not 
used in a current year. As a result, our final sample consists of 2970 long-term incentive plans. 
We categorize industries using the top-level FTSE ICB (Industry Classified Benchmark), 
consisting of the following industries: basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, 
financial, healthcare, technology, oil and gas, utilities and industrials. 
 
5.3.2 The Design of Executive Compensation Contracts 
In this section, we analyse the design of executives’ equity compensation. We find that long-
term incentives take different forms, and usually, in the UK context, “long-term” refers to those 
plans that last for three years. 
We identify three very different forms of compensation. Firstly, traditional share options are 
options on the company’s stock with a non-zero strike price, so that the executive receives cash 
equal to the difference between the share price and the exercise price on the day they are 
exercised. Secondly, performance share plans (PSPs), also known as nil cost options, are 
options on the company’s stock with a zero-strike price, which pay cash on the day they are 
exercised in a similar manner. Finally, share matching plans, also known as co-investment 







performance conditions are met after three years, they receive a multiple of their initial 
investment in the form of shares. For some firms, this deferral is compulsory rather than 
voluntary. For example, in a “2:1” match, a deferral of 200,000 shares leads to the grant of an 
additional 200,000 shares if performance targets are met. Finally, long-term compensation may 
be given in the form of cash. 
Performance targets can be further classified as the range of company performance in which 
rewards will vest: many plans have lower threshold targets, which are the minimum that must 
be attained for any rewards at all to vest, and upper threshold targets, at which the maximum 
possible reward is paid out. Further, performance targets can be classified as being relative to a 
benchmark or comparator group, or absolute. 
Long-term incentive plans will not usually vest without the achievement of performance 
hurdles as assessed over a three-year performance period. These awards are made on a rolling 
basis and are frequently updated or modified depending on a company’s objectives. 
 
5.4 Methodology 
5.4.1 Independent Variables 
For independent variables, we use volatility in earnings per share (hereafter, EPS volatility) and 
volatility in total shareholder return (hereafter, TSR volatility). Furthermore, we also include 
corporate governance characteristics: board size, percentage of non-executive directors, firm 
age and CEO tenure which, potentially, have an influence on performance choices. 
Following Zakaria (2012), we employ a set of control variables using free cash flow, market to 
book value and sales. We hypothesize that the choice of performance measure will be 







appropriate peers to compare their relative performance. Murphy (2000) finds that firms with 
higher level of growth opportunities are more likely to employ TSR over internal based 
measures, as TSR incentivizes manager of higher growth firms to smooth out any fluctuations.  
All of these variables relate to the previous year as the observation. MTB is defined as the 
Market to Book value, using the MTBV datatype from Datastream. 
Total shareholder returns and earnings per share are derived from the Return Index data 
published by Datastream. In addition, we use Datastream to collect the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board. We collect data for board size from Bloomberg. 
We follow Zakaria (2012) and define TSR volatility as the past Total Return volatility, 
measured quarterly, over the prior 36 months. We define EPS volatility as the volatility of EPS 
growth measured on a semi-annual basis, over the prior 36 months, since UK firms disclose 
EPS twice a year. 
 
5.4.2 Sample Construction 
Firms use a wide range of performance measures in CEO compensation and have different 
payment methods, which include matching plans, options and performance share plans.  
Interestingly, most firms use the same performance measure category for all payment methods 
(i.e. options, restricted stock shares and matching plans). A few firms, however, employ 
different performance measure categories for different payment methods, for example, 
choosing EPS and TSR jointly in one long-term incentive plan while using EPS only in an 







For the purposes of the present analysis, if more than one long-term incentive plan exists, we 
include only firms which have the same performance measure category across all long-term 
incentive plans. This restriction loses 3% of the overall sample by firm-years. 
Initially, our sample consists of 2970 active long-term incentive plans. For the purposes of 
descriptive statistics, we exclude plans that relate to one-off circumstance, e.g. mergers and 
acquisitions, spin-offs, retention plans and recruitment plans, since in most cases, these are 
specific to named executives, and many do not have any performance conditions attached. 
We also exclude those firms which use a combination of TSR and some other performance 
measure (not including EPS or income-based measures) in a single year, and also, those firms 
which use a combination of EPS and some other performance measure (not including TSR) in 
a single year. 
Additionally, to be included in a regression, a company must have valid corporate governance 
variables and valid data on total shareholder return and earnings per share for the prior three 
years for each year. The sample used for regression analysis is at the firm level and consists of 
1931 firm-years. 
 
5.4.3 Data Coding 
The central testable prediction of the optimal contracting theory is that volatility in performance 
measures will affect the choice of performance measure. Accordingly, we test this using a 
multinomial logit model, in which the dependent variable, namely, the choice of performance 
measure, consists of four different categories: we code "EPS and TSR jointly" as category 0, 







In the following analysis, the "neither EPS nor TSR" category includes plans where the 
performance measure is either qualitative or where it includes neither a TSR nor an earnings 
measure. 
 
5.4.4 Model Estimation 
Multinomial Logit Model 
Let Pi,j  be the probability that the ith firm chooses performance measure j , given by  
, , ,Pr( )   for , {0,1,2,3}i j i j i kP R R k j j     ,                                                              (5.1) 
where Ri,j is the maximum utility attainable for firm i if it chooses performance measure j.  Then, 
'
, ,,i j j i i jR X                    (5.2) 
where Xi is a vector of firm characteristics, and βj is a vector of corresponding coefficients.  
If the stochastic terms εi,j are independent and identically distributed, and follow the Weibull 
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In this model, we use the firms that choose EPS and TSR jointly as a performance measure as 
the reference category and normalize the corresponding vector β0 = 0. Hence, the probability 
of firm i having (EPS and TSR jointly) as a performance measure in a compensation contract 
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for j = 1,2, and 3.                  (5.5) 
We estimate this model using maximum likelihood. The estimated coefficient βj should be 
interpreted as the change in the probability of choice j (EPS, TSR, or neither EPS nor TSR) 
relative to the probability of choosing (EPS and TSR jointly), for a one-unit change in the 
independent variable. 
The multinomial logit model can be seen as simultaneously estimating a binary logit model 
comparing among the dependent categories and reference category (Long, 1997). When 
estimating a multinomial logit model, we need to select a reference category to which the 
estimated coefficient will relate.  
The results from the model will tell us whether the type of performance measure is influenced 
by volatility where Xi is a vector of firm characteristics. Our model is therefore: 
i ,  t-1 i ,  
, 1 , 1 2 , 1
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5.5 Data Analysis and Empirical Results 
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
5.5.1.1 Performance Measures Used in Long-Term Incentive Arrangements 
Table 5.1 exhibits the breakdown of performance measures used in compensation contracts by 
plan type. We observe that EPS only, and TSR only, are the most popular performance metrics 
used in long-term incentive plans, followed by ROE and EBIT. Many firms in our sample use 
more than one performance measure, resulting in 5124 performance measures in 2970 plans. 
Market-based measures (i.e. TSR, Share Price and Total Property Return) together account for 
72% of long-term incentives. 
Panel A of Table 5.2 presents the breakdown of plans that use different performance target 
categories. When all plans are considered, Panel B reveals that 31% of plans choose EPS and 
TSR jointly as a performance measure, making this the most frequently employed category. 
Further, 42% of plans use only one performance measure, while in unreported statistics, we 
find that 51% use two measures, and 7% use multiple performance metrics.  
Panel C presents statistics for the firms included in the regression, where we include only those 
which use TSR only, EPS only, TSR and EPS jointly or neither TSR nor EPS. When these are 
considered, 27% of the firms TSR only, 25% use EPS only, 39% of use EPS & TSR jointly, 
and 9% of plans use neither TSR nor EPS as a performance metric. This indicates that many 
plans are using EPS and TSR jointly as a performance target. 
Panel A of Table 5.3 presents a summary of the statistics for firm characteristics for the sample 
period and reports the means, medians and standard deviations. The median (mean) board size 
is 9 (8.67), consistent with Ozkan (2007). The average (median) proportion of non-executive 







mean value of TSR volatility is 0.05, suggesting that EPS is a much more volatile measure 
compared to TSR. 
Panel B of Table 5.3 reports the correlations between the independent variables of the sample. 
The correlation between the EPS volatility and TSR volatility is only -0.02. Turning to the 
correlations between the control variables, we find that the largest correlations are no higher 
than 39% (Panel B of Table 5.5.2). Thus, we infer that concerns of multicollinearity are not a 
major issue in the data. 
Panel C of Table 5.3 reports summary statistics for compensation consultants. New Bridge 
Street is the most popular consultant, with a market share of 34.4%, followed by Deloitte 
(14.9%), Kepler (11.9%), PwC (9.8%), Towers (10.4%) and Mercer (1.2%). The "big six" 
remuneration consultants account for 83% of total market share, similar to the US, where the 
largest six remuneration advisors account for more than 67% of total market share (Cadman et 
al., 2010). Other smaller advisors include MEIS, EY, MM&K, Fit, Aon Hewitt, M C Lutyens, 







Table 5.1: Performance measures used in long-term incentive arrangement 
Performance share 
plans
2176 1721 38 1415 269 56 135 34 88 106 73 133 3 4063
Share options 347 114 8 244 15 0 16 6 0 5 0 7 8 423
Matching plans 447 190 5 234 69 9 32 3 31 26 28 11 5 638







No condition TotalTSR Share price EPS ROE TPR Profit Revenue Cash flow NAVNo.
 
This table presents the number of plans falling into each respective category. 
“No.” indicates the number of plans, “TSR” indicates the use of Total Shareholder Return, defined as the increase in share price in addition to dividend income, 'Share price' 
indicates the use of share price alone, i.e. the increase in share price exclusive of dividend income. “EPS” indicates the use of earnings per share, “ROE” indicates the return on 
common equity as a measure, and “NAV” indicates the use of net asset value. “TPR” stands for total property return, in the case of Real Estate firms. “Total” indicates the total 
number of performance measures used across all plans so that one plan can have several performance measures. 
Other qualitative measures include the use of non-financial/personal objectives in the executive compensation contracts (e.g. customer satisfaction, safety, health and strategy). 












Table 5.2: Performance measures categories in long-term incentive arrangements 
 
  



















columns 1, 3, 
5 and 6 
 
Panel A Performance share plans 508 379 289 98 792 111 2177 1700 
 
Options 71 7 193 0 69 36 376 369 
 
Matching plans 59 69 112 44 58 75 417 304 
 
Total  638 455 594 142 919 222 2970 2373 
          
Panel B Performance share plans 17.1% 12.8% 9.7% 3.3% 26.7% 3.7% 
  
 
Options 2.4% 0.2% 6.5% 0.0% 2.3% 1.2% 
  
 
Matching plans 2.0% 2.3% 3.8% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 
  
 
Total  21.5% 15.3% 20.0% 4.8% 30.9% 7.5% 100.0% 
 
          












Total  26.9%  25.0%  38.7% 9.4% 
 
100.0% 
   
This table presents the number of plans falling into each respective category. 
 
“TSR only” indicates the number of plans that exclusively select TSR as a performance measure. “TSR and others” indicate the number of plans that use TSR in combination 







and EPS jointly as a performance metric. “Neither EPS nor TSR” indicates the number of plans that consists of performance measures other than total shareholder return and 
earnings). 
 
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Firm Level Characteristics 
 
Variable Mean Median 
 
Std.-Dev Variable Mean Median 
 
Std.-Dev 
EPS Volatility 0.30 0.15 
 
1.15 % of non-executive directors 49.73 47.00 
 
2.47 
TSR Volatility 0.05 0.02 0.20 Ln (Free Cash Flow) 7.02 6.90 0.40 
Market to Book 3.85 2.27 4.23 Ln (Sales) 6.75 6.60 1.74 
Board Size 9.00 8.67 2.60 Ln (CEO Tenure) 1.38 1.50 0.95 
Ln (Firm Age) 3.05 3.04 1.04     
 







Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Main Independent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) EPS Volatility 1         
(2) TSR Volatility -0.02 1        
(3) Market to book -0.00 -0.02 1       
(4) Ln (Board size) 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 1      
(5) Non-executive directors % -0.04* -0.02 0.05** 0.22*** 1     
(6) Ln (Sales £’000) -0.10*** -0.03 0.01 0.30*** 0.36*** 1    
(7) Ln (Free cash flow) -0.05** -0.03 0.00 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.39*** 1   
(8) Ln (CEO Tenure) -0.05** -0.00 -0.01 -0.09**** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.06*** 1  
(9) Ln (Firm Age) -0.11*** 0.02 -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.018 -0.00 0.00 0.13*** 1 
Panel B reports the pairwise correlation of the main independent variables. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
Panel C: Compensation Consultant Statistics 
Name of Advisor No of Plans Percent 
Deloitte 377 14.96% 
High New Bridge Street 868 34.44% 
Kepler 301 11.94% 
Mercer 32 1.27% 
Others  430 17.06% 
PwC 249 9.88% 
Towers 263 10.44% 
Total 2520 100% 







Table 5.4 details the multinomial logit regression results for the determinants of performance 
choices. In multinomial logit, the dependent variable is limited, hence its interpretation differs 
from that of an OLS regression coefficient. In order to test whether the volatility of a 
performance measure impacts the choice of performance measure category employed by the 
firm, in Model 1, we control for industry and the identity of the consultant, and in Model 2, we 
additionally control for plan effects (i.e. options, performance share plans, and matching plans). 
Therefore, in Table 5.5, we include marginal effects to clarify the magnitude effect of each 
variable. Marginal effects represent the change in the dependent variable that is produced by a 
unit change in the independent variable.  
We observe from Table 5.2 that categorizing by the type of plan, in contrast to performance 
share plans, options are rarely used in this sample. Instead, many firms use nil-cost options that 
are categorized as performance share plans. 
Table 5.4: Multinomial logit model estimating the probability of performance measures in 
compensation contracts 
 
Multinomial logistic regression of performance measures in compensation contracts against EPS 
volatility, TSR volatility, board size, market to book, firm sales, % of non-executive dire, free cash flow, 
CEO tenure and firm age. All results are relative to the base category of (EPS and TSR jointly). “TSR 
vol” is the three-year volatility before plan adoption, “EPS vol” is the three-year volatility in EPS before 
plan adoption. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. Industry dummies are included in both specifications. Detailed description 
of variable definitions can be found in Appendix A to Chapter 5. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 (with Plan Dummies) 









   Column 1 Column 2 Column 3  Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
EPS vol 0.119*** -0.120** 0.051  0.116*** -0.115** 0.023 
  (0.021) (0.058) (0.033)  (0.020) (0.056) (0.037) 
TSR vol -3.673*** -2.193 -1.726  -3.935*** -2.218 -1.140 
  (1.304) (1.334) (1.642)  (1.349) (1.356) (1.126) 
Market to book 0.000 -0.001 -0.060**  0.002 0.000 -0.094*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.025)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.032) 
Ln (Board size) 1.341*** 0.874*** 0.154  1.417*** 0.869*** 0.294 







Non-executives% 0.024*** -0.021*** -0.012  0.025*** -0.019*** -0.007 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Ln (Sales) -0.362*** -0.035 -0.219***  -0.348*** -0.015 -0.181** 
  (0.059) (0.060) (0.084)  (0.059) (0.062) (0.089) 
Ln (Free Cash Flow) 0.550*** -0.687*** -0.107  0.638*** -0.604*** -0.238 
  (0.202) (0.218) (0.357)  (0.210) (0.220) (0.345) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.201*** 0.225*** 0.239*  0.194*** 0.228*** 0.131 
  (0.066) (0.076) (0.127)  (0.069) (0.079) (0.132) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.324*** 0.135* -0.388***  -0.316*** 0.152** -0.381*** 
 (0.0634) (0.074) (0.121)  (0.064) (0.075) (0.133) 
Industry 
   
 
   
Basic Material 0.586** -1.657*** -0.994**  0.707*** -1.570*** -0.685* 
  (0.264) (0.471) (0.458)  (0.270) (0.461) (0.411) 
Consumer Goods -0.501** 0.592*** -16.03***  -0.428* 0.608*** -16.37*** 
  (0.246) (0.199) (0.240)  (0.251) (0.205) (0.276) 
Financials 1.846*** 0.696** 1.959***  1.782*** 0.700** 2.083*** 
  (0.307) (0.346) (0.363)  (0.314) (0.354) (0.389) 
Healthcare 0.833** -1.068* -16.07***  0.898** -1.007* -16.52*** 
  (0.364) (0.592) (0.375)  (0.362) (0.589) (0.383) 
Industrials -0.921*** -1.495*** -2.198***  -0.853*** -1.455*** -2.041*** 
  (0.185) (0.202) (0.370)  (0.188) (0.204) (0.382) 
Oil & gas 0.183 -0.830* -15.93***  0.218 -0.793* -16.59*** 
  (0.328) (0.470) (0.418)  (0.319) (0.467) (0.461) 
Technology -1.278*** 0.471* -0.255  -1.079*** 0.532** -0.307 
  (0.365) (0.260) (0.390)  (0.370) (0.269) (0.409) 
Utilities 0.906*** -2.116*** -1.733  0.969*** -1.956** -1.293 
 (0.315) (0.780) (1.078)  (0.329) (0.797) (1.107) 
Consultant dummies 
   
 
   
HNBS 0.729*** -0.447** -1.092***  0.781*** -0.403* -1.009*** 
  (0.224) (0.202) (0.315)  (0.228) (0.206) (0.330) 
Kepler 0.837*** -0.080 -1.524***  0.873*** -0.062 -1.446** 
  (0.256) (0.247) (0.577)  (0.261) (0.251) (0.574) 
Mercer 0.243 2.388*** 2.799***  0.170 2.327*** 2.974*** 
  (1.230) (0.806) (1.019)  (1.380) (0.837) (1.075) 
Other 0.905*** -0.622** 0.247  0.926*** -0.600** -0.323 
  (0.278) (0.278) (0.326)  (0.283) (0.292) (0.358) 
PwC 0.805*** -0.237 -0.702  0.814*** -0.212 -0.977** 
  (0.277) (0.269) (0.461)  (0.284) (0.277) (0.488) 
Towers -0.228 -1.132*** -0.994***  -0.153 -1.163*** -1.168*** 
  (0.268) (0.253) (0.367)  (0.271) (0.259) (0.448) 
Constant  -5.406*** 3.886** 3.141  -6.032*** 3.659** 5.752** 
 (1.407) (1.546) (2.529)  (1.512) (1.635) (2.541) 
        
Plan types dummies     Yes 
  
Observations 1931    1931   
Log-likelihood -1834    -1767   








Table 5.5: Marginal effects of the impact of volatilities on performance choices 
 
Marginal effects of the impact of volatilities and corporate governance variables on performance 
choices in compensation contracts for Model 1. Marginal effects represent the effect of a unit change 
in the variable on the probability of an outcome (EPS, TSR, EPS and TSR, Neither EPS nor TSR). 
 
 TSR EPS TSR & EPS Neither TSR nor EPS 
Variable Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
EPS vol 0.035*** -0.026*** -0.008 -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
TSR vol -0.692** -0.091 0.783** -0.000 
 (0.341) (0.203) (0.329) (0.007) 
Market to book 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.015) 
Ln (Board size) 0.248*** 0.044 -0.291** -0.001 
 (0.067) (0.048) (0.145) (0.121) 
Non-executives % 0.007*** -0.005** -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Ln (Sales) -0.080*** 0.018** 0.061*** -0.000 
 (0.030) (0.008) (0.014) (0.021) 
Ln (Free cash flow) 0.171*** -0.140** -0.029 -0.000 
 (0.049) (0.055) (0.048) (0.043) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.030 0.020 -0.052*** 0.000 
 (0.024) (0.015) (0.014) (0.031) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.082* 0.042*** 0.0412 -0.000 
 (0.049) (0.011) (0.028) (0.075) 
Industry dummies 
    
Basic materials 0.248*** -0.196*** 0.006 -0.058*** 
 (0.053) (0.029) (0.052) (0.021) 
Consumer goods -0.115*** 0.203*** 0.005 -0.093*** 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.041) (0.016) 
Financials 0.256*** -0.101*** -0.257*** 0.101*** 
 (0.048) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) 
Healthcare 0.307*** -0.170*** -0.043 -0.093*** 
 (0.0741) (0.042) (0.071) (0.016) 
Industrials -0.081** -0.144*** 0.300*** -0.074*** 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.034) (0.016) 
Oil & gas 0.134* -0.116** 0.074 -0.093*** 
 (0.078) (0.049) (0.076) (0.016) 
Technology -0.208*** 0.185*** 0.036 -0.014 
 (0.037) (0.054) (0.055) (0.026) 
Utilities 0.345*** -0.218*** -0.047 -0.079*** 
 (0.074) (0.029) (0.071) (0.021) 
Consultant dummies     
HNBS 0.184*** -0.126 -0.054 -0.004 
 (0.067) (0.139) (0.201) (0.386) 
Kepler 0.183* -0.078 -0.099 -0.005 
 (0.096) (0.148) (0.236) (0.455) 
Mercer -0.150** 0.495 -0.363*** 0.019 
 (0.073) (1.616) (0.093) (1.648) 
Other 0.237 -0.160* -0.077 0.000 
 (0.160) (0.092) (0.061) (0.041) 
PwC                                                                                                                                   0.187*** -0.101 -0.082 -0.003 
 (0.059) (0.126) (0.185) (0.324) 
Towers 0.012 -0.167 0.158 -0.003 







5.5.2  Empirical Results 
5.5.2.1 Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Table 5.4 reports the results of the multinomial logit model with four performance choices. The 
R2 of 0.23 is in line with the previous studies of Zakaria (2012) and Crespi et al. (2004).  
In Model 1, Column 1 reveals that firms are significantly more likely to choose TSR only rather 
than TSR and EPS jointly if they have higher EPS volatility. Additionally, firms are 
significantly less likely to use TSR only rather than TSR and EPS jointly if they have higher 
TSR volatility. 
In Column 2, relating to the selection of EPS only, we find a negative and highly significant 
coefficient for EPS volatility, indicating that firms are less likely to use EPS only, over the 
alternative of EPS and TSR jointly, when firms have volatile EPS. Our findings are consistent 
with Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1993), who argue that firms prefer to choose 
performance measures that are less volatile. This is also in line with the predictions of the 
optimal contracting theory, suggesting that volatility has a significant role in the choice of 
performance measure. However, we do not find evidence of an association between the 
probability of choosing neither TSR nor EPS and the volatilities of EPS and TSR. 
Column 1 shows that the coefficient of sales is negatively associated with the selection of TSR 
only and neither EPS nor TSR category relative to reference category so that firms with higher 
sales are significantly less likely to use TSR alone. It could be argued that as large firms tend 
to be pioneers of innovative designs (Kole, 1997), and are more likely to include several 
different performance measures in their remuneration contracts. 
De Angelis and Grinstein (2015) compare the likelihood of using either market-based or 







reference group of EPS and TSR together. While they find that firms with longer CEO tenure 
are more likely to use accounting based measures, we find that firms with longer CEO tenure 
are more likely move away from using EPS and TSR jointly, to using TSR alone or EPS alone. 
We speculate that this may be because CEOs dislike dual targets and that longer tenure gives 
them more influence in the pay-setting process. One possible explanation of this result could 
be that their study considers a different dataset from a separate demography. 
Our findings also show that firms rely more on accounting-based measures, and less on TSR 
alone, as firm age increases. These are in line with De Angelis and Grinstein (2015), who 
likewise find that young firms tend to use market-based measures rather than accounting 
measures in performance contracts. They argue that this is in line with optimal contracting 
theory since market value is a better indicator of long-term outcomes than current-year 
accounting measures. 
The coefficients of market to book ratio are insignificant in Column 1 and Column 2, indicating 
that firms with higher growth opportunities have no clear preference for choosing EPS only or 
TSR only. 
Firms with a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the board are less likely to favour 
EPS only but are more likely to favour TSR only relative to the base category. These results 
suggest that firms with a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board are 
motivated to employ TSR, either alone, or in conjunction with EPS, as it is in the greater interest 
of shareholders.  
Concerning consultant-specific effects, the reference group used in the present study for the 
identity of the remuneration advisor is “Deloitte”. Based on the results in Column 1, firms that 
use HNBS, Kepler, PwC and the “Others” category as their remuneration consultants are more 







Kuang et al. (2014), who find that Deloitte is less likely to use TSR only than New Bridge Street 
or Towers Perrin. 
However, firms that hire HNBS, Towers and consultants in the “Others” category are less likely 
to favour EPS over EPS and TSR jointly, relative to Deloitte. Finally, we detect a significantly 
positive association between the choice of Mercer and the choice of neither TSR nor EPS 
relative the base category. These findings strongly suggest that compensation consultants play 
an influential role in the design of remuneration contracts, and indicates the operation of 
normative isomorphism, as consultants who provide services to multiple firms use similar 
performance metrics.  
Turning now to industry-specific factors, the reference category used is the “consumer services” 
group. Basic Materials and Utilities are significantly more likely to choose TSR only, and less 
likely to choose EPS only, than EPS and TSR jointly. Consumer Goods and Technology firms 
are significantly more likely to choose EPS only over EPS and TSR jointly. Financials are 
significantly more likely to choose TSR only, and EPS only, and neither EPS nor TSR than 
(EPS and TSR jointly), whereas the reverse is true for Industrials. Finally, Oil & Gas are 
significantly less likely to choose EPS only over EPS and TSR jointly. 
Since these industry dummies are significant after controlling for all the other independent 
variables, this provides strong evidence for norms operating inside distinct industries, so that 
normative isomorphism is one of the key influences on the choice of the performance measure. 
Broadly speaking, these results do not vary when controlling for plan type as shown in Columns 








5.5.2.2 Marginal Effects 
Addition to multinomial logit coefficient and the levels of significance, we have also shown the 
marginal effects, evaluated at the mean, of a change in the independent variable in Table 5. The 
marginal effects display the relative importance of each explanatory variable in predicting the 
probability of each event occurrence. For a dummy variable, marginal effects show by how 
much the probability of performance choices will change with a change in a dummy variable; 
while for a continuous variable, they show how much the probability will change with a one-
unit change in the value of the independent variable. 
In Table 5.5, Column 1 reveals that the estimated marginal effect of EPS volatility on TSR only 
is 0.035. This implies that an increase of 1 unit in 3-year earnings per share volatility raises the 
probability of choosing TSR only by 3.5 percentage points. The results in Column 2 show that 
a 1-unit increase in 3-year EPS volatility results in 2.6 percentage points decreases in the 
probability of choosing EPS only as performance criteria; this result is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The pattern of results observed in Model 1 and Model 2 is in line with the 
optimal contracting hypothesis, since under optimal contracting theory, the more volatile the 
performance measure, the less likely it is to be chosen as a performance measure. Hence, 
volatility in EPS impacts the choice of performance measure as seen in both models. These 
results are in line with Banker and Datar (1989). Nevertheless, from Column 3, EPS volatility 
is not associated with the probability of choosing EPS and TSR jointly.  
In Table 5.5, Column 3, the coefficient on TSR volatility for choosing EPS and TSR jointly is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, so that a unit increase in 3-year TSR 
volatility is associated with a 78.3 percent increase in the probability of EPS and TSR jointly 
being selected. This shows that TSR volatility is an important factor in the selection of EPS in 







significant in influencing the choice of EPS alone. This suggests that TSR alone is not viewed 
as a reasonable way to control for noise, consistent with Holmstrom (1982) and that high TSR 
volatility is countered by using EPS and TSR jointly as a guard against volatility in any one 
measure. The inclusion of an accounting measure in firms with higher values of TSR volatility, 
therefore, helps to filter some out noise in TSR. 
The results in Table 5.5, Column 1 indicate that when remuneration advisors HNBS, Kepler 
and PwC consultant category provide advice to firms, the probability of selecting TSR only as 
a performance measure is 18%, 18% and 19% points higher respectively than Deloitte. 
However, relative to Deloitte, none of the other consultants shows a preference for EPS-
contingent plans as shown in Column 2. A likely interpretation is that since Deloitte is an 
accounting firm, they tend to frequently recommend plans with accounting performance 
conditions.  
By contrast, in Column 3, which relates to the choice of EPS and TSR jointly, only Mercer has 
a significant coefficient, so that the choice of Mercer is associated with a 36 percentage point 
reduction in the probability of selecting EPS and TSR jointly. Finally, in Column 4, relating to 
the choice of neither EPS nor TSR, none of the coefficients are significant. This is interesting 
since it shows that the institutional isomorphism identified above, pertains only to the issue of 
selecting TSR only. It appears that some advisors hold much more positive views on TSR only, 
but that they do not hold such strongly divergent on the other performance measures. 
The probability of firms operating TSR-based plans in basic materials, financials, healthcare, 
oil and gas, and utility industries is 0.25, 0.26, 0.31, 0.13 and 0.34 higher respectively than 
firms in the consumer services group (reference category). However, the probability of 







respectively. Technology firms prefer EPS based performance metrics and one possible 
interpretation is that executives are incentivized through methods which generate net income.  
In case of Dummy variables in column 2 indicate that industries other than technology and 
consumer goods have a reduced probability of employing EPS exclusively than consumer 
services industry. More interestingly, no industry except industrials employs EPS and TSR 
jointly significantly more than the reference category. Furthermore, there exists a negative and 
statistically significant association between all industries except financial and the selection of 
neither EPS nor TSR. Further, untabulated results reveal that within the real estate and insurance 
sectors of the financial industry, the use of NAV and ROE measures is more prevalent. 
According to column 1, a one-unit increase in log sales results in an 8 percentage points 
decrease in the probability of TSR being selected. While these results are not consistent with 
Zakaria (2012), who finds that large firms more often use TSR as a performance measure than 
EPS, her study was based on a much older sample, from 2003/2004. Also, sales has a strong 
marginal effect with an increase in the probability of EPS and TSR jointly by 6.1 percentage 
points for a one-unit increase in log sales. However, the marginal effect for non-executive 
directors (column 1, TSR only) and (column 2, EPS alone) is 0.007 and 0.005 percent 
respectively, showing that a greater presence of non-executive directors influences the choice 
of performance measure. 
There is an interesting contrast in the effects of volatility in performance measures: whereas in 
columns 1 & 2, they are strongly significant in influencing the likelihood of EPS alone or TSR 
only being selected, in column 4, they play no role in the likelihood of neither EPS nor TSR 
being selected. Likewise, corporate governance factors and remuneration consultants do not 
significantly influence the probability of choosing neither EPS nor TSR category. This clearly 







a firm. Nonetheless, the results also show that for firms within the financial industry, there is a 
0.10 probability of choosing the neither EPS nor TSR category. This could be because of strong 
dependence on measures other than total shareholder returns or earnings within these industries. 
Summarising the results from the marginal effects, our results suggest that out of all four 
categories, the use of TSR only in incentive contracts is industry-specific, and some consultants 
prefer using one performance measure relative to another. Industry forces drive the choice of 
accounting and financial performance measures, providing evidence of normative isomorphism 
in the design of pay packages. Firms with highly volatile TSR prefer to choose EPS and TSR 
jointly as a performance measure. One possible explanation is even if TSR is volatile, firms 
still use TSR along with an accounting measure to filter out noise in the market-based measure. 
The use of EPS and TSR jointly is influenced by firm size and in general is not specific to 
consultant and industry; only one consultant (Mercer) and financial industry show a strong 
negative association with selection of EPS and TSR jointly. 
 
5.5.2.3  Robustness 
In this section, we subject the previous results to a variety of robustness tests, all of them are 
available in the Appendix to Chapter 5. We use different measures of volatility: we use basic 
EPS and basic TSR volatilities instead of using cumulative EPS and cumulative TSR volatility, 
as many of these plans use basic EPS as a performance measure. The negative relationship 
between the choice of EPS as a performance measure and EPS volatility still holds. As shown 
in Table A.5.1 in the Appendix to Chapter 5, we also introduce industry-adjusted EPS and TSR 
volatility as a benchmark for the volatility measure. Interestingly, once these industry-adjusted 
measures are added, the main results remain qualitatively similar and show that firms with high 







robustness test includes the use of time fixed effects. The main results again do not change 
qualitatively. Table A.5.4 in the Appendix to Chapter 5 presents the results when we use total 
assets to replace sales and find similar results on this alternative proxy. Finally, in Table A.5.5 
in the Appendix to Chapter 5, we also include EPS along with net income measure and find 
consistent results that firms with higher volatile earnings are less likely to prefer earnings 
measures. 
 
5.6 Design of Compensation Contracts 
Next, we turn our attention to the design of compensation contracts. Every performance 
measure has hurdles with lower and upper threshold targets: for minimum vesting, firm 
performance needs to trigger the lower threshold target, and for full vesting, firms must meet 
the upper threshold target, as specified in the executive compensation contract. Vesting refers 
to the restriction on ownership of shares being lifted, meaning that executives can now transfer 
or sell the shares they are entitled to. For example, in a standard three-year long-term incentive 
plan, if the performance-contingent shares are offered in 2010, then executives can vest their 
shares in 2013 based on the subsequent achievement of performance targets. The amount of 
shares vesting depends upon where firm performance lies between the lower and upper 
threshold ranges. The value of these awards is usually determined by the share price on the day 
the share vests. Usually, from the date of the grant, executives have ten years before options or 
restricted stock shares lapse. 
TSR is usually measured relative to a sector, or an index or a bespoke (i.e. hand-picked) group 
which the firm chooses. Frequently, the minimum reward is triggered if the firm’s growth in 
TSR ranks in excess of the median (50th percentile) group of companies in their comparator 







quartile (75th percentile) relative to the comparator group over the three-year performance 
period. Vesting between these two limits is usually on a straight-line basis. 
ABI (1999) recommended that EPS growth targets should be measured in absolute terms in 
executive compensation contracts. Generally, firms use either EPS absolute growth or EPS 
growth in excess of the Retail Price Index (RPI). EPS is most commonly expressed as a 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) over a three-year performance period. As an example 
of EPS thresholds, a typical minimum performance hurdle is 3% p.a. (i.e. 9% over the 
performance period). The firm needs to have a minimum threshold of an average growth rate 
of 3% p.a. in order for the CEO to vest 25% of the equity. In order to get a maximum payout 
(100%) of the equity, firms typically have to exhibit an average growth rate of 6% p.a. (i.e. 18% 
over the performance period). Some firms use EPS growth benchmarks against RPI or CPI. 
Different firms in the same sector may select different vesting criteria. As an example, in 2012 
Atkins, a multinational firm in the support services industry, used only EPS as a performance 
measure in their LTIPs. In order to trigger the basic reward, Atkins should meet a minimum 
performance hurdle of 5% annual growth rate in EPS resulting in 25% of the equity vesting. By 
contrast, in 2012, Michael Page, another multinational firm in the support services industry, 
minimum performance hurdle was set at EPS growth of 5% per annum leading to 50% of the 
equity vesting. 
 
5.6.1 Market-Based Measures 
5.6.1.1 Peer Group Choices for TSR Only Contracts 
Once firms decide to use market-based measures in their compensation contracts, the next key 







Government’s Directors’ Remuneration Report (2002) requires companies to disclose the peer 
firms used in determining executive compensation. 
Table 5.6: Market-based performance targets and relative benchmarks 
The above table indicates the respective number of plans that use market-based measures in remuneration 
contracts. “Bespoke” indicates when group members are hand-picked by the firm. “Sector” and “index” indicate 
the use of a specific sector or index, respectively, as a comparator group (e.g. the FTSE 250 Support Services 
Index). “Bespoke sector” indicates the use of a peer group of companies from a specific sector (e.g. oil companies). 
“Bespoke sector” indicates the use of a peer group of companies from a specific sector (e.g. oil companies). 
“Bespoke index” refers to the use of specific companies from an index (e.g. choosing the 51st to 150th firms in the 
FTSE 350 as ranked by market capitalization). “Bespoke sector and index” is the use of self-selected firms from 
both a sector and an Index (e.g. the FTSE All Share Media companies excluding FTSE 100 participants). “Sector” 
indicates the use of specific sectors as a comparator group (e.g. Media/Mining). “TSR absolute” refers to the 
absolute growth in total shareholder returns. “Target share price” refers to the achievement of a specific target 
share price. “TSR underpin” refers to when it is used as a precondition with another performance measure. 
Table 5.6 shows a breakdown of benchmarks relating to TSR as a performance measure. The 
results indicate that 34% and 32% of the plans use bespoke (disclosed and undisclosed) and 
index TSR, respectively, to proportion the vesting of equity compensation. It is easier for firms 
to choose indices, as this requires less effort than the self-selection of peer groups. However, 
choosing the right peer group is crucial, otherwise, it will introduce volatility to the payout, 
eventually demotivating executives.40 
                                                 
 
40 This is discussed in more details by Kapinos et al. (2014) in the industry paper titled, Relative Total Shareholder 
Return (TSR) Plan Design Across the Atlantic, Aon 
Market-based Measure PSPs Share options Matching plans 
Relative to TSR    
Bespoke (Disclosed) 614 25 56 
Bespoke (Not Disclosed) 13 0 0 
Bespoke index 142 5 17 
Bespoke sector 25 0 13 
Bespoke sector and index 36 6 0 
Index 566 54 49 
Sector 83 1 8 
Sector and index 168 6 25 
TSR (Underpin) 11 4 0 
Absolute TSR    
Target share price 38 8 5 
TSR absolute growth 63 13 22 







On the other hand, only 4.7% of firms use TSR absolute growth as a performance measure 
within their equity plans. The results also show that it is more common that TSR is subject to 
comparison with a peer group than a specific rate of increase (i.e. absolute TSR growth) in all 
types of long-term incentive arrangements. One possible explanation is that absolute TSR does 
not take into account the general movements in the market and is not a true reflection of 
executives’ effort (Barty and Jones, 2012). Infrequently, some firms also use a specific share 
price figure in their long-term incentive plans. Only 10% of plans use both sector and index 
together as a relative benchmark. Firms in the general retail, travel and leisure, media and real 
estate investment sectors more commonly use sectors as a TSR peer group. 
Next, we analyse the comparator groups within the components of long-term incentive plans, 
where we find that many firms use bespoke peer groups in their plans. We further break down 
the different market indices to study the various peer group used in long-term incentive plans. 
Table 5.7: Comparator Groups (Index) in Relative to TSR Plans 
 
Index PSPs Share options Matching plans 
 
Small Cap 
115 8 17 
FTSE 100 102 3 4 
FTSE 250 277 18 20 
FTSE 350 32 12 5 
FTSE All Share 22 7 0 
Others (HSBC /Morgan Stanley) 18 6 3 
Total 566 54 49 
Table 5.7 summarizes the comparators used by companies to benchmark their own TSR performance. “FTSE 250” 
refers to the firms in the FTSE 250 UK Index; similarly, “FTSE 100”, “FTSE 350” and “FTSE Small Cap” refer 
to the firms in the FTSE 100, FTSE 350 Index and FTSE Small Capitalization Index, respectively. “Others” refers 
to firms that use alternative categories of the index (e.g. HSBC/Morgan Stanley Index). Firms may have more than 
one plan, each of which may reference a different comparator group. 
                                                 
https://www.radford.com/home/insights/articles/2014/relativ.e_tsr_plan_design_across_the_atlantic.asp  








Table 5.7 shows that 47% of the plans in the sample use the FTSE 250 peer group. Only 16% 
of plans choose TSR relative to the FTSE 100 Index, and interestingly, 21% of the plans are 
identified as using FTSE Small Cap peer group, so that the FTSE 250 peer group is the most 
widely used comparator group choice in compensation contracts. 
 
5.6.1.2 Vesting Levels in TSR Based Contracts 
After making the choice of performance measure and peer group, firms choose payouts at 
different levels of performance. While it is common for US companies to have a maximum 
payout between 100% and 200% of base salary, the payout policy for UK firms rarely exceeds 
100% of base salary.41 According to ABI guidelines, vesting conditions in performance 
measures should be fully transparent, explained and linked to the achievement of shareholders’ 
value (ABI, 2013). 
Table 5.8 
 
















0.00%-10.00% 44 4 16 50.01%-60.00% 0 0 0 
10.01%-20.00% 217 3 46 60.01%-70.00% 32 0 4 
20.01%-30.00% 1303 72 117 71.01%-80.00% 161 6 28 
30.01%-40.00% 93 26 8 81.01%-90.00% 204 17 32 
40.01%-50.00% 57 10 8 91.01%-100.00% 1329 95 131 
Not Disclosed 25 0 0 Not Disclosed 16 0 0 
Complex 6 3 0 Complex 6 0 0 
Single threshold 3 0 0 Single threshold 0 0 0 
Underpin 11 4 0 Underpin 11 4 0 
Total 1759 122 195 Total 1759 122 195 
        
0% vesting  37 4 16     
25% vesting 951 45 78 100% vesting 1162 84 118 
Minimum vesting of awards ranges from 0% to 50% after meeting lower threshold targets. Vesting at upper 
quartile ranges from 60% to 100%. “Single Threshold” refers to firms using only a single threshold hurdle in their 








plans. “0% Vesting” refers to contracts which assign a zero percent vesting of equity for the achieving median 
TSR performance. “Upper quartile vesting levels” presents the percentage of equity which vests when TSR 
performance is at least equal to the upper quartile of the comparator group’s TSR. Most plans set 100% equity 
vesting if firms’ performance is at least equal to the upper quartile of the comparator group. The remaining plans, 
where less than 100% of the equity vests at this level, are here classified as “Outperformance TSR plans” and are 
detailed in Panel B below. “Underpin” refers to the situation in which TSR is used as an initial indicator in 
conjunction with another performance measure. 
Panel A of Table 5.8 documents the vesting level of equity at the median and upper quartile 
threshold performance with respect to the comparator group’s TSR. As discussed earlier, 
performance at least equal to the median of the peer group is frequently used by firm as a 
minimum performance threshold.  
Table 5.8.  
Panel B: Outperformance TSR plans 
 
Maximum Vesting Levels PSPs Options Matching plans 
Upper Quintile 177 13 17 
Upper Decile 79 4 9 
Outperformance Over the Index 244 21 26 
Outperformance Over the Median 97 0 25 
Table 5.8, Panel B reports the breakdown of plans where TSR performance criteria for maximum vesting is above 
the upper quartile of comparator groups’ TSR. 
As shown in Panel A in the above table, there is a wide variation in the percentage of equity 
which vests if the firm’s relative TSR places it in at least the 50th percentile rank over a three-
year performance period. In 2.7% of our plans, 0% of the award vests at this level. 3% of plans 
set between 0% to 10% to vest at this level, and 72% of plans set between 20% and 30% of 
equity to vest at this level. Of these, 52% of plans set exactly 25% of equity to vest, making it 
the most popular vesting level used by these firms. By contrast, in 4% of our plans, exactly 50% 
of the award vests at this level. This implies that two firms could set different minimum vesting 
percentages of equity at median performance relative to the comparator group, so that the firm 
with the lower percentage of equity vesting at the minimum vesting threshold has the tougher 







The upper quartile vesting levels reveal that 66% of the plans’ awards permit maximum payout 
(full vesting) if the TSR of the company exceeds the performance of 75% of the comparator 
group (upper quartile) over a three-year performance period, while only 9% of plans allow 
between 70% and 80% of equity to vest after meeting upper quartile performance. This clearly 
suggests the presence of either normative or mimetic isomorphism, since a high proportion of 
firms choose to adopt identical practices in this regard.  
There exists diversity within the LTIP plans awarded by firms: the presence of similar 
performance measures but with different comparator groups introduces a considerable variation 
in the median and upper quartile threshold vesting in practice, adding further complexity to the 
design of compensation contracts, even though vesting levels do not vary widely if we break 
down these long-term incentive plans. 
The term “underpin” functions as a threshold or hurdle. In cases where firms have two or more 
performance measures, one of them may be designated as an “underpin” so that the underpin 
performance target must be achieved before any of the awards will vest. As an example of this, 
consider Dechra Pharma that granted a performance shares plan in 2010 with a primary EPS 
target, and a TSR “underpin” performance target. The underpin TSR performance target 
required TSR performance to be at least equivalent to the median group of companies, and once 
this was met, the EPS performance measure with lower and upper threshold targets came into 
operation. In the case that the TSR underpin target was not met, no equity would vest, even if 
the EPS upper threshold target was attained. 
As described here earlier, many plans employ a standard set of TSR growth thresholds: the 
initial vesting threshold is set to the median of the comparator group, and the upper vesting 
threshold is set to the upper quartile of the comparator group. Away from these standard 







2010 selected an upper threshold of TSR to be greater than or equal to 20% per annum in excess 
of the FTSE 250 Index for maximum payout and so is included in the “Outperformance over 
the Index” category.  In some plans, the maximum threshold is above the upper quartile of the 
comparator group, usually, the upper quintile or decile, while for others, some firms choose 
plans in which growth in TSR should be equal to the median plus an additional margin, in order 
to trigger maximum payout. Panel B of Table 5.8 reveals that that out of 1759 performance 
share plans, 244 use outperformance relative to an index in order for the maximum payout to 
vest. In contrast, 177 plans require firms’ TSR growth relative to the group of companies to be 
in the upper quintile for the maximum vesting. In contrast to Zakaria (2012) and Pass et al. 
(2000), there has been a shift in the landscape of remuneration contracts, as firms increasingly 








5.6.2 Accounting-Based Measures 
5.6.2.1 Breakdown of Types of EPS 
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In a similar manner to the TSR targets analysed previously, EPS targets also have initial and maximum 
vesting thresholds which function in a similar way. The principal difference arises in that EPS target is 
usually absolute, and do not refer to a comparator group, as with TSR targets. These descriptive statistics 
indicate that firms incorporate diverse performance targets, and as before, lower or upper threshold targets 
often have different vesting levels of equity. 
We note from Table 5.9 that within long-term incentive arrangements, there are different definitions of EPS 
owing to different calculation methods, though most firms prefer using basic earnings per share, 68% of 
plans choose a performance target based on basic EPS growth in excess of RPI, while 55% use EPS absolute 
growth over a three-year performance period. After basic EPS, the next most popular performance measure 
is adjusted earnings per share, with 17% of the plans employing this, and about 6% of plans use diluted 
EPS as performance criteria. Diluted earnings per share denote the conversion of dilutive securities into 
common stock, resulting in an adjustment of the number of shares outstanding as well as earnings. Lastly, 
4% of plans employ underlying EPS-contingent compensation arrangements. Unlike TSR, EPS is measured 
in absolute terms rather than relative to the companies. Relative EPS is less common as firms find it difficult 
to find a peer group for which the profit growth is similar to that of the company. 
 
5.6.2.2 EPS targets and Vesting levels 
Next, Table 5.10 reveals that while the minimum threshold range is relatively compressed, the upper 
threshold range is more dispersed, whether real or absolute terms are used. 
Turning first to minimum thresholds, Panel A of Table 5.10 reports minimum thresholds for EPS where 
these are stated in real terms, as an RPI + x% figure. 82% of plans lie in the range of RPI + 2% p.a. to RPI 







Table 5.10. Panel A: Distribution of EPS growth in excess of RPI required for minimum and maximum threshold (in per annum equivalent) 
Minimum threshold targets (RPI + x %) PSPs Options 
Matching 
plans 
Maximum threshold targets (RPI + x %) PSP Options 
Matching 
plans 
0.01% to 0.99% 8 0 0 1.00% to 1.99% 1 6 0 
1.00% to 1.99% 14 0 0 2.00% to 2.99% 3 7 15 
2.00% to 2.99% 222 64 62 3.00% to 3.99% 1 1 0 
3.00% to 3.99% 196 7 47 4.00% to 4.99% 24 11 20 
4.00% to 4.99% 132 38 11 5.00% to 5.99% 27 10 22 
5.00% to 5.99% 71 8 3 6.00% to 6.99% 39 20 10 
6.00% to 6.99% 24 2 4 7.00% to 7.99% 86 29 13 
7.00% to 7.99% 6 7 0 8.00% to 8.99% 46 11 0 
8.00% to 8.99% 6 4 0 9.00% to 9.99% 156 27 24 
9.00% to 9.99% 13 3 0 10.00% to 10.99% 45 4 7 
10.00% to 10.99% 0 0 0 11.00% to 11.99% 124 4 6 
11.00% to 11.99% 4 0 0 12.00% to 12.99% 27 0 14 
12.00% to 12.99% 1 4 0 13.00% to 13.99% 8 21 1 
13.00% and above 3 0 0 14.00% to 14.99% 64 6 7 
Not disclosed 4 0 0 15.00% to 15.99% 20 2 3 
No lower threshold 1 22 15 16.00% and above 31 0 0 
Relative to the Index 0 0 0 Not disclosed                                3 0 0 
Underpin 32 4 6 Underpin 32 4 6 
Minimum vesting levels    Maximum vesting levels    
1.00% to 9.99% 41 2 25 90.00% to 99.99% 737 159 148 
10.00% to 19.99% 71 2 9 Not disclosed                                0 0 0 
20.00% to 29.99% 491 97 58 Complex 0 0 0 
30.00% to 39.99% 56 20 18 Single threshold 0 0 0 
40.00% to 49.99% 29 16 17 Underpin 32 0 6 
Not Disclosed 14 0 0 Total  737 163 148 
Complex  0 0 0     
Single Threshold 3 22 15 0% Vesting  26 2 12 
Underpin 32 0 6 25% Vesting  376 77 14 







Table 5.10. Panel B: Distribution of EPS absolute growth required for minimum and maximum threshold (in per annum equivalent) 
Minimum absolute threshold targets PSPs Options Matching Maximum absolute threshold targets PSP Option Matching 
0.01% to 0.99% 1 0 0 4.00% to 4.99% 0 3 3 
1.00% to 1.99% 0 0 0 5.00% to 5.99% 8 0 0 
2.00% to 2.99% 18 8 8 6.00% to 6.99% 2 5 1 
3.00% to 3.99% 21 12 17 7.00% to 7.99% 8 13 0 
4.00% to 4.99% 86 6 5 8.00% to 8.99% 15 7 10 
5.00% to 5.99% 78 10 11 9.00% to 9.99% 38 6 9 
6.00% to 6.99% 26 0 8 10.00% to 10.99% 12 1 5 
7.00% to 7.99% 19 4 7 11.00% to 11.99% 55 1 3 
8.00% to 8.99% 9 0 0 12.00% to 12.99% 22 1 2 
9.00% to 9.99% 28 4 4 13.00% to 13.99% 20 1 14 
10.00% to 10.99% 4 0 0 14.00% to 14.99% 63 7 9 
11.00% to 11.99% 3 0 0 15.00% to 15.99% 5 0 0 
12.00% to 12.99% 1 0 0 16.00% to 16.99% 15 0 4 
13.00% to 13.99% 0 0 0 17.00% to 17.99% 0 0 0 
14.00% to 14.99% 8 0 0 18.00% to 18.99% 0 0 0 
15.00% to 15.99% 7 0 0 19.00% to 19.99% 20 0 0 
Not disclosed 8 0 0 20.00% and above 28 0 0 
Single threshold 2 1 0 Not disclosed 8 0 0 
Relative to the Index 11 0 0 Relative to Index 11 0 0 
Minimum vesting levels    Maximum vesting levels    
1.00% to 9.99% 34 3 6 90.00% to 99.99% 314 45 60 
10.00% to 19.99% 50 6 3 Not disclosed 10 0 0 
20.00% to 29.99% 191 12 33 Complex  6 0 0 
30.00% to 39.99% 26 20 6 Single Threshold 0 0 0 
40.00% to 49.99% 5 3 12 Underpin 0 0 0 
Not disclosed 14 0 0 Total  330 45 60 
Complex  8 0 0     
Single Threshold 2 1 0 0% Vesting  29 3 2 
Underpin 0 0 0 25% Vesting   144 12 27 







Panel A and B of Table 5.10 present the distribution of EPS growth corresponding to the 
minimum and maximum threshold target range. 
Panel B of Table 5.10 documents the distribution of EPS absolute growth targets, as opposed 
to the real-terms growth targets presented in Panel A. 79% of the plans, have a minimum 
threshold hurdle range between 2% p.a. to 8% p.a. 
Turning next to upper thresholds, Panel A of Table 5.10 reveals that 69% of the plans in our 
sample have an upper threshold target range of RPI + 7% p.a. to RPI + 15% p.a. with a particular 
concentration in the range of RPI + 9% p.a. to 9.99% p.a. These results are in line with Ward 
(2000), who finds that EPS growth plus RPI of 2% is most commonly used in incentive plans 
from 1994 to 1998, and also with Zakaria (2012), who finds that 68.1% of plans have a 
minimum vesting threshold in the range of RPI + 2% p.a. to RPI + 6% p.a. Zakaria (2012) does 
not disclose specific range data for upper thresholds. With regards to absolute targets in Panel 
B, 79% of plans have upper growth targets between 7% and 16.99%. The descriptive statistics 
of Zakaria (2012) show that during 2002/2003, less than half of plans with EPS based 
compensation contracts employed upper thresholds hurdles, showing that the use of upper 
threshold targets have increased over time, and overall targets are more demanding. 
Table 5.10 additionally presents information on the level of equity which vests at the minimum 
EPS target. In Panel A, discussing real EPS targets, 62% of the plans have a vesting range of 
between 20.00% and 29.99%. Similar to the comparable results for TSR, minimum equity 
vesting has a particular peak at 25%, which is used by 44% of plans. In Panel B, concerning 
absolute EPS targets, 54% of plans have a vesting of between 20.00% and 29.99%, and there is 
a peak at 25%, used by 42% of plans. Overall, these results suggest that normative or mimetic 
isomorphism is not limited to the choice of performance measure but is also present in the 







5.7 Performance Target Achievements 
Prior studies suggest that firms exhibit a bias in the selection of their TSR comparator group, 
choosing them in such a way as to make outperformance more likely and lead to greater vesting 
of equity. Consistent with the analysis in Lewellen et al. (1996) study, we examine the three-
year return in firms which select different indices, in order to shed light on whether the different 
selection of relative TSR benchmarks helps executives achieve their minimum and maximum 
performance hurdles, and whether the selection of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 or FTSE Small 
Cap indices was most beneficial for executives. It is easier to perform TSR calculation for firms 
which select a pre-defined market index, since firms which select bespoke comparator groups 
frequently have a global set of peers, making it difficult to calculate their TSRs individually. In 
the following analysis, we, therefore, exclude such companies from our sample and include 
only firms which choose a named index in their relative TSR plans. 
Table 5.11: This table presents the breakdown of the number of plans achieving median or upper 
quartile performance thresholds of relative TSR benchmarks against the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, 






















2007 0.56(0.61) 0.10(0.04) 14 6 2 6 
 
2008 0.52(0.51) 0.45(0.30) 23 11 2 10 
FTSE 100 
2009 0.51(0.49) 1.13(0.73) 14 8 2 4 
 
2010 0.65(0.79) 0.75(0.52) 15 4 2 9 
 
2011 0.52(0.54) 0.80(0.58) 21 9 6 6 
 














Year                     
Avg (Median) 
TSR Firm 
















2007 0.59(0.64) 0.01(0.12) 23 8 5 10 
 
2008 0.55(0.71) 0.44(0.36) 27 14 3 10 
FTSE 250 2009 0.58(0.59) 1.20(0.83) 36 16 7 13 
 
2010 0.51(0.57) 0.66(0.55) 37 15 11 11 
 
2011 0.57(0.65) 0.73(0.63) 40 15 10 15 
 



























2007 0.36(0.48) 0.00(0.06) 4 2 2 0 
 
2008 0.35(0.49) 0.42(.32) 6 3 2 1 
FTSE 350 2009 0.35(0.25) 1.18(0.81) 6 4 1 1 
 
2010 0.55(0.87) 0.68(0.52) 6 2 0 4 
 
2011 0.17(0.19) 0.74(0.60) 3 2 0 1 
 

























 2007 0.93 (0.98) -0.13(0.17) 8 0 1 7 
 
2008 0.73(0.90) 0.32(0.22) 12 3 1 8 
 
2009 0.47(0.50) 1.21(0.72) 15 3 5 7 
FTSE Small 
Cap 
2010 0.64(0.72) 0.57(0.42) 15 4 6 5 
 
2011 0.57(0.68) 0.49(0.39) 17 4 6 7 
 











“Avg (Median) TSR Index” indicates the average (median) three-year change in total shareholder returns for the 
index. “Avg (Median) TSR Firm” indicates the average (median) of three-year change in total shareholder returns 
for all firms using the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE 350 and FTSE Small Cap indices, by year. “No. of plans” 
refers to the number of plans using a specific index. “Targets not achieved” represents the number of plans that do 
not achieve any performance hurdles in a particular year using a specific index. “Median threshold targets 
achieved” stands for the number of plans achieving the lower threshold hurdles only. “Upper threshold targets 
achieved” refers to the number of plans achieving upper threshold hurdles. A prior three-month averaging period 
has been used in the TSR calculations. Firms with unavailable data for the past and actual 3-year EPS (TSR) 
growth are excluded from our sample. In addition, we consider actual 3-year EPS (TSR) growth figures, so that 
the latest year considered is 2012. This results in a final sample which is different from that shown in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.11 shows the number of plans which select a TSR benchmark relative to the FTSE 100, 
FTSE 250 or FTSE Small Cap indices. Many firms in their compensation contracts select the 
50th and 75th TSR percentile ranking for minimum and maximum payouts, respectively, as 
shown previously. The findings above show that around half of the plans of firms that selected 
the FTSE 100 in 2007, 2008 and 2010 met the upper threshold targets in addition to the median 
threshold targets, and only 18% of plans achieve the median threshold hurdle while failing to 
attain the upper threshold hurdle. 
The most popular index used by firms is the FTSE 250 with 47% of plans employing it. From 
the above table, we observe that on average 46% of plans do not achieve their median threshold 
targets, while 34% of such plans achieve both the median and the upper threshold targets. Only 
a few firms use the FTSE 350 index as a relative index, among whom, only 25% of plans meet 
both the median and the upper threshold targets, and 53% of plans do not even meet the median 
performance hurdle.  
We also notice that an average TSR growth in FTSE Small Capitalization ranges from -0.13% 
to 0.63, as indicated by the Avg (Median) TSR Index column. From 2007 to 2012, we observe 
that there are high and lower TSR values, the results from Table 5.11 show that the firms do 
not achieve the initial performance hurdle with 2007 as an exception. More than 49% of the 







targets, so that among all indices, there is greater percentage of upper threshold targets achieved 
in plans which use the FTSE Small Cap as a relative Index. 
Next, in Tables 5.12 and 5.13, we focus on target attainability for plans that employ EPS as a 
performance measure. RPI growth figures are collected from the National Statistics website. 
Table 5.12. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of EPS Real/RPI growth targets 
 












Initial threshold 511 4.42% 1.78% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 21.50% 
Maximum threshold 511 10.29% 3.34% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 30.00% 
Past 3-year EPS 
growth 
511 14.41% 30.96% 0.16% 10.90% 20.62% 90.00% 
Actual 3-year EPS 
growth 




Panel B: The breakdown of number of plans achieving minimum or maximum performance 


































2007 74 0.083 0.143 10 28 36 0.050 0.080 
2008 88 0.080 0.140 14 29 45 0.048 0.084 
2009 82 0.045 0.095 16 45 21 0.163 0.108 
2010 87 0.086 0.146 16 34 37 0.113 0.093 
2011 91 0.092 0.152 11 19 61 0.097 0.047 
2012 89 0.082 0.142 24 27 38 0.045 0.105 
























228 4.80% 3.17% 3.20% 4.00% 6.70% 20.00% 
Maximum 
threshold target 
228 10.93% 4.67% 9.00% 10.00% 15.00% 28.00% 
Past 3-year EPS 
growth 
228 23.63% 56.00% 1.75% 15.02% 26.00% 107.00% 
Actual 3-year EPS 
growth 
228 20.80% 28.90% 4.90% 16.14% 21.00% 150.00% 
  
Table 5.13.  
 
Panel B:  The breakdown of a number of plans achieving minimum or maximum performance 

































2007 34 5.00% 10.00% 4 22 8 17.15% 15.25% 
2008 39 5.00% 10.00% 3 23 13 16.30% 14.57% 
2009 31 5.00% 10.50% 5 26 0 15.13% 15.50% 
2010 45 5.00% 11.75% 5 33 7 12.15% 15.83% 
2011 38 5.00% 12.00% 10 16 12 7.60% 10.80% 
2012 41 5.50% 13.00% 5 18 18 7.85% 7.81% 
Total 228 
  
32 138 58   
 
“No of plans” refers to the number of firms using EPS performance measure in their plans. “Past 3-year EPS 
growth” is the earnings per share growth for each company over the past three years prior to the plan. “Actual 3-
year growth” is the earnings per share growth for the company over the next three years after plan adoption. 
“Minimum threshold” is the median earnings per share growth of the minimum threshold target set by firms. 
“Maximum threshold” is the median earnings per share growth of the upper threshold set by firms. “Minimum 
threshold targets achieved” signifies the number of plans achieving lower threshold targets only. “Minimum and 
maximum target achieved” refers to the number of plans achieving both minimum and maximum threshold targets. 







The results in the Panel A of Table 5.12 indicate that on average, 46% of the plans in our sample 
do not meet a minimum performance hurdle. By contrast, 36% of the plans achieve lower and 
the maximum threshold targets. One exception is 2009 when 19% and 54% of the plans 
achieved minimum and maximum threshold targets due to lower RPI respectively. Looking at 
the 3-year past EPS growth, we observe that minimum threshold targets are set below three-
year prior EPS growth in 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
Panel B of Table 5.13 presents the results relating to absolute EPS targets. In contrast to firms 
using real EPS targets, we observe that firms using absolute EPS growth attain their upper and 
lower thresholds targets with greater ease; only 25% of plans do not meet lower or upper-
performance hurdles. Panel A of Table 10 shows that there exists greater variance in minimum 
and maximum threshold targets, due to targets being widely spread over the sample. On 
average, minimum threshold targets do not vary much over time, and range between 5% to 
5.5% p.a. from 2007 to 2012. 
Interestingly, on average, firms using absolute EPS measures tend to set lower minimum EPS 
threshold targets compared to their actual past 3-year EPS growth results and in addition, there 
exists a difference in target attainability in firms using absolute EPS over firms which employ 
EPS in excess of RPI.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
Using a comprehensive sample of 400 large firms from 2007 until 2015, we examine the 
influence of volatility and corporate governance variables on firms’ choice of performance 
measures. We find that the choice of a performance measure is not arbitrary, but instead, 







firm performance measure. Consistent with the optimal contracting approach, we find that firms 
tend to choose performance measures which are less volatile, implying that contracts are 
designed optimally. Further, remuneration advisors and the volatility in performance measure 
neither influence the selection of TSR nor EPS category. 
Some consultants exhibit a preference to select TSR, while other consultants prefer the use of 
EPS, so that consultant identity is an important factor in the choice of performance metrics in 
compensation contracts, providing evidence of normative isomorphism within executives’ 
compensation contracts. Furthermore, firms with higher sales prefer to choose a combination 
of EPS and TSR as a performance metric, indicating that larger firms prefer to rely on a 
combination of EPS and TSR performance measures as key indicators of the firm’s value 
creation.  
This study provides an in-depth analysis of the design of executive contracts and the different 
plan characteristics of long-term incentive arrangements. We observe from our descriptive 
statistics that there has been a decline in the use of options, while performance share plans 
appear to remain a key element of long-term incentive plans. 
Key findings from our descriptive analysis show that firms use various types of market-based 
measures. Among market-based measures, the use of relative TSR is most frequent, and the 
FTSE 250 is the most common Index employed in relative TSR plans. However, firms are 
increasingly setting stretching targets away from traditional benchmarking through the use of 
outperformance plans, in which maximum vesting is above the traditional median or upper 
quartile. Moreover, there also exists different target attainability within different TSR index, so 
that the FTSE Small Cap offers the greater potential for target attainment.  
Our findings also indicate that firms use different versions of EPS and that growth in EPS can 







threshold range of 2% p.a. to 8% p.a. is most popular in plans using an EPS absolute growth 
target, while for plans using an EPS growth benchmark against growth in RPI, the target range 
of 2% p.a. to 6% p.a. is most popular. There exists a wider spread of upper threshold targets in 
plans that use EPS benchmark against growth in RPI compared to absolute EPS targets: the RPI 
targets are concentrated in the range of RPI + 7% p.a. to RPI +17% p.a., while EPS absolute 
growth targets mostly range from 7% p.a. to 15% p.a. After adjusting for the effect of RPI in 
EPS targets, we observe that minimum and maximum threshold targets are set lower in absolute 
EPS growth targets, and hence, achievement of targets is higher in firms using absolute EPS 
growth figures. Since the ABI guidelines provide no clear structure for determining the 
appropriate standards, we argue that this represents a case of mimetic isomorphism, in which 
firms copy each other’ standards. 
This study will reassure shareholders and institutional holders since we show that the choice of 
performance measure in compensation contracts tends to reflect optimal contracting. From a 
policy perspective, we find that remuneration advisors play an influential role in contract design 
and there exist many forms of isomorphism in one form or another, which arise from hiring 









APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 
Variable Definition 
This table provides a detailed description of the construction of all the variables used in this 
chapter. 
Dependent Variable                          Definition 
Performance measure 0 if long-term incentives consist of EPS and TSR jointly, 1 if firms’ 
incentive grants have only TSR condition, 2 if firms’ incentive grants 
consist of EPS measure exclusively and 3 if firms’ incentive grants 
contain neither EPS nor TSR condition 
 




The standard deviation in stock returns three-years before the plan 
adoption 
 
TSR vol The standard deviation in EPS growth three-years prior to the plan 
adoption 
 
Market to book ratio 
 
 
Book value of the common equity divided by the market value of the   
common equity 
Firm Age Firm Age is defined as the year the firm was founded and is a proxy of 
firm maturity. It is the natural logarithm of the difference between the 




The natural logarithm of number of years served as the CEO and is a 
proxy of CEO experience 
 
Non-executive directors % Percentage of number of non-executive directors over total number of 
directors on board 
 
Board size Total number of directors on the board 
Sales Natural Logarithm of the firm’s sales/turnover 
                                                 
 
42 Note: In the case of our study, the sample is from 2010 to 2014, Thus, for example, for the firm which was 







Table A.5.1: Robustness test 
 
Multinomial logistic model estimating the effects of industry-adjusted EPS and TSR 
volatilities on performance measures  
 
Multinomial logistic regression of performance measures in compensation contracts against 
industry-adjusted TSR, industry EPS volatility, TSR volatility, board size, market to book, firm 
sales, % of non-executive directors, free cash flow, CEO tenure and firm age. All results are relative 
to the base category of (EPS and TSR jointly). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variable TSR EPS Neither EPS nor TSR 






Multinomial logit model 
results 
EPS vol  0.070** -0.299*** 0.009 
 (0.033) (0.105) (0.050) 
TSR vol -3.749*** -0.560 -1.203 
 (0.765) (0.517) (1.167) 
Market to book 0.0014 -0.001 -0.059** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.025) 
Ln (Board size) 1.359*** 0.869*** 0.135 
 (0.322) (0.309) (0.425) 
Non-executives% 0.022*** -0.022*** -0.013* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Ln (Sales £’000) -0.342*** -0.025 -0.210** 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.082) 
Ln (Free Cash Flow) 0.535*** -0.655*** -0.054 
 (0.204) (0.208) (0.304) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.165** 0.207*** 0.225* 
 (0.067) (0.075) (0.127) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.346*** 0.132* -0.402*** 
 (0.063) (0.075) (0.120) 
Constant -4.969*** 3.650** 2.947 
 (1.395) (1.496) (2.229) 
Industry effects Yes   






Log likelihood -1844   
Pseudo R-squared 0.23   
 
Please refer the footnote in Table 4, and Industry-adjusted TSR vol is the standard deviation of firm’s stock 
returns growth minus the mean standard deviation of stock returns growth of the industry over three-year 
period  before plan adaptation and EPS vol is standard deviation of firm’s eps growth minus the mean 














Table A.5.2: Robustness test 2 
 
Multinomial logistic model estimating the effects of basic EPS volatility and TSR 
volatility on performance measures 
 
Multinomial logistic regression of performance measures in compensation contracts against 
basic EPS volatility, TSR volatility, board size, market to book, firm sales, % of non-
executive directors, free cash flow, CEO tenure and firm age. All results are relative to the 
base category of (EPS and TSR jointly). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variable TSR EPS 
Neither earnings 
nor TSR 







Multinomial logit    
model results 
EPS vol 0.008*** -0.014** 0.005 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) 
TSR vol -0.397*** -0.178 -0.095 
  (0.122) (0.156) (0.142) 
Market to book 0.001 -0.002 -0.057** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.025) 
Board size 1.394*** 0.795*** 0.161 
  (0.320) (0.305) (0.427) 
Non-executives% 0.022*** -0.020*** -0.013 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Ln (Sales £’000) -0.371*** -0.039 -0.219*** 
  (0.060) (0.059) (0.082) 
Ln (Free Cash Flow) 0.533** -0.575*** -0.121 
  (0.215) (0.196) (0.313) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.162** 0.232*** 0.225* 
  (0.067) (0.076) (0.127) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.354*** 0.150** -0.409*** 
  (0.063) (0.074) (0.121) 
Constant -4.990*** 3.195** 3.261 
 (1.446) (1.434) (2.272) 
Industry effects Yes   
Consultant effects Yes   
Observations 1931   
Log likelihood -1834   









Table A.5.3: Robustness test 3 
 
Multinomial logit model estimating the probability of performance measures in 
compensation contracts with time dummies 
 
Multinomial logistic regression of performance measures in compensation contracts 
against TSR volatility, EPS volatility, board size, market to book, firm sales, % of non-
executive directors, free cash flow, CEO tenure and firm age. All results are relative to the 
base category of (EPS and TSR jointly). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variable TSR EPS 
Neither earnings nor 
TSR 






Multinomial logit    
model results 
EPS vol 0.117*** -0.138** 0.049 
  (0.021) (0.062) (0.033) 
TSR vol -3.185** -1.247 -1.311 
  (1.330) (1.073) (1.206) 
Market to book 0.000 -0.002 -0.059** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.025) 
Board size 1.348*** 0.840*** 0.144 
  (0.321) (0.306) (0.425) 
Non-executives % 0.025*** -0.019*** -0.012 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Ln (Sales £’000) -0.361*** -0.034 -0.217** 
  (0.058) (0.060) (0.085) 
Ln (Free Cash Flow) 0.524*** -0.705*** -0.136 
  (0.203) (0.219) (0.361) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.218*** 0.273*** 0.254* 
  (0.0683) (0.079) (0.132) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.318*** 0.148** -0.382*** 
  (0.064) (0.074) (0.121) 
Constant -4.990*** 3.195** 3.261 
 (1.446) (1.434) (2.272) 
Industry effects Yes   
Consultant effects Yes   
Observations 1931   
Log likelihood -1827   
Pseudo R-squared 0.23   











Table A.5.4: Robustness test 4 
 
Multinomial logit model estimating the probability of performance measures in 
compensation contracts (using total assets as a proxy for firm size) 
 
Multinomial logistic regression of performance measures in compensation contracts 
against TSR volatility, EPS volatility, board size, market to book, firm sales, % of non-
executive directors, free cash flow, CEO tenure and firm age. All results are relative to the 
base category of (EPS and TSR jointly). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
Variable TSR EPS 
Neither earnings 
nor TSR 






Multinomial logit    
model results 
EPS vol 0.131*** -0.137** 0.070 
 (0.023) (0.062) (0.038) 
TSR vol -3.521*** -1.994 -1.610 
 (1.264) (1.256) (1.547) 
Market to book 0.000 -0.005 -0.063** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.025) 
Board size 0.655** 1.561*** 0.357 
 (0.325) (0.334) (0.443) 
Non-executives % 0.013** -0.010* -0.010 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Ln (Assets) -0.322*** -0.052 -0.253** 
 (0.069) (0.062) (0.099) 
Ln (Free Cash Flow) 0.119 -0.287 -0.194 
 (0.170) (0.263) (0.438) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.241*** 0.224*** 0.273** 
 (0.065) (0.072) (0.126) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.321*** 0.174** -0.386*** 
 (0.063) (0.075) (0.120) 
Constant -4.969*** 3.650** 2.947 
 (1.395) (1.496) (2.229) 
Industry effects Yes   
Consultant effects Yes   
Observations 1931   
Log likelihood -1845   







Table A.5.5: Robustness test 5 
 
Multinomial logit model estimating the probability of performance measures in 
compensation contracts (inclusion of EPS along with income measures in earnings 
category) 
 
Multinomial logistic regression of performance measures in compensation contracts against 
TSR volatility, EPS volatility, board size, market to book, firm sales, % of non-executive 
directors, free cash flow, CEO tenure and firm age. All results are relative to the base 
category of (EPS and TSR jointly). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variable TSR EPS 
Neither earnings 
nor TSR 






Multinomial logit    
model results 
Earnings vol 0.129*** -0.109** 0.048 
 (0.023) (0.055) (0.035) 
TSR vol -3.858*** -2.070 -1.672 
 (1.133) (1.130) (1.447) 
Market to book 0.000 -0.001 -0.045** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) 
Board size 1.266*** 0.730** 0.014 
 (0.321) (0.305) (0.410) 
Non-executives % 0.025*** -0.021*** -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Ln (Sales) -0.361*** -0.018 -0.168** 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.080) 
Ln (Free Cash Flow) 0.551*** -0.721*** -0.083 
 (0.204) (0.222) (0.319) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.204*** 0.222*** 0.231* 
 (0.066) (0.075) (0.123) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.336*** 0.102 -0.439*** 
 (0.061) (0.073) (0.117) 
Constant -4.969*** 3.650** 2.947 
 (1.395) (1.496) (2.229) 
Industry effects Yes   
Consultant effects Yes   
Observations 1964   
Log likelihood -1885   









6 RPE CHOICES IN COMPENSATION CONTRACTS OF UK FIRMS 
6.1 Introduction 
Equity-based compensation has become an increasingly significant element of executive 
compensation for UK CEOs. Historically, firms granted time-based options and restricted stock 
shares, however, as discussed in Section 2.1.2, in 1995 the Greenbury report recommended that 
incentive compensation should be linked to relative performance in order to trigger or accelerate 
the vesting of equity. Agency theory views performance-related pay as a key mechanism that 
fosters incentive alignment between the interests of shareholders and executives, and hence, it 
is crucial for firms to set an appropriate level of compensation, and alongside, set challenging 
but achievable performance targets (Stedry and Kay, 1966). Usually, the board remuneration 
committee determines the design of executive compensation contracts on behalf of 
shareholders, but, the terms by which remuneration committees determine the design of relative 
performance plans have not been well understood and explored. 
Executives’ equity-based compensation is the most variable component of their compensation 
package. Many reforms and policies have stressed the importance of transparency and 
toughness in the performance criteria of equity compensation. Corporate performance, which 
is often a key determinant of CEO pay in such packages, can be measured in relative or absolute 
terms. Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is the use of peers’ performance in evaluating 
the company’s performance. Holmstrom (1982) argues that firms should exclude components 
of performance measures that are driven by exogenous shocks, indicating that RPE ought to 
exclude the effects of common shocks when determining executive compensation. 
In the context of executive compensation, it has become common practice for firms to examine 







termed “compensation benchmarking”, to providing competitive pay packages relative to peer 
firms of similar industry or market capitalization. Interestingly, there is full disclosure of peers 
used for “compensation benchmarking” in the US, while such details are rarely seen in UK 
annual reports. Similar to the process of compensation benchmarking, remuneration 
committees also use peer groups to compare the firm’s relative performance. There exist greater 
disclosure and transparency in peers selected for “relative performance evaluation” purposes in 
the UK compared to the US. 
There are two different ways of studying RPE usage. In the explicit method, researchers use 
regulatory filings to observe whether firms use RPE. In the UK, since 2002, the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report (DRR, 2002) requires firms to be transparent in producing information 
related to executive compensation contracts, and subsequently, there has been an increase in 
disclosure of explicit methods.43 Currently, UK companies disclose detailed information 
related to components and level of pay in their annual reports.  
In the implicit method, the more common approach to test the RPE hypothesis is to regress 
executive pay on average industry or market performance (e.g. Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; 
Janakiraman et al., 1992; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999b; Albuquerque, 2009). However, due 
to limited data availability on peer groups, researchers do not identify the actual peer groups, 
making it difficult to test accurately whether or not the use of RPE is present in compensation 
contracts. Since 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires US-listed firms 
to disclose RPE utilisation, benchmarks and peers in their proxy statements. Only very recently, 
                                                 
 
43 The Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002). http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20021986.html   







studies make use of new disclosure rules and investigate implicit RPE tests while incorporating 
explicit RPE details for US firms (e.g. Gong et al., 2011; Black et al., 2016; Bizjak et al., 2017)   
Over, the last few years there has been a change in a way in which executives are awarded 
equity compensation, with an introduction of a mix of RPE and absolute growth measures in 
long-term incentive plans. In addition, greater disclosure and scrutiny in executive pay have led 
firms to select innovative compensation designs, thereby making compensation structure more 
complex for shareholders and the general public to evaluate and understand. 
The advantage of studying the determinants of RPE use in the UK is that the enhanced 
disclosure and transparency present in the reporting provides us with a superior opportunity to 
examine the process of performance benchmarking. In addition, the majority of firms in the UK 
employ performance vested long-term incentives in their compensation contracts. There exist 
considerable variation in the choice of the peer groups, minimum and maximum performance 
targets, and the corresponding percentages of equity vesting at these threshold targets (Ferri, 
2009). The descriptive statistics of Zakaria’s (2012) study reveals that it is uncommon for UK 
firms to employ RPE based measures in short-term bonuses, as opposed to long-term incentive 
plans. Therefore, the focus of this study will be on long-term incentive plans. 
This chapter is devoted to providing detailed evidence on the explicit usage and characteristics 
of RPE in long-term incentive plans awarded by firms in the FTSE 350. We examine the 
relationship between common risk and the explicit use of RPE. Results reveal that common risk 
is associated with the decision by firms to use RPE in compensation contracts after controlling 
for corporate governance characteristics. This factor also influences the specific plan 
characteristics including the use of peer group choice and percentage of equity vesting at initial 







plans pick custom, index, and sector peer group as categories, respectively, in their long-term 
incentive plans. 
This chapter makes several contributions to the limited literature on the explicit use of RPE for 
UK firms. Firstly, this study uses a large comprehensive dataset covering the years 2010 to 
2014, while the only existing study in the literature which examines performance characteristics 
of RPE plans for UK firms was carried out by Carter et al. (2009), although, for only 2002. In 
investigating the explicit use of RPE, we consider all the performance standards (i.e. absolute 
only, relative only, and absolute and relative jointly) used in compensation contracts. Further, 
we employ different measures of common risk which are calculated using the benchmark 
returns from market, industry and supersector. Secondly, to the best of our knowledge, we are 
the first to provide an in-depth breakdown of peers and performance target characteristics in 
RPE plans and their determinants, though there exists limited literature on target setting 
especially in the context of US firms (Kole, 1997; Indjejikian and Nanda, 2002; Leone and 
Rock, 2002). Lastly, in our descriptive analysis, we examine the extent to which the nature of 
the peer group (i.e. self-selected firms, sector peers, or a broader index peers) and other long-
term incentive characteristics affects the equity vesting in actuality at different ranges. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 covers the literature review and 
hypothesis development, Section 6.3 discusses the variables, and Section 6.4 focuses on the 
detailed design of RPE-based contracts and vesting percentages by industry. In Section 6.5, we 
discuss the empirical tools we use to examine firms’ decisions to use RPE-based contracts while 







6.1.1 Discussion on the use of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) presence 
Agency costs emerge when principals (shareholders) hire agents (directors) to act in their 
interests since the two parties have divergent interests and information asymmetry prevents 
shareholders from monitoring CEO actions directly. Nevertheless, the agency problem can be 
mitigated by tying executive compensation to firm performance (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Holmstrom, 1982; Diamond and Verrecchia 1982). In order to evaluate managerial actions, 
firms can choose either absolute or relative performance measures. During the target setting 
process, absolute targets are set at the start of the period and are based on analysts’ forecast and 
past performance (Murphy, 2000), whereas the relative performance approach selects peers at 
the start of the process but uses ex-post peer group performance to assess actual managerial 
performance.  
As discussed in Section 3.3.1, the initial literature on executive compensation mainly explores 
the relationship between pay and performance, seeking to answer the question of whether higher 
pay is justified by higher performance; subsequently, the literature has shifted to focus on the 
choice of metric used to evaluate corporate performance contracts (e.g. Lambert and Larcker, 
1987; Ittner et al., 1997 and Core et al., 2003). For example, Lambert and Larcker (1987), who 
study the selection of performance metrics between market versus accounting measures in 
salary plus bonus contracts. However, only very recently have researchers started to focus on 
detailed contractual terms and analyze ways in which firms set performance measures and the 
extent to which such practices support the predictions of optimal contracting theories. Among 
this latter group, key studies include De Angelis and Grinstein (2015), who examine a selection 
of contractual choices and firm characteristics in bonus and equity plans of US firms. Their 







suggested by the Informativeness Principle (Holmstrom, 1982), which states that firms should 
rely more heavily on a measure that is highly sensitive to a CEO’s actions.  
Economic theory states that if exogenous shocks affect the performance of multiple agents’, it 
will be beneficial for firms to employ relative performance instead of absolute performance 
when there exists greater common uncertainty (e.g. Holmstrom (1979, 1982)). The presence of 
RPE filters out common shocks, which leads to risk-sharing benefits between shareholders and 
managers and provides shareholders with a more informative measure while assessing 
managerial actions and “de-noising” CEO effort (Holmstorm, 1982; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 
1987). Consequently, firms that benchmark against their peers can insulate non-firm-specific 
risks common to the firm’s peers and hence make equity compensation more efficient. 
As discussed in Section 3.3.3, while testing implicit RPE use, researchers regress executive pay 
against the firm’s and the market’s performance. A positive coefficient on firm performance is 
taken to show a positive correlation between firm performance and the level of executive pay, 
while a negative coefficient on market performance indicates a filtering out of the market risk 
component of firm performance. As Antle and Smith (1986) note, higher peer performance, as 
measured by accounting and market measures, decreases the level of compensation. 
Only a limited number of studies have tested explicit RPE use in incentive contracts (Murphy, 
2000; Bannister and Newman, 2003; Carter et al., 2009; Gong et al., 2011; Black et al., 2016; 
Bizjak et al., 2017). Murphy (2000) investigates a sample of 177 U.S. firms in the 1997 Towers 
Perrin survey and finds that 28.8% of firms use RPE in incentive plans. Their research also 
argues that prior studies which identify RPE presence by employing an implicit approach are 
more likely to have used a misspecified model, by assuming similar peer groups 
(industry/market) in RPE firms. Before the advent of mandatory SEC disclosure of peer groups 







mixed results. Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Janakiraman et al. (1992) and Rajgopal et al. (2006) 
document support for the use of RPE using implicit methods. 
As reviewed in Section 3.3.3, much of the existing literature focuses on US firms, making 
explicit use of mandatory SEC disclosure and testing for evidence of implicit RPE use in 
compensation contracts by regressing pay against performance. Concerning the literature on 
determinants of RPE use in compensation contracts, there exist two principal studies, namely, 
Carter et al. (2009) and Gong et al. (2011). The Carter et al. (2009) study is restricted to a 
sample of 180 UK plans for a single year, 2002, for FTSE 350 firms, while Gong et al. (2011) 
study the S&P 1500 companies, again for only one year, 2006; they find that firms select peers 
in a manner that captures common risk, consistent with agency theory. These studies’ 
categorization of companies however lacks subtlety, in that they neglect to identify those firms 
which use absolute rather than relative measures: Carter et al. (2009) classify firms into “RPE 
only”, “Some RPE” and “No RPE”, while Gong et al. (2011) classify firms into “RPE only” 
and “Non-RPE”, omitting those firms that use some RPE or absolute measures. In the present 
study, we seek to advance over both of these, by classifying firms into “RPE only”, “absolute 
only” and “absolute and RPE”. In addition, the characteristics of relative performance 
incentives have not yet been thoroughly explored in the current literature.  
The Carter et al. (2009) study failed to find evidence that economic determinants are associated 
with the decision to use RPE in the long-term incentive plans of UK firms (e.g. common risk) 
and only uses a single proxy to capture common risk. By contrast, our study extends the 
literature by taking into account several proxies of common risk. Further, we also consider the 
marginal effects of various performance categories, implying a unit change in an independent 







the identity of the compensation consultant, neither of which are captured by Carter et al. 
(2009).  
To the best of our knowledge, the dataset used in this study employed in analyzing the explicit 
use of RPE is the most detailed in the context of investigating long-term incentive contracts for 
UK firms. We also extend the literature by including corporate governance variables such as 
independent directors and board size. Since 2002, the structure of UK remuneration contracts 
has changed and performance contingencies are increasingly more varied and complex (Ferri, 
2009). Thus, it is useful to test RPE in the current UK settings. As noted above, the prior 
literature on RPE has only considered RPE and non-RPE (absolute) categories exclusively, but 
this study, additionally, considers companies which employ absolute and relative measures 
jointly. We consider this to be an important methodological advance since this latter category 
accounts for over 50% of the firms in our sample.  
RPE firms incentivize executives to perform better while insulating their compensation from 
common shocks that likewise influence the performance of similar firms, the market or the 
industry. Consequently, RPE improves the alignment between pay and performance. Agency 
theory guides our empirical design as it suggests that the efficiency of a compensation contract 
can be improved by employing the performance of agents exposed to similar risks. 
 
6.1.2 On Peer Groups used in RPE 
Albuquerque et al. (2013) and Faulkender and Jun Yang (2010) employ an explicit approach to 
analyze compensation benchmarking peers of US firms. The disclosing firm compares the CEO 
compensation of their peers on the level of their own CEOs and further investigates the 







are two important components that explain peer group selection. Moreover, the level of peers’ 
compensation is another important factor in determining the selection of peers. Faulkender and 
Jun Yang (2010) demonstrate that firms are more likely to pick peers which compensate their 
executives with a higher level of remuneration, providing evidence of self-serving bias in 
compensation benchmarking. 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) conduct a pioneering study on an RPE style of tournament theory, 
where the main aim is to create a tournament to incentivize managers to outperform their peers, 
eventually leading to higher relative performance for greater reward. Within these models, pay 
rises with greater relative performance instead of absolute performance. In plans with RPE 
conditions, executives are continuously evaluated based on their performance relative to their 
peers. Thus, the selection of peers is a vital part of the incentive system in addressing agency 
problems. On the other hand, rent extraction theory advocates that firms will select peers in 
their RPE based plans in such a way as to maximize relative performance and award higher pay 
to executives (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990).   
As discussed earlier, much of the existing literature investigates peer selection for compensation 
benchmarking. Contrary to compensation benchmarking, the primary aim of performance 
benchmarking is to remove common risk. From firm selection bias or rent extraction point of 
view, the effect of peer performance is the opposite for RPE peers relative to pay benchmarking 
peers, since better-performing companies award higher levels of compensation, and 
accordingly will be chosen as benchmarking peers. However, underperforming companies are 
more likely to be selected as RPE peers to improve relative performance for the purposes of 
maximizing compensation (Bizjak et al., 2008). Another example of rent extraction in 
performance benchmarking is to pick a set of peers which do not face similar external shocks 







firm (Albuquerque, 2009). This makes such contracts less efficient. The selection of peers in 
compensation benchmarking serves a different purpose for the selection of peers used for 
performance benchmarking purposes, hence the finding from compensation benchmarking does 
not necessarily apply to RPE peers.  
In a working paper, Bizjak et al. (2017) test the explicit use of RPE in US firms.  Similar to 
prior studies on compensation benchmarking, they investigate determinants of peer firm 
selection in relative performance evaluation plans. Their results conclude that firms select peers 
to filter out common shocks, which is in line with the economic motivation behind RPE use. 
These findings also show evidence of bias in peer selection and benchmarking which results in 
higher levels of executive compensation, as selected firms tend to have lower market betas and 
lower estimates of future stock returns. 
Turning towards other RPE characteristics, Hvide (2002) concludes that tournament style RPE 
can have a significant impact on the selection of performance conditions. In this regard, 
theoretical work by Brisley (2006) indicates that for a stretching performance target (i.e. payout 
range) vesting of options as an increasing function of share price can improve risk-taking 
incentives more than vesting at a single point; while Brennan (2001) contends that the use of 
performance hurdles in options are unlikely to be considered as optimal. Lazear and Rosen 
(1981) discuss target spread (the difference between median and maximum performance 
required for equity vesting of executives), which is one of the characteristics in evaluating RPE 
and argue that magnitude of the spread across different levels of pay at several percentile 
rankings can be used to manage CEO effort. Only limited studies have investigated 
characteristics of RPE directly. In this present study, however, we focus on analysing the impact 
of common risk on the target spread, selection of peer group, and vesting payout at initial and 







6.1.3 RPE Award Design 
In RPE-based plans, the most common award is a rank-order tournament, where the level of 
equity payout is conditioned on the percentile ranking at the end of a pre-specified performance 
period, which can be measured against total shareholder returns or EPS relative to a peer group. 
Firms select defined peer groups to evaluate agent’s performance and the proportion of initial 
shares’ vesting depends on the firm’s relative rank at the upper and lower bounds and between 
these two bonds. The payout is usually a straight line between the upper and lower bounds of 
the performance target. The lower bound, required for minimum vesting, is conventionally set 
at median performance (i.e. the 50th percentile ranking), whereas the upper bound, beyond 
which no additional benefits are awarded, is most commonly set when relative performance is 
at the upper quartile (i.e. the 75th percentile ranking). The maximum threshold is defined as the 
maximum performance beyond which no additional incremental incentives are awarded.  
Firms occasionally select a stepped payout, where payout increases in a series of steps. In the 
target setting process, firms that employ outperformance plans determine the payout level based 
on magnitude by which the company outperforms its peer group. To give an example, in 2010, 
Petrofac, used TSR outperformance relative to self-selected peers a performance target in their 
long-term incentive plan. The firm needs to have an initial threshold of TSR equal to the index, 
in order for 30% of the equity to vest. The maximum payout was set to a TSR outperformance 










6.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis development 
Based on the above discussions, we formulate the following research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6.1: The higher the common risk faced by the firm, the greater the likelihood of 
choosing RPE based measures. 
 
6.3 Research Variables 
6.3.1 Use of RPE in remuneration contracts 
In this section, by using the explicit approach, we examine factors that may affect firms’ 
decision to employ RPE in remuneration contracts. We also control for the operation of multiple 
plans in their compensation contracts.   
Common Risk 
Agency theory predicts that the risk-sharing benefits of RPE increase when common risk affects 
both peer and firm performance as it filters out common risk (e.g. Holmstrom 1982). Consistent 
with theory, we expect to find a positive association between RPE implementation and common 
risk between a firm and its peers. Similar to the approach of Gao et al. (2017) and Gong et al. 
(2011) and, also, due to the greater prevalence of total shareholder return as an RPE measure, 
we use total shareholder return to compute proxies for common risk.  
We measure common risk by regressing each firm’s stock return (ri) on market returns (rm), 
FTSE 350 Index). We apply a similar procedure with industry and supersector return based on 
the FTSE ICB industry or supersector, to explore the possibility that the firm’s return 







greater use of RPE. Previous research has also tested the use of industry peer groups in RPE 
(e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990 and Janakiraman et al., 2012).  
𝑟𝑖=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑚 + ε𝑖                                                                                                            (6.1) 
In our robustness tests, we also employ other different proxies to measure common risk as used 
in previous literature i.e. Gao et al. (2017) which uses data for US companies. Thus, we employ 
R squared from the regression of firm-level returns on the value of weighted index returns over 
the prior 48 months. Finally, in our robustness tests, we also use correlation as a proxy for 
common risk. 
Industry Concentration  
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) argue that firms operating in competitive industries are less 
inclined to use relative performance-based incentives as it may encourage destructive 
competition, thus, influencing the shareholders’ value. Their empirical results show that as the 
competition increases, the sensitivity of pay to rival firms also increase, suggesting that the 
lower the industry concentration (i.e. the more competitive) the less likely it is to use RPE-
based plans. Following Gong et al. (2011), we use industry concentration, measured as 
Herfindahl Index of sales within each FTSE ICB industry, as a proxy for the industry 
concentration. 
Compensation Consultant 
With greater complexity in contract designs, the role of the remuneration consultant becomes 
crucial in determining the level and structure of executive compensation. Therefore, firms seek 
independent advice from an expert on best market practices. In the UK, the majority of FTSE 
350 companies hire at least one compensation consultant due to their expertise in matters related 







contracts with RPE condition as shown by Murphy and Sandino (2009). It was revealed further 
in the descriptive statistics conducted by Kuang et al. (2014) that a consultancy firm- HNBS, 
advised their clients on RPE based contracts in stocks and options more than their competitors.  
Board Size 
Board size is measured as the total number of non-executives and executives on the board.  Prior 
studies state that large boards are formed of a higher number of individuals that bring greater 
expertise and knowledge to the board. However, it has also been argued that the size of board 
impacts its ability to control and monitor activities, thereby, making them less effective due to 
the lack of coordination and communication. Thus, large boards are not always an assurance of 
good corporate governance quality. Previously, board size has been studied to analyse its effects 
on executive compensation, as discussed in Section 4.3. These studies have found that board 
size plays a monitoring role in determining the different forms of executive pay (e.g., Mehran, 
1995; Core et al. 1999). This suggests that board size could also potentially play a role in 
determining decisions related to executive pay, such as the use of RPE or selection of firms’ 
performance target.  
Independent Directors 
Board independence is usually defined as the proportion of outside directors on a board. They 
are members of the board but do not play a direct role in the everyday operation of the business 
as part of the executive team. A greater percentage of independent directors on board is 
considered a sign of good internal corporate governance as they represent shareholders’ 
interests.  
In the current study, we seek to explain the influence of board independence on the selection of 







between a greater percentage of non-executive directors and RPE selection in US firms. These 
findings lead us to expect that the use of RPE is associated with good internal corporate 
governance. 
Institutional Investors 
In 2002, the Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRRR) introduced mandatory non-binding 
annual shareholders vote on executive pay at each firm’s Annual General Meeting, also referred 
to as say-on-pay (SOP) in the UK (Conyon and Sadler, 2002). This provides the shareholders 
with an opportunity to have a voice on matters related to executive compensation. In recent 
years, the role of institutional investors has become crucial in monitoring executive pay as they 
desire to set relevant targets which are also more difficult to achieve by executives. Institutional 
owners influence accountability due to their investments in the business. Moreover, in the 
annual general meeting (AGM), there exists a vote in favour of or against CEO pay rise, or on 
performance measures managerial actions through a high level of ownership. They are 
considered as effective monitors and mitigators of agency problems. According to the Institute 
of British Insurers (2002), institutional investors argue that better corporate governance should 
influence firms’ selection of RPE-based plans in compensation contracts. Thus, we expect the 
selection of RPE based contracts to occur in better-governed firms. Hence, in this present study, 
we use the sum of top 4 institutional ownership who own more than 5% of company shares as 
a proxy for the quality of corporate governance. Other measures of corporate governance 
quality used in this study are board size and percentage of independent directors.  
Sales 
There is limited evidence on the association between RPE and firm size. Himmelberg and 







likely to filter market and industry fluctuations while awarding talented CEOs. Additionally, 
the organisational complexity of large corporations makes it difficult to find appropriate peers. 
Thus, we do not expect large firms to opt for RPE as a performance standard in executive 
compensation contracts. 
Firm Performance 
The introduction of RPE in compensation contracts can be used as a justification to award 
higher level of executive pay by companies which already perform relatively better than their 
peers. Alternately, Rajgopal et al. (2006) suggest industry-adjusted market performance as a 
proxy for CEO talent and observe that better performing firms display less evidence of RPE 
use. Following the previous literature on RPE, for example, Gong et al. (2011), we also include 
industry-adjusted stock performance in our empirical model. 
Dividend Yield 
Carter et al. (2009) find no effect of dividend yield on the use of RPE in compensation contracts. 
However, the authors find that firms which pay higher dividends opt for easy performance 
targets by employing performance hurdles and lower payout target spread while evaluating their 
executives. 
Market to Book 
Murphy (2000) finds that firms with higher level of growth opportunities are more inclined to 
employ external standards (RPE) than internal standards, such as earnings, which tend to 
incentivize managers of higher growth firms to smooth out fluctuations (Leone and Rock, 








6.4 Executive Compensation Contracts 
Table 6.1: Breakdown of type of performance standards in remuneration contracts 
 
Performance Measurement 
No. of firm-year 
observations Percentage 
Absolute (Non-RPE) 263 24.5% 
Relative Exclusively 189 17.6% 
Relative & Absolute Jointly 620 57.8% 
Total 1,072 100 
  
The sample consists of constituents of the FTSE 350 UK index from 2007 to 2014. Table 6.1 
demonstrates that 24.5% of firms in the sample use non-RPE measures, while 17.6% of firms 
implement RPE based plans exclusively and another 58% employ a mixture of RPE and non-
RPE measures. Overall, the sample consists of 1072 firm-year observations. In their study of 
firms in 2004, Carter et al. (2009) find that on an average, 17% of UK firms use a mixture of 
absolute and relative measures compared to 58% in the present sample. This provides further 
evidence that with time, performance standards have undergone a change in compensation 




















Absolute and Relative 
measures jointly Total 
Basic Resources 12(17%) 33(46%) 27(37%) 72(7%) 
Consumer Goods 37(34%) 29(28%) 41(38%) 107(10%) 
Consumer Services 75(32%) 36(15%) 124(52%) 235(21%) 
Financials 34(24%) 19(13%) 87(62%) 140(13%) 
Healthcare 11(22%) 4(8%) 35(70%) 50(5%) 
Industrials 65(22%) 17(6%) 209(72%) 291(27%) 
Oil and Gas 4(7%) 25(43%) 30(50%) 59(6%) 
Technology 17(35%) 7(14%) 25(51%) 49(5%) 
Telecommunications 6(18%) 6(19%) 20(62%) 32(3%) 
Utilities 2(6%) 13(35%) 22(59%) 37(4%) 
Total 263 189 620 1072 
 
Table 6.2 represents performance standards by industry in long-term incentive arrangements. 
Oil and Gas firms frequently select relative measures; this could be because fluctuations in oil 
prices can be filtered using industry comparators. Similarly, companies in the Basic Resources 
industry frequently adopt plans with relative measures. However, the dominance of absolute 
measures in the Technology industry could be explained by R&D expenditures and innovation 
growth targets. These descriptive statistics indicate that industry-specific effects should be 
employed in our empirical design as the selection of RPE is more prevalent in certain industries. 
Gong et al. (2011) find that 25% of US firms disclosed RPE use in 2006, compared to over 74% 
in the current sample, indicating that a greater number of UK companies incorporate RPE 









Table 6.3: Breakdown of relative performance evaluation (RPE) and non-RPE in long-term 
incentive plans of FTSE 350 UK firms 
 
Panel A: Breakdown of RPE plans in long-term incentive in remuneration contracts 
 
 No. of firm-year observations 
Performance payout range 802 
Performance payout range and hurdle 7 
Total 809 
 
Performance Measures No. of firm-year observations 
Total Shareholder Returns  769 
Earnings per share 25 




Panel B: Breakdown for non-RPE firms based on long-term incentives in remuneration 
contracts 
 No. of firm-year observations 
Performance payout range 806 
Hurdle/underpin and performance payout range 77 
Total 883 
 
Performance Measures No. of firm-year observations 
Earnings per share (EPS) only 615 
EPS and ROIC 42 
Net Asset Value 19 
Earnings Measure (EBIT, Net Profit or Return on 
Common Equity only) 77 
EPS and others 115 
Total Shareholder Return 15 
Total 883 
 
Table 6.3 presents a breakdown of performance measures and the use of a payout range or 
hurdle in RPE and non-RPE based measures. Carter et al. (2009) descriptive statistics show that 







suggest that recently it has become a less common practice to adopt a single performance hurdle 
in RPE based plans, as most of these plans select a payout range. In plans with non-RPE 
conditions, we observe that some firms employ a single performance hurdle or “underpin” 
terminology. Generally, an underpin measure is used in conjunction with another performance 
measure and the firm needs to achieve both performance metrics in order for executives to vest 




















Table 6.4 summarises the comparator groups used by firms in long-term incentive plans to benchmark-relative performance. Some firms in our sample use 
more than one long-term incentive plan, resulting in 1291 long-term incentive plans in 809 firm-year observations. More than 70% of Oil and Gas and 
Telecommunication firms pick bespoke/self-selected peers to measure relative performance, while Industrial firms predominantly pick FTSE 250 UK firms as 
a relative benchmark. In the Financials sector, 47 out of the 150 RPE plans aspire to compare with sector plus index category in financials’ industry. One likely 
interpretation for this is that the fluctuations in Real Estate and Financial industries can be best filtered out using the analogous index and industry performance. 
Overall, 42% of plans incorporate self-selected peers (bespoke) in relative performance contingencies.
Index 











Basic Resources 7 - 4 21 2 7 22 6 40 109 
Consumer Goods 7 - 7 23 9 5 5 5 73 134 
Consumer Services - 8 - 44 23 25 20 49 83 252 
Financials - - - 7 3 10 3 47 88 158 
Industrials 20 22 7 117 5 27 4 42 131 375 
Oil and Gas - - - 4 - 7 - 1 60 72 
Technology - - - 15 12 2 - 10 7 46 
Telecommunications 3 - - - 5 - - - 20 28 
Utilities 9 - - 7 - 24 4 - 20 64 
Healthcare - 13 - 10 - 6 3 - 21 53 














FTSE 100 88 FTSE 100 excl. financial firms 25 
FTSE 51-150 33 FTSE 51-150 (excl. investment trusts) 13 
FTSE Small Cap 16 FTSE Small Cap (excl. investment trusts) 27 
FTSE All Share 18 
FTSE 250 (excl. financial, insurance and 
investment trusts) 5 
FTSE 250 118 FTSE 250 (excl. investment trusts) 107 
FTSE 250 (excl. financial companies) 10 
FTSE 250 (excl. financial and investment 
trusts) 8 
FTSE 350 41 FTSE 350 (excl. investment trusts) 13 
FTSE 350 (excl. financial companies) 5 FTSE Morgan Stanley/HSBC Index 10 
FTSE Global Index 5    
 
The above table illustrates the breakdown of sector and index comparator groups used to 
benchmark relative performance and is a sub-category of sector and index peers used in Table 
6.4. We note that some plans explicitly use a named index while others prefer to select 
constituents of the index (e.g. FTSE 51-150). However, 19.2% of firms in their plans compare 
their own performance relative to the FTSE 250 companies which is the most popular category 
to benchmark relative performance. This clearly shows that there is diversity in the selection of 
peers when evaluating the relative performance of the company. In contrast to Pass et al. (2000), 
the descriptive statistics of this study reveal that firms which employ a broader market index 
category (e.g. FTSE 100 or 250), often choose to exclude financial firms from their peer group. 
Sector   
  
FTSE Pharma and Biotech 4 FTSE Travel and Leisure 21 
FTSE Oil and Gas 5 FTSE Mining and Oil 12 
FTSE REIT 10 FTSE Beverages 7 
FTSE Electricity 6    
 
Sector plus Index     
FTSE All Share Tech Index 3 FTSE World Media Index 10 
FTSE All Share Media Index 17 FTSE 350 Support Services 15 
FTSE 350 Real Estate Index 47 FTSE World Technology Index 10 
FTSE 350 Industrials 15 FTSE 350 Mining Companies 5 
FTSE 350 General Retailers 18 FTSE 350 Travel and Leisure 2 
FTSE Global Telecom 5 FTSE 100 Tech-mark Index  7 
FTSE Global Mining Index 10 
Dow Jones U.S. Oil Equipment Index and 
STOXX Europe Oil Equipment and Services 







An exclusion of certain comparator group from the index appears to be a recent practice within 
the pay-setting process. Further, 8.7% firms benchmark their performance against the FTSE 
100 in determining the level of executive pay in their plans. A small proportion of these, 3.3%, 
benchmark their performance against the FTSE Small Cap Index. Lastly, firms in the Financial 
and Consumer Services industries (e.g. Media, Real Estate) evaluate performance relative to 
sector peers. This suggests that the firms in these industries filter out shocks using industry 
relative performance. 
Table 6.6 below shows the breakdown by industry of the firms that employ outperformance 
plans and plans with upper quintile or decile performance for maximum award payout. We find 
that around 62% of plans in the Basic Resources industry and 58% of the financial firms adopted 
plans where the maximum payout is not triggered at the traditional 75th percentile ranking. This 
suggests that financial firms select tighter performance conditions than other industries. 
Additionally, 48% of firms in the Utility industry use plans with relative performance 
contingencies which set its maximum payout as different from the traditional upper quartile. 
We note that all RPE firms set their initial threshold target at the median performance which 
must, first, be attained if at all, any rewards are to vest. Finally, Columns Avg_ RPE_IV and 
Avg_RPE_UQV suggest that the average percentage of equity vesting at 50th percentile and 
upper quartile percentile ranking vary by industry and some industries set lower initial vesting 







Table 6.6: Breakdown by industry of plans with non-traditional relative percentile ranking for maximum payout and percentage vesting at initial and upper 













Note: No. stands for the number of RPE-based plans. “80th PR” indicates the number of plans where the maximum payout is at the upper quintile performance levels (80th percentile ranking). 
“90th PR” indicates the number of plans where the maximum payout is at the upper decile performance levels (90th percentile ranking). “OP over Median” indicates the number of plans where 
the required firm performance should be above the median performance plus an additional percentage growth p.a. to receive the maximum payout. “OP over Index” indicates the number of 
plans where the required firm performance should be above the index plus an additional percentage growth p.a. to reward the maximum payout. “% of plans” indicates the total number of 
plans where the maximum payout is only awarded when maximum performance is different from the traditional upper quartile (75th percentile) in RPE based plans. “Avg_RPE_IV” indicates 
the average percentage of initial vesting after achieving median performance (i.e. the 50th percentile ranking) by industry. “Avg_RPE_UQV” indicates the average percentage of equity which 
vests once the firm achieves upper quartile percentile ranking in each specific industry.
Industry No. 80th PR 90th PR 
% OP over 
Median 







Basic Resources 109 6 10 12 40 68 62.4% 25.2% 95.0% 
Consumer Goods 134 0 10 8 10 28 20.9% 25.9% 94.0% 
Consumer Services 252 50 18 7 27 102 40.5% 25.9% 96.0% 
Financials 158 31 0 11 49 91 57.6% 24.8% 95.6% 
Industrials 375 18 9 43 18 88 23.5% 27.4% 97.8% 
Oil and gas 72 7 8 20 0 35 48.6% 27.9% 91.5% 
Technology 46 6 12 0 0 18 39.1% 30.0% 96.7% 
Telecom 28 6 0 0 0 6 21.4% 31.6% 98.4% 
Utilities 64 0 2 21 8 31 48.4% 25.7% 96.5% 
Healthcare 53 8 0 3 0 11 20.8% 26.0% 96.0% 







6.5 Empirical Strategy 
6.5.1 Data Coding 
The hypothesis we test in our analysis is whether firms subject to greater common risk affect 
the likelihood of choice of performance type. Our dependent variable consists of three different 
categories. Each year firms face the choice of performance metrics in their long-term incentive 
plans. The strategic choice of firm i as Yi=j, where j is equal to {0, 1, 2}. Accordingly, we test 
this using a multinomial logit model, in which the dependent variable, namely, the choice of 
performance standard consists of three different categories: we code (absolute and relative 
measures jointly) as category 0, absolute measures only as category 1 and relative measure 
exclusively as category 2. The values allocated to performance standards only indicate different 
choices, and the ordinal value has no meaning. 
 
6.5.2 Empirical Model 
Multinomial Logit Model 
Let Pi,j  be the probability that the ith firm chooses performance standard j , given by  
, , ,Pr( )   for , {0,1,2}i j i j i kP R R k j j     ,                                                             (6.2) 
where Ri,j is the maximum utility attainable for firm i if it chooses performance measure j.  Then, 
𝑅𝑖𝑗= 𝛽′𝑗𝑋𝑖, ε𝑖𝑗            







If the stochastic terms εi,j are independent and identically distributed, and follow the Weibull 








                                (6.3) 
In this model, we use the firms that employ absolute and relative measures jointly as the base 
category and normalise the corresponding coefficient β0 = 0. Hence, the probability of having 
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  for j = 1 and 2                 (6.5) 
The explanatory variables consist of common risk, industry concentration, and set of control 
variables. Following Gong et al. (2011) and Gao et al. (2017), we proxy for firm characteristics 
using market to book, dividend yield and sales. We also include board size, non-executive 
directors and institutional ownership as proxies for corporate governance characteristics. 
The multinomial logit model can be seen as simultaneously estimating a binary logit model 
comparing among the dependent categories and reference category (Long, 1997). When 
estimating a multinomial logit model, we need to select a reference category to which the 
estimate coefficient will relate.  
The results from the model will tell us whether the type of performance type is influenced by 
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for firm i at time period t, where ɛi,t is the error term                                                          (6.6) 
 
6.5.3 Data Sources, Sample Construction, and Variable Definition 
6.5.3.1 Independent Variables 
The sample consists of all constituents of the FTSE 350 UK index from 2010 to 2014. Total 
shareholder returns and industry-adjusted returns are derived from the Datastream Return 
Index. The corporate governance data which includes board size and number of independent 
directors is extracted from Datastream and Bloomberg, respectively. Data for institutional 
ownership has been gathered from Fame. Definitions for all the variables used are included in 
Appendix to Chapter 6. 
 
6.5.3.2 Dependent Variables 
Sample Construction 
Data on executive compensation characteristics has been hand-collected from annual reports. 
Following Gong et al. (2011), if the firm states that one long-term incentive plan is evaluated 
based on firm performance relative to the peer group, and an additional long-term incentive 
plan is determined on an absolute measure, then we code this under the category of absolute 
and relative measure jointly. Similarly, if the firm employs relative measures across their long-







one-off (e.g. recruitment plans) or plans with no performance conditions attached. This study 
considers long-term incentive plans that were active and in use for the given period of study. 
This analysis is performed at the firm level. 
Four variables are used to study plan-level characteristics of RPE. Peer Group Choice is an 
indicator variable that equals 0 if the plan uses a pre-defined index such as the FTSE 350 or 
250 for its comparator group, and 1 if the plan selects custom peers as comparator group, and 
2 if the plan includes sector peers as a comparator group. RPE_IV is the percentage of equity 
vesting set by the firms after achieving median percentile performance. RPE_UQV is the 
percentage of equity vesting target set by the firms after achieving upper quartile percentile 
ranking. Finally, “target spread” is the difference between the maximum and median percentile 
rankings relative to peers in order for vesting to occur. 
6.5.4 Variable Classification 
For common risk proxies, namely, beta, R-squared and correlation, we run separate multinomial 
logit regressions by estimating three models separately. These regressions are categorised in 
columns named ‘‘Market’’, ‘‘Industry’’ and ‘‘Supersector’’ and indicate that the common risk 
variables are calculated using benchmark returns from the FTSE 350, the appropriate industry 
or supersector index respectively. The common risk variables in Table 6.8 are labelled as 
“Common risk_industry”, which is calculated using benchmark returns within each FTSE ICB 
Industry, “Common risk_market”, which is calculated using benchmark returns from the FTSE 
350 and “Common risk_ supersector”, which is calculated using benchmark returns within each 








6.5.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Following Tables 6.7 and 6.8, provide a descriptive statistic of the main variables and 
correlation matrix of independent variables used in the regression model.  
Table 6.7 shows that the maximum value and standard deviation of beta_industry and 
beta_super sector are greater than beta_market; this implies that industry and supersector 
market returns are more volatile than the market. Average institutional ownership is 25% with 
a maximum value of 74%. The main objective for long-term incentive plans is to achieve long-
term goals for the company (Mallin, 2007). However, surprisingly, in the US, greater numbers 
of firms still grant time-contingent shares. The UK adopted long-term incentive schemes before 
the US and share vests after three years, once the plan has been devised. Over time, the level of 
detail and complexity in the design of long-term incentive pay has increased considerably. 
Consistent with Ozkan (2007). The minimum value of board size is 5, with a mean of 9.3. 







Table 6.7: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables. (Variables are defined in the Table 
A. 6.1 in the Appendix to Chapter 6) 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
R-square_Market 0.29 0.18 0.00 0.78 
Beta_Market 0.86 0.46 0.02 2.78 
Corr_Market 0.49 0.19 0.00 0.93 
R-square_Industry 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.97 
Beta_Industry 0.87 0.48 0.01 3.33 
Corr_Industry 0.52 0.47 0.00 0.96 
R-square_Supersector 0.33 0.22 0.00 0.96 
Beta_Supersector 0.88 0.49 0.01 3.14 
Corr_Supersector 0.59 0.48 0.00 0.94 
Ind_Con 0.19 0.18 0.04 1.00 
Multiple plans 0.35 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Ln_Sales 14.21 1.75 5.0 19.7 
Board_Size 9.28 2.26 5.00 17.00 
% of Ind_Directors 0.58 0.11 0.25 0.79 
MTB 2.81 7.60 0.10 25.00 
Instit_Own 0.30 0.11 0.10 0.74 
Adj_Ret 0.30 0.66 -0.89 1.63 
Div_Yld 3.20 2.18 0.00 11.46 
 
Before proceeding to the regression analysis stage, Table 6.8 presents correlation matrix for all 
independent variables. Common risk is positively correlated with the dividend yield, indicating 
that firms having more volatile returns than the market, industry and super sector are more 
likely to pay higher dividends. In addition, firms subject to greater common risk have lower 
growth opportunities. Wooldridge (2010) and Gujarati (2004) suggest that multicollinearity 
might threaten the coherence of the regression analyses if correlation exceeds 80%. In this 
study, none of the correlation magnitudes of independent variables is greater 30%, and thus, we 
infer that multicollinearity should not be an issue. Correlations between common risk_mrk, 









Table 6.8: Correlation matrix of Independent Variables 
 
.
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
(1) Common risk_mrk 1 
          
 
(2) Common risk_ind  1           
(3) Common risk_sup 
  
1 
        
 
(4) Board_Size -0.04** -0.07* -0.05* 1 
       
 
(5) Ind_Directors -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.14*** 1 
      
 
(6) Ln_Sales 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.25* 0.27 1 
     
 
(7) Div_Yld 0.14** 0.23** 0.21* -0.06* 0.00 -0.13* 1     
 
(8) MTB -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.14* 1 
   
(9) Multiple 0.05* 0.09* 0.12* 0.06* 0.16 0.12* 0.03 0.07 1 
  
 
(10) Instit_Own 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.13 -0.04** -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 1 
 
 
(11) Ind_Con -0.11 -0.20 -0.20 0.06 -0.01 0.15 -0.07* -0.04* 0.06* -0.03 1  








6.6 Empirical Results 
6.6.1 Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Panel A of Table 6.9 reports results of the multinomial logit model with three performance 
standards. The R2 of 0.16 is in line with previous studies conducted by Carter et al. (2009) and 
Gong et al. (2011). The results in Column 2 demonstrate that firms which share greater common 
risk with their market peers are significantly more likely to prefer RPE exclusively over the 
joint use of relative and absolute measures in their long-term incentive plans. This is consistent 
with the intuition that firms select RPE-based conditions exclusively when they face greater 
common risk with peers. Similarly, firms subject to higher levels of common risk are 
significantly less likely to adopt absolute measures than the alternative absolute and relative 
measure jointly in compensation contracts. As shown in Table 6.5, industry and supersector 
also represent potential peers for relative evaluation purposes. Subsequently, we also estimate 
separate models using industry beta and supersector beta to compute common risk, and the 
results in Columns 3 to 6 of Panel A in Table 6.9 reinforce our previous finding that companies 
aim to filter exogenous shocks in selecting performance standards in executive compensation 
contracts. 
Column 1 shows that the coefficient of sales is positive and significant, implying firms with 
higher sales are more likely to employ absolute measures exclusively. One interpretation of this 
finding is that large firms have a more complex business structure with various segments which 
could make the selection of similar peer group difficult. Thus, they prefer to implement absolute 
growth measures, which can be further evidenced from the insignificant association between 
sales and the exclusive use of RPE in Column 2. The results in Column 1 also show that as 








the alternative of absolute and relative measures jointly. Additionally, the coefficent of board 
size is positive but statistically insignificant for the likelihood of the selection of relative 
measures over reference category. This suggests that firms with larger boards prefer to, at least, 
include relative measures in a compensation contract. The coefficients for independent directors 
are negative and significant for both the likelihood of selecting the absolute measures 
exclusively and relative measures exclusively. These results indicate that firms with a higher 
percentage of independent directors prefer to employ both relative and absolute measures 
signifying better corporate governance, leading to effective monitoring of compensation 
packages.  
Further, we also detect a negative relationship between the percentage of institutional 
ownership and the selection of RPE exclusively. That is, there exists a significant probability 
that as institutional ownership increases, the multinomial log odds for preferring relative 
measures exclusively over the alternative of absolute and relative jointly decreases. This gives 
an indication of good corporate governance, in that a greater presence of institutional owners 
leads to a greater use of both relative and absolute measures in compensation contracts. 
Evidence for the effective monitoring role of institutional investors has been observed in 
previous UK studies (e.g. Ozkan, 2007). 
Concerning market to book ratio, the coefficient is negative and significant in determining 
relative measures exclusively, showing that firms with greater market growth opportunities are 
less likely to use RPE exclusively relative to the base category. This result is in line with the 
study by Albuquerque (2009), which argues that RPE is less beneficial for firms with higher 
growth opportunities. The coefficient on multiple plans is negative and significant for the 








measure exclusively (-0.65, p-value<0.01) compared to firms that do not award RPE. This 
suggests that firms which award multiple plans are less inclined to employ relative or absolute 
measures exclusively over the alternative base category. One interpretation is that firms employ 
a mix of relative and absolute performance targets if they operate multiple long-term incentive 
plans. 
Firms from more highly concentrated industries are less likely to implement RPE in all of their 
grants relative to base category. This finding is consistent with Carter et al. (2009), suggesting 
that firms in more concentrated industries do not prefer to employ RPE exclusively as a 
performance standard. 
Turning now to industry-specific factors, the reference category used is the “consumer services” 
group. Based on the results in Column 2, firms in Basic Resources, Oil and Gas, Technology, 
Telecommunications and Utilities are more likely to select relative measures exclusively than 
firms in the consumer services industry. The choice of performance category is not influenced 
by year specific dummies. 
 
 
Table 6.9: Multinomial logistic model estimating the probability of performance standards 
in compensation contracts 
 
Panel A: Multinomial logistic model predicting various performance standards in compensation 
contracts with common risk, multiple plans, board size, institutional ownership, independent 
directors, multiple plans, market to book ratio, industry-adjusted returns, industry concentration, 
and corporate governance variables. Significance levels are indicated by ***p < 0.01(1%), **p < 
0.05(5%) and *p < 0.1(10%), based on robust standard errors and are reported in parentheses. 
Definition of all variables used in this study is included in Appendix A to Chapter 6. Base 










       







exclusively exclusively exclusively exclusively 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Market Market Industry Industry Supersector Supersector 
Common_Risk -0.498*** 0.753*** -0.510** 0.769*** -0.274 0.677***  
(0.184) (0.180) (0.218) (0.266) (0.216) (0.260) 
Board_Size -0.976** 0.293 -0.924** 0.355 -0.893** 0.326  
(0.404) (0.551) (0.408) (0.554) (0.406) (0.544) 
Ind_Directors % -0.022** -0.030*** -0.025** -0.031*** -0.025** -0.030***  
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Ln_Sales 0.208*** -0.081 0.205*** -0.081 0.204*** -0.087  
(0.063) (0.087) (0.063) (0.087) (0.063) (0.087) 
Div_Yld -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.022 -0.018 0.001  
(0.051) (0.058) (0.050) (0.061) (0.049) (0.058) 
MTB -0.015 -0.053** -0.015 -0.056*** -0.014 -0.054**  
(0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.021) 
Multiple -0.647*** -1.293*** -0.645*** -1.191*** -0.660*** -1.205***  
(0.191) (0.261) (0.189) (0.251) (0.190) (0.250) 
Instit_Own % -0.005 -0.029*** -0.005 -0.030*** -0.005 -0.029***  
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) 
Ind_Con 0.646 -3.583*** 0.451 -3.838*** 0.481 -4.312***  
(1.114) (1.263) (1.094) (1.250) (1.104) (1.249) 
Adj_Ret 0.157 0.146 0.142 0.096 0.114 0.100  
(0.253) (0.302) (0.254) (0.287) (0.249) (0.287) 
Industry 
      
Basic Resources -0.942* 1.998*** -1.195** 2.548*** -1.148** 2.588***  
(0.501) (0.518) (0.474) (0.478) (0.469) (0.475) 
Consumer Goods -0.511 -0.075 -0.580* 0.052 -0.555* 0.043  
(0.325) (0.451) (0.326) (0.450) (0.330) (0.451) 
Financials -0.016 -0.268 -0.223 0.021 -0.132 -0.112  
(0.288) (0.426) (0.290) (0.422) (0.288) (0.418) 
Industrials -0.368 -2.662*** -0.458* -2.633*** -0.439 -2.772***  
(0.270) (0.599) (0.269) (0.591) (0.268) (0.602) 
Oil & Gas -2.497** 1.829*** -2.746*** 2.201*** -2.706*** 2.225***  
(1.056) (0.522) (1.035) (0.520) (1.046) (0.518) 
Technology 0.316 0.864 0.235 1.079* 0.228 1.135**  
(0.403) (0.572) (0.400) (0.560) (0.398) (0.556) 
Telecommunications -1.597** 2.018** -1.690** 2.360*** -1.520** 2.321***  
(0.778) (0.786) (0.773) (0.786) (0.770) (0.791) 
Utilities -1.942** 1.783*** -1.950** 2.134*** -1.777** 2.009***  
(0.806) (0.499) (0.810) (0.528) (0.803) (0.522) 
Year 
      
2010 0.123 -0.050 0.114 -0.053 0.106 -0.069  
(0.277) (0.361) (0.274) (0.352) (0.272) (0.353) 
2011 0.007 -0.111 -0.012 -0.147 0.011 -0.198  
(0.270) (0.380) (0.270) (0.363) (0.270) (0.363) 
2012 0.147 -0.072 0.107 -0.045 0.115 -0.029  
(0.271) (0.370) (0.272) (0.363) (0.271) (0.360) 
2013 0.072 -0.206 -0.111 -0.052 -0.045 -0.088  
(0.278) (0.379) (0.288) (0.389) (0.287) (0.386) 
Constant 0.638 2.107 0.874 2.075 0.607 2.303*  
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6.6.2 Marginal Effects 
In addition to multinomial logit coefficient and the levels of significance, we also present 
marginal effects, evaluated at the mean, of a change in the independent variable (Table 6.9, 
Panel B). The marginal effects display the relative importance of each explanatory variable in 
predicting the probability of event occurrence. For a dummy variable, marginal effects show 
by how much the probability of performance choices will change for shift in the dummy 
variable from 0 to 1; however, for a continuous variable, they show how much the probability 
will change with a one-unit change in the value of the independent variable. 
Panel B of Table 6.9 reports the marginal effects of multinomial logistic regression. Column 2 
shows that one unit increase in common risk_market is associated with a 6.0 percent increase 
in the probability of incorporating RPE exclusively in their long-term incentive plans. By 
contrast, the results in Column 1 reveal that one-unit increase in common risk_market results 
in a 9.6 percent decrease in the probability of selecting absolute measure exclusively. To look 
more specifically at the joint use of RPE and absolute measure sample, according to Column 7, 
a one-unit increase in common risk_market results in a 3.6 percent increase in the likelihood of 
selection of relative and absolute measures jointly. These results are in line with our hypothesis 
and show that firms filter common shocks and yield a more informative measure to assess 
agents’ performance. 
Column 1 reveals that the estimated marginal effect of sales is 0.036, implying that an increase 
of 1 unit in log sales raises the probability of the absolute measure in compensation contracts 
by 3.6 percentage points. However, the marginal effect of institutional ownership (column 7, 








and relative measure selected increases by 0.2 percent for a 1-unit increase in institutional 
ownership. In addition, greater board size and percentage of independent directors are also 
associated with adoption of absolute and relative measures jointly. However, the magnitude of 
the board size coefficient is higher, where the marginal effect of board size shows that an 
increase in one unit of board size will increase the probability of absolute and relative measures 
jointly by 13.4 percent (column 7). These results may be interpreted as evidence that board 
members and independent directors provide monitoring role on the choice of performance 
standards in compensation contracts. 
In regard to marginal effects of the coefficient on multiple plan dummy in Column 7, the 
probability of firms choosing absolute and relative measures jointly in multiple plans is 16.7% 
higher respectively than firms which do not operate multiple equity plans. In Column 1, 
concerning industry dummies, the probability of employing the absolute measure exclusively 
reduces by 27.1%, 24.7% and 25.6% in the Oil and Gas, Telecommunications and Utility 
industries, respectively compared to the Consumer Services group, demonstrating that firms 
prefer not to employ absolute measures within these industries. Also, only Industrials firms 
employ absolute and relative measures jointly in compensation contracts. The marginal effects 
for firms with higher industry betas display larger positive coefficients than that of firms with 
higher market beta as shown in Columns 2 and 4. This suggests that there is greater likelihood 
that firms with highly volatile industry returns filter out common shocks than for firms with 








Table 6.9: Marginal effects of impact of common shocks on performance standards 
 
Panel B: Marginal effects of common risk, multiple plans, board size, institutional ownership, 
independent directors, multiple plans, market to book ratio, industry-adjusted returns, industry 
concentration, and corporate governance variables on different performance standards in 
compensation contracts. Marginal effects represent the effect of a unit change in the variable on 
the probability of an outcome (RPE exclusively, absolute exclusively, and RPE and absolute 
measures jointly). Significance levels are indicated by ***p < 0.01(1%), **p < 0.05(5%) and *p 
< 0.1(10%), based on robust standard errors and are reported in parentheses.  
 







exclusively exclusively exclusively exclusively 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Market Market Industry Industry Supersector Supersector 
Common_Risk -0.096*** 0.060*** -0.100*** 0.062*** -0.059 0.052***  
(0.030) (0.014) (0.037) (0.019) (0.037) (0.019) 
Board_Size -0.170** 0.036 -0.164** 0.040 -0.159** 0.038  
(0.067) (0.038) (0.069) (0.038) (0.069) (0.038) 
Ind_Directors % -0.003** -0.002** -0.004** -0.002** -0.004** -0.002**  
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Ln_Sales 0.036*** -0.009 0.036*** -0.009 0.037*** -0.009  
(0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) 
Div_Yld -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.000  
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
MTB -0.002 -0.003** -0.002 -0.004*** -0.002 -0.004**  
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Multiple -0.089*** -0.079*** -0.091*** -0.072*** -0.094*** -0.073***  
(0.032) (0.021) (0.032) (0.020) (0.032) (0.020) 
Instit_Own % -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.002***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ind_Con 0.167 -0.257*** 0.140 -0.273*** 0.155 -0.310***  
(0.185) (0.088) (0.184) (0.088) (0.187) (0.089) 
Adj_Ret 0.024 0.008 0.023 0.004 0.018 0.005  
(0.042) (0.020) (0.042) (0.019) (0.042) (0.019) 
Industry 
      
Basic Resources -0.210*** 0.392*** -0.263*** 0.513*** -0.259*** 0.533***  
(0.049) (0.104) (0.042) (0.089) (0.041) (0.087) 
Consumer Goods -0.092* 0.005 -0.113* 0.017 -0.106* 0.017  
(0.055) (0.039) (0.058) (0.037) (0.058) (0.039) 
Financials 0.003 -0.020 -0.047 0.007 -0.025 -0.005  
(0.059) (0.031) (0.058) (0.032) (0.059) (0.031) 
Industrials -0.046 -0.085*** -0.070 -0.072*** -0.063 -0.079***  
(0.051) (0.022) (0.053) (0.019) (0.052) (0.020) 
Oil & Gas -0.271*** 0.382*** -0.305*** 0.456*** -0.298*** 0.474***  
(0.041) (0.108) (0.039) (0.106) (0.038) (0.105) 
Technology 0.032 0.086 0.007 0.109 -0.001 0.125  
(0.083) (0.073) (0.084) (0.074) (0.082) (0.078) 
Telecom -0.247*** 0.416** -0.281*** 0.481*** -0.268*** 0.480***  
(0.046) (0.176) (0.046) (0.172) (0.048) (0.173) 
Utilities -0.256*** 0.364*** -0.285*** 0.430*** -0.272*** 0.408***  
(0.042) (0.103) (0.043) (0.111) (0.045) (0.110) 



















Table 6.9. Panel B- continued  
 
Definition of all variables used in this study is included in Appendix A to Chapter 6. 








  (7) (8) (9) 
 Market Industry Supersector 
Common_Risk 0.036* 0.038* 0.007  
(0.021) (0.022) (0.039) 
Board_Size 0.134* 0.124* 0.122  
(0.072) (0.074) (0.074) 
Ind_Directors % 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln_Sales -0.028** -0.028** -0.027**  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Div_Yld 0.002 0.002 0.003  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
MTB 0.005* 0.005* 0.005*  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Multiple 0.167*** 0.163*** 0.167***  
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Instit_Own % 0.002** 0.002** 0.002*  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ind_Con 0.090 0.133 0.155  
(0.197) (0.196) (0.198) 
Adj_Ret -0.032 -0.027 -0.023  
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Industry 
   
Basic Resources -0.181* -0.250*** -0.274***  
(0.103) (0.090) (0.087) 
Consumer Goods 0.086 0.095 0.089  
(0.062) (0.063) (0.064) 
Financials 0.017 0.040 0.030  
(0.060) (0.061) (0.061) 
Industrials 0.132** 0.142*** 0.142*** 
 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) 
Oil & Gas -0.111 -0.152 -0.176  
(0.111) (0.109) (0.108) 
Technology -0.118 -0.116 -0.124  
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) 
Telecom -0.168 -0.200 -0.211  
(0.169) (0.164) (0.164) 
Utilities -0.108 -0.144 -0.136  
(0.107) (0.115) (0.114) 
Year-specific effects Yes Yes Yes 









6.6.3 RPE Plan Characteristics 
6.6.3.1 Peer Group Choice 
The previous tests confirm the association between common risk and choice of RPE plan, but 
they do not shed light on characteristics of the RPE plans themselves. One key RPE 
characteristic is the comparator group used to evaluate relative performance. Firms can select 
different peer groups, with RPE theories proposing that the choice of peer group should be 
based on their ability to filter common risk. We now turn our attention to the issue of peer group 
selection, and the focus will be on RPE based plans for the remainder of the study. As shown 
in Table 6.5, peer group choices consist of three categories: index, custom peers (self-selected 
peers), and sector peers. The dependent variable used in this study is nominal and consists of 
three independent choices which cannot be ordered in a meaningful way. Thus, similar to the 
previous section, we perform multinomial logistic regressions to examine peer group choices, 
with a reference category against which to test. Here, we choose the reference category as the 
use of a broad index as a peer group in long-term incentive plans.  We control for plan types by 
using dummies; dummy option is equal to one if the company grants only options in their 
compensation contract, and zero otherwise. The dummy for matching plans is constructed in a 
similar way. 
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The results are presented in Table 6.10 and use similar independent variables to the previous 
section. Column 1 reveals that firms subject to high levels of exogenous shocks are significantly 
less likely to select custom peers over a predefined index. In Column 2, relating to the selection 
of sector peers, we find a negative and highly significant coefficient for common risk_market. 
This indicates that firms are less likely to select sector peers, over the alternative of broad index, 
when firms have a higher market beta. Both of these findings imply that when companies face 
greater common risk with FTSE 350 peers, they are less likely to employ bespoke or sector peer 
group relative to broad-based market peer group. 
Column 3 shows that firms with highly volatile industry returns are less likely to prefer custom 
peers relative to the broad index category. This result suggests that market indices do a better 
job in filtering common risk if shocks are specific to the industry or supersector, consistent with 
Carter et al. (2009). However, in Columns 4 and 6, the coefficients for common risk_industry 
and common risk_supersector are positive but statistically insignificant for the likelihood of 
selection of sector peers. This indicates that firms with higher market or sector beta do not 
influence the selection of sector peer group. This is puzzling since we expect firms with greater 
common risk with sector peers should opt for sector category as opposed to broad index. 
Albuquerque (2009) argues that if external shocks are industry specific then broad index is not 
appropriate peer group, which is in line with what we expected. By contrast, our results show a 
positive but insignificant relationship between common risk_industry and sector peer selection. 
To conclude, these results show mixed support for theories that firms select peer group in such 








Interestingly, the coefficients for sales show positive and significant association for both the 
likelihood of custom and sector peer group selection over the alternative broad index category. 
One possible interpretation of this association is that larger firms have a more complex business  
structure with many dimensions and the constituents of the market index (FTSE 350) are very 
different in their business operations as opposed to sector or custom peers. Thus, large firms do 
not select the broader index as an appropriate peer group, instead of selecting custom or sector 
peers to evaluate firm’s performance. In Column 2, there is a significantly negative relationship 
at the 5% level between the probability of sector peer selection and the percentage of 
independent directors, implying firms with a greater proportion of independent directors are 
less likely to favour sector peers over the broad index category. This preference for broad index 
as a comparator group against which they benchmark firm’s performance could be due to their 
limited understanding of the complexities involved in selection of peer group. Overall, we find 
little evidence that corporate governance characteristics impact the choice of peer group in RPE 
based contracts. 
The coefficients for industry concentration are negative and significant for both the likelihood 
of custom and sector peer selection, suggesting that firms in more concentrated industries prefer 
to select a broad index relative to the other two categories. With respect to the multiple plan 
dummy, we find a positive and significant coefficient which indicates that companies which 
operate multiple plans are more likely to use sector peers than firms that grant single plans. This 
may be because firms grant multiple plans in order to select several peer groups to evaluate the 
performance of executives. The coefficients of year dummy indicate insignificant associations 
between different peer group choices. However, this result is not surprising, since we have 








time. This implies that peer group choices and the selection of RPE are not influenced by year 
specific dummies. 
Overall, these results show some evidence of an association between common shocks and peer 
group selection. Regarding corporate governance characteristics, there is evidence that 
independent directors monitor the choice of the peer group in RPE based plans. 
Table 6.10: Multinomial logistic model estimating the probability of peer group choices in 
compensation contracts 
 
Multinomial logistic model predicting peer group choices in compensation contracts with common 
risk, multiple plans, board size, institutional ownership, independent directors, multiple plans, market 
to book ratio, industry-adjusted returns, and industry concentration. Significance levels are indicated 
by ***p < 0.01(1%), **p < 0.05(5%), *p < 0.1(10%), based on clustered standard errors at the RPE 
firm level and are reported in parentheses. Definition of all variables used in this study is included in 
Appendix A to Chapter 6.                                         
 
Base Category:  RPE Peer Group Choice (Broad Index) 
 












  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Variable Market Market Industry Industry Supersector Supersector 
Common_Risk -0.693*** -0.572** -0.854*** 0.167 -0.740*** 0.113 
 (0.223) (0.232) (0.250) (0.274) (0.254) (0.292) 
Board_Size -0.414 -0.687 -0.537 -0.357 -0.458 -0.413  
(0.575) (0.642) (0.582) (0.664) (0.581) (0.657) 
Ind_Directors % 0.016 -0.023** 0.011 -0.025** 0.011 -0.025**  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Ln_Sales 0.294*** 0.229** 0.274*** 0.195** 0.274*** 0.198**  
(0.102) (0.098) (0.100) (0.097) (0.100) (0.097) 
Div_Yld -0.077 -0.074 -0.065 -0.111 -0.079 -0.107  
(0.056) (0.071) (0.058) (0.069) (0.057) (0.071) 
MTB 0.011 -0.001 0.012 0.000 0.012 -0.000  
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
Multiple 0.122 0.541** 0.091 0.563** 0.116 0.547**  
(0.222) (0.247) (0.222) (0.248) (0.220) (0.248) 
Instit_Own % -0.268 1.009 -0.037 1.011 -0.113 1.038  
(1.159) (1.286) (1.152) (1.286) (1.147) (1.275) 
Ind_Con -10.334*** -9.402*** -9.716*** -8.168*** -9.193*** -8.365***  
(1.783) (2.065) (1.725) (2.054) (1.638) (2.031) 
Adj_Ret -0.585* -0.325 -0.539* -0.334 -0.563* -0.334  
(0.306) (0.358) (0.318) (0.355) (0.314) (0.359) 
Industry 
      









(0.708) (0.703) (0.625) (0.596) (0.626) (0.604) 
Consumer Goods 2.092*** 1.691*** 2.014*** 1.524*** 1.986*** 1.504***  
(0.397) (0.544) (0.403) (0.536) (0.396) (0.537) 
Financials 1.014** 1.691*** 0.843* 1.568*** 0.962** 1.548***  
(0.425) (0.432) (0.430) (0.447) (0.427) (0.435) 
Industrials -1.516*** -2.016*** -1.416*** -2.065*** -1.314*** -2.084***  
(0.348) (0.426) (0.346) (0.431) (0.337) (0.427) 
Oil & Gas 1.980*** 17.666*** 1.909*** 17.638*** 1.701*** 17.719***  
(0.474) (0.747) (0.482) (0.723) (0.454) (0.722) 
Technology -0.447 2.549*** -0.642 2.123*** -0.759 2.168***  
(1.188) (0.655) (1.196) (0.649) (1.190) (0.649) 
Telecommunications 3.044*** 3.972*** 2.814*** 3.741*** 2.811*** 3.770***  
(0.913) (1.002) (0.883) (1.002) (0.886) (1.008) 
Utilities 0.134 1.790*** 0.105 1.929*** 0.234 1.933***  
(0.673) (0.599) (0.682) (0.605) (0.680) (0.606) 
Year 
      
2010 0.200 0.257 0.211 0.199 0.218 0.182  
(0.321) (0.392) (0.324) (0.396) (0.320) (0.396) 
2011 -0.008 0.264 0.003 0.315 0.048 0.284  
(0.316) (0.381) (0.319) (0.380) (0.317) (0.382) 
2012 -0.297 0.261 -0.316 0.285 -0.346 0.299  
(0.319) (0.378) (0.319) (0.385) (0.320) (0.384) 
2013 -0.512 0.053 -0.623* 0.152 -0.591* 0.130  
(0.349) (0.395) (0.351) (0.403) (0.349) (0.401) 
Options -0.531 0.461 -0.855* 0.484 -0.772 0.474  
(0.444) (0.397) (0.499) (0.414) (0.483) (0.412) 
Matching plans 1.452*** 1.134* 1.389** 1.298** 1.400*** 1.283** 
 
(0.539) (0.592) (0.541) (0.584) (0.537) (0.584) 
Constant -1.504 0.632 -0.690 -0.269 -1.050 -0.100  
(1.619) (1.830) (1.605) (1.822) (1.590) (1.798) 
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6.6.3.2 Initial and Maximum Threshold Vesting 
Previous research by Zakaria (2012) revealed that firms tended to employ single performance 
hurdles to achieve a maximum payout in UK compensation contracts. By contrast, the present 
study finds that firms rarely use performance hurdles in compensation contracts, as depicted in 








light on the optimal contracting approach since Brennan (2001) shows that firms’ inclusion of 
performance hurdles in performance-vested equity grants is unlikely to be considered as 
optimal, as performance hurdles is a fixed point and not a range. Therefore, even if firms include 
a performance hurdle, they will still employ another performance measure which will include 
a payout range as shown in Section 5.6. 
Carter et al. (2009) show that there exists a variation in the percentile ranking that must be 
attained for initial rewards to vest. By contrast, the descriptive statistics of our present study 
reveals that firms usually incentivize executives at median (50th percentile ranking) 
performance and this remains unchanged. Nonetheless, there exist variations which belong to 
the maximum performance required to achieve full reward. The vesting levels at minimum 
threshold can vary from 0% to 50% for different firms. Hence, we investigate the determinants 
of vesting of equity at initial and upper quartile performance thresholds. 
We now progress to examining the differences in the payout structure of RPE plans, using OLS 
regression models with industry and time dummies. We perform this analysis at the plan level, 
as individual plan characteristics can vary, and in our estimation, standard errors are clustered 
by firm. 
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The results in Panel A of Table 6.11 demonstrate that the coefficient on common risk is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level in determining the percentage of equity vesting at 
the initial threshold. This indicates that firms facing greater common risk tend to employ 








Concerning corporate governance variables, firms with a greater percentage of independent 
directors also tend to set lower vesting levels at or above median performance. This suggests 
that independent directors play a monitoring role which is not just limited to the selection of 
RPE or peer group. On the other hand, firms which grant multiple plans employ higher levels 
of initial equity vesting at median performance. One possible explanation is that firms with 
multiple long-term incentive plans set different performance metrics, and thus, they do not 
employ tougher performance conditions than firms which operate a single plan in their long-
term incentive plan. 
To investigate the determinants of vesting at upper quartile performance, we exclude plans 
where the required firm performance should be above the median plus an additional percentage 
growth p.a. and the plans where the required performance should be above the Index plus an 
additional percentage growth p.a. over a three-year period to receive the maximum payout. In 
these plans, performance targets are determined ex-post and remain unknown. This is because 
it is nearly impossible to work out the required performance which would result in percentage 
vesting at the upper quartile. 
In Panel B of Table 6.11, we show that the coefficient of common risk is negatively related to 
the percentage of equity vesting at the 75th percentile ranking, indicating that firms which face 
greater common risk tend to employ lower vesting levels at upper quartile percentile ranking. 
This suggests that firms opt for tougher performance conditions by operating outperformance 
plans that have a maximum reward at the upper quintile or decile, and also indicates that firms 
have shifted away from traditional benchmarking evaluation, where the maximum reward is at 
the 75th percentile. Multiple plans, on the other hand, are not associated with the percentage of 








of independent directors employ a lower percentage of equity vesting at the upper quartile 
threshold. These findings suggest that the board and independent directors play a monitoring 
role in compensation contracts. 
 
6.6.3.3  Target Spread 
The results discussed above indicate that common risk and corporate governance factors impact 
the percentage of equity vesting set at median and upper quartile percentile rankings. However, 
they do not consider these threshold targets for vesting to occur. The current study also observes 
variations in threshold targets, most of which belong to maximum performance required to 
achieve full vesting.  
Another important RPE characteristic is the target spread, that is, the difference between the 
maximum and minimum percentile rankings for vesting to occur, in order to evaluate relative 
performance. Typically, the initial and maximum percentile rankings are the 50th percentile 
(median) and the 75th percentile (upper quartile) respectively, with a target spread of 25. The 
target spread for firms with a maximum percentile ranking of 80th percentile (upper quintile) 
is therefore 30. Hence, the target spread is greater in firms, where the percentile ranking 
required for maximum vesting is at the upper quintile or decile than firms which opt for 
maximum vesting at the traditional upper quartile percentile ranking. There exists greater 
diversity in the maximum percentile ranking at which the maximum possible reward is paid 
out, as observed in Table 6.6. 
The spread relates to the performance target (percentile ranking), and the equity payout 








incentivize executives, then we would expect a greater target spread. Companies with a wider 
performance spread and a lower percentage of equity vesting at initial or upper quartile 
performance target are considered to have challenging performance conditions. Here, we are 
keen to explore whether there exists a relationship between the spread and the impact of 
common shocks. Similar to the previous section, we employ an OLS regression model, with 
standard errors robust to clustering at the firm level.  
The results in Column 1 and 2 of Table 6.11 (Panel C) demonstrate that the coefficient on the 
target spread is positive and statistically significant at 10% level. This result infers weak 
evidence of the existence of a relationship between the spread and common risk. Meanwhile, 
in Column 3, the coefficient on common risk_supersector are found to be insignificantly 
associated with the spread. This finding contrasts with the previous empirical evidence reported 
by Carter et al. (2009), who find that the spread is negatively associated with common risk. It 
could be argued that characteristics of RPE have been changed in the meantime, so that the 
firms, now, tend to operate plans with maximum payout at upper quintile or decile percentile 
rankings. At the same time, firms employ fewer single performance hurdles in their long-term 
incentive plans. Due to different settings, the previous results cannot be generalized. The 
coefficient on board size is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, implying that 
firms with a larger board size use tougher performance criteria by setting wider target spreads. 
This is in line with the view that larger boards provide more effective monitoring of the design 
of compensation packages as they tend to have larger remuneration committees. 
The results in the previous section indicate that firms which operate multiple equity plans for 
their executives tend to set higher levels of equity vesting at the initial performance threshold. 








significant relationship between sales and target spread. These results are similar to those using 
a percentage of equity vesting at the initial threshold as a dependent variable but in opposite 
directions, implying that firms with higher sales tend to select tougher performance conditions. 
To sum up, these results clearly suggest the impact of common risk and corporate governance 
variables on characteristics of RPE. However, institutional ownership does not influence the 
characteristics of RPE. 
 
6.6.4 Robustness Tests 
In this section, we subject the results presented in a variety of robustness tests, all of them 
available in the Appendix to Chapter 6. In order to study the determinants of RPE selection, we 
also use alternative proxies for common risk (correlation and R-squared) as shown in Table 
A.6.1 and Table A.6.2 in the Appendix to Chapter 6. The results reinforce our main findings 
and show a positive association between common risk and firms’ selection of RPE. As observed 
in Chapter 5, some consultants prefer to select certain performance measures. Hence, we also 
control for the identity of the remuneration consultant in determining the selection of RPE-
based compensation contracts. In Table A.6.3 in the Appendix to Chapter 6, the reference group 
used in the present study for the identity of the remuneration advisor is “HNBS”. The main 
results remain statistically significant between the choice of RPE plan and common risk. In 
addition, we find that firms which appoint Deloitte, Kepler, Mercer and Towers Watson as 
remuneration advisors are more likely to employ absolute measures relative to the remuneration 
advisor “HNBS”. This suggests the presence of institutional isomorphism in performance 










Panel A: Regressions of impact of common risk on Initial Vesting 
 
This table represents the estimation of results for percentage of vesting level occurring at minimum performance, as 
set by the firms against common risk, multiple plans, board size, institutional ownership, independent directors, 
multiple plans, market to book ratio, industry-adjusted returns and industry concentration. The dependent variable is 
RPE_IV. This table presents the results of OLS with industry and time dummies. Significance levels are indicated by 
***p < 0.01(1%), **p < 0.05(5%), *p < 0.1(10%), based on clustered standard errors at the RPE firm level and are 
reported in parentheses. Definition of all variables used in this study is included in Appendix A to Chapter 6.                         
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market Industry Supersector 
Common_Risk -2.393*** -2.109** -2.168**  
(0.898) (1.034) (1.036) 
Board_Size 1.319 1.471 1.460  
(2.535) (2.548) (2.535) 
Ind_Directors % -0.107** -0.105** -0.106**  
(0.050) (0.050) (0.049) 
Ln_Sales 0.044 -0.005 0.005  
(0.324) (0.325) (0.324) 
Div_Yld -0.471** -0.413* -0.441**  
(0.227) (0.222) (0.219) 
MTB -0.015 -0.015 -0.015  
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
Multiple 2.333** 2.383** 2.469***  
(0.929) (0.925) (0.914) 
Instit_Own % 0.01 0.008 0.007  
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Ind_Con -1.478 -1.908 -1.481  
(5.415) (5.223) (5.034) 
Adj_Ret -0.504 -0.576 -0.573  
(0.761) (0.735) (0.726) 
Industry 
   
Basic Resources 5.454* 4.565* 4.589*  
(2.791) (2.712) (2.703) 
Consumer Goods 1.397 1.244 1.343  
(1.203) (1.194) (1.182) 
Financials -0.0625 -0.772 -0.461  
(1.375) (1.267) (1.308) 
Industrials 0.449 0.297 0.575  
(1.672) (1.617) (1.677) 
Oil & Gas 1.719 1.195 1.274  
(2.373) (2.308) (2.301) 
Technology 3.392** 3.188* 3.248**  
(1.654) (1.634) (1.639) 
Telecommunications 9.553** 9.011* 9.292**  
(4.610) (4.647) (4.577) 
Utilities 0.170 0.113 0.470  
(1.595) (1.511) (1.531) 
Year 
   
2010 0.299 0.373 0.423  
(0.444) (0.464) (0.467) 
2012 -1.377* -0.130 -0.021  
(0.713) (0.455) (0.443) 
2013 -0.824 -0.567 -0.653  
(0.568) (0.541) (0.559) 
2014 -1.582** -1.397** -1.355*  
(0.675) (0.683) (0.687) 
Constant 32.02*** 31.95*** 31.71***  
(6.011) (5.972) (6.002) 
Plan types dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 672 672 672 










Panel B: Regressions of impact of common risk on Upper Quartile Vesting 
 
This table represents the estimation of results for percentage of vesting level which occurs at upper quartile performance as 
set by the firms against common risk, multiple plans, board size, institutional ownership, independent directors, multiple 
plans, market to book ratio, industry-adjusted returns, and industry concentration. The dependent variable is RPE_UQV 
This table presents the results of OLS with industry and time dummies.  Significance levels are indicated by ***p < 
0.01(1%), **p < 0.05(5%), *p < 0.1(10%), based on clustered standard errors at the RPE firm level and are reported in 
parentheses. Definition of all variables used in this study is included in Appendix A to Chapter 6.     
                     
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Market Industry Supersector 
Common_Risk -2.820** -3.412** -3.447**  
(1.116) (1.418) (1.380) 
Board_Size -4.511** -5.867*** -5.878***  
(2.095) (2.102) (2.119) 
Ind_Directors % -0.143** -0.140** -0.139**  
(0.0671) (0.0678) (0.0675) 
Ln_Sales -0.812** -0.742* -0.730*  
(0.377) (0.377) (0.375) 
Div_Yld -0.359 -0.317 -0.362  
(0.223) (0.246) (0.229) 
MTB 0.0583 0.066 0.068  
(0.0541) (0.053) (0.051) 
Multiple 0.275 0.237 0.337  
(1.031) (1.033) (1.038) 
Instit_Own % 0.012 0.015 0.014  
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) 
Ind_Con -4.442 -4.487 -3.784  
(8.422) (8.497) (8.268) 
Adj_Ret 1.059 1.212 1.178  
(0.959) (0.968) (0.966) 
Industry 
   
Basic Resources 5.492 3.635 3.634  
(3.441) (3.355) (3.357) 
Consumer Goods 3.870 3.739 3.907  
(2.796) (2.835) (2.844) 
Financials 4.551** 3.646* 4.157*  
(2.091) (2.161) (2.114) 
Industrials 3.452 3.288 3.743*  
(2.126) (2.187) (2.161) 
Oil & Gas 3.640 2.537 2.737  
(3.725) (3.475) (3.462) 
Technology 4.227 3.950 4.039*  
(2.560) (2.559) (2.433) 
Telecommunications 6.314 5.290 5.775  
(3.965) (3.938) (3.950) 
Utilities 6.561*** 5.410** 6.212**  
(2.493) (2.448) (2.405) 
Year 
   
2010 -0.00562 -0.231 -0.171  
(0.681) (0.652) (0.653) 
2012 0.482 0.456 0.583  
(0.455) (0.467) (0.475) 
2013 0.931 0.672 0.525  
(0.628) (0.635) (0.612) 
2014 0.561 -0.273 -0.199  
(0.816) (0.864) (0.857) 
Constant 128.1*** 130.6*** 130.1***  
(7.354) (7.371) (7.328) 
Plan types dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 530 530 530 










Panel C: Regressions of impact of common risk on Target Spread 
 
This table represents the estimation of results for different between minimum and maximum threshold performance target 
against common risk, multiple plans, board size, institutional ownership, independent directors, multiple plans, market to 
book ratio, industry-adjusted returns and industry concentration. The dependent variable is RPE_Spread. This table presents 
the results of OLS with industry and time dummies.  Significance levels are indicated by ***p < 0.01(1%), **p < 0.05(5%), 
*p < 0.1(10%), based on clustered standard errors at the RPE firm level and are reported in parentheses. Definition of all 
variables used in this study is included in Appendix A to Chapter 6. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Market Industry Supersector 
Common_Risk 0.754* 0.815* 0.917 
  (0.402) (0.432) (0.674) 
Board_Size 2.170** 2.492** 2.470** 
  (1.091) (1.073) (1.085) 
Ind_Directors -0.025 -0.025 -0.024 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Ln_Sales 0.524** 0.508** 0.504** 
  (0.231) (0.227) (0.229) 
Div_Yld -0.057 -0.052 -0.044 
  (0.127) (0.139) (0.133) 
MTB -0.019 -0.021 -0.022 
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
Multiple 0.425 0.477 0.446 
  (0.634) (0.632) (0.641) 
Instit_Own 0.010 0.009 0.009 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ind_concent -6.821** -7.249** -7.398** 
  (3.204) (3.290) (3.320) 
Adj_Ret -0.543 -0.603 -0.602 
  (0.650) (0.702) (0.715) 
Industry 
   
Basic Resources 2.322* 2.982** 2.993** 
  (1.379) (1.233) (1.265) 
Consumer Goods -1.839 -1.764 -1.792 
  (1.215) (1.238) (1.242) 
Financials -2.873** -2.700** -2.792** 
  (1.256) (1.238) (1.235) 
Industrials -2.698*** -2.743*** -2.847*** 
  (0.837) (0.853) (0.845) 
Oil & Gas -1.182 -0.813 -0.848 
  (1.458) (1.343) (1.350) 
Technology -0.718 -0.507 -0.487 
  (1.101) (1.061) (1.056) 
Telecommunications 1.487 1.805 1.701 
  (1.720) (1.669) (1.709) 
Utilities -1.149 -0.684 -0.846 
  (1.956) (1.761) (1.767) 
Year 
   
2010 0.386 0.488 0.483 
  (0.520) (0.517) (0.520) 
2012 -0.294 -0.319 -0.345 
  (0.491) (0.498) (0.495) 
2013 0.0778 0.133 0.195 
  (0.522) (0.528) (0.533) 
2014 -0.0207 0.170 0.182 
  (0.621) (0.644) (0.643) 
Constant 17.52*** 17.00*** 17.02*** 
  (3.735) (3.807) (3.755) 
Plan types dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 530 530 530 








6.6.5 Actual Equity Vesting Percentages 
Our next objective is to analyze the impact of different RPE plan characteristics on percentage 
of equity vesting. This analysis sheds light on the issue whether peer groups and other 
characteristics of the plan are chosen in a manner such as to attain greater vesting, resulting in 
greater executive compensation. 
Table 6.12: Effect of RPE characteristics on percentage of equity vesting 
Table 6.12 provides descriptive information on actual vesting of the number of plans for 
different RPE characteristics which are as follows: RPE peer group, target spread which is the 
difference between maximum and median percentile ranking, and initial vesting at median and 
vesting at upper quartile percentile ranking. 








% of plans 
achieving target 
Index 270 165 105 38.8% 
Sector 48 39 9 18.7% 































 0.01%-25.00% 1  0.01%-25.00% 3  0.01%-25% 3 
 
25.01%-50.00% 14  25.01%-50.00% 22  25.01%-50% 8 
 50.01%-75.00% 82  50.01%-75.00% 1  50.01%-75% 53 
 
75.01%-100.00% 8  
75.01%-
100.00% 








Panel B: Target Spread 
 




% of plans 
achieving target 
25.00-29.99 457 275 182 40.00% 
30.00-34.99 65 52 13 18.5% 
35.00-39.99 43 35 8 18.6% 
 
 
Panel C: Initial Vesting 
 




% of plans 
achieving target 
0.00%-10.00% 9 7 2 22.2% 
10.01%-20.00% 59 38 21 35.5% 
20.01%-30.00% 443 316 127 28.6% 
30.01%-40.00% 29 20 9 31.0% 


















































































0.01%-25.00% 0  0.01%-25% 0  0.01%-25% 0 
 
25.01%-50.00% 2  25.01%-50% 11  25.01%-50% 14 
 
50.01%-75.00% 0  50.01%-75% 10  50.01%-75% 110 
 












30.01%-40.00% 0.00% 20 40.01%-50.00% 0.00% 12 
 0.01%-25.00% 1  0.01%-25.00% 5 
 
25.01%-50.00% 0  25.01%-50.00% 0 
 
50.01%-75.00% 6  50.01%-75.00% 0 
 
75.01%-100.00% 2   75.01%-100.00% 8 
 








% of plans 
achieving target 
60.01%-70.00% 20 15 5 25.0% 
70.01%-80.00% 29 24 5 17.2% 
80.01%-90.00% 58 41 17 29.3% 













60.01%-70.00% 0.00% 15 70.01%-80.00% 0.00% 24 
 0.01%-25.00% 2  0.01%-25.00% 0 
 
25.01%-50.00% 3  25.01%-50.00% 5 
 
50.01%-75.00% 0  50.01%-75.00% 0 













Table 6.12  
Descriptive statistics on the breakdown of different RPE characteristics on targets achieved/ not achieved and 
actual range of vesting percentages, after three years, once the plan has been adopted, in long-term incentive plans. 
Panel A refers to the RPE characteristic dealing with the breakdown of plans that employ index, custom, and sector 
as RPE peer group. Panel B refers to the breakdown of plans which employ different target spread, difference 
between the maximum and minimum percentile ranking for initial and maximum vesting to occur in their 
compensation contracts. Panel C presents the breakdown of plans which achieve/not achieve median percentile 
ranking which, respectively, lead/ not lead to initial vesting as set by the firms. These plans with initial vesting are 
further studied on how many of these fall across the range of equity vesting percentages at the end of three years. 
Panel D presents the breakdown of plans which vest/ not vest after achieving/not achieving upper quartile 
percentile as set by the firms. These plans with upper quartile vesting are further examined on how many of these 
fall across the different range of equity vesting percentages at the end of three years. “Targets not achieved” 
represents the number of plans that have not achieved any performance target at all. “Targets achieved” represents 
the number of plans that have achieved some target for RPE characteristic under consideration. “% of plans 
achieving target” refers to the % of plans that have achieved some target for RPE characteristic under 
consideration. “No. of plans” refers to the number of plans that have or have not achieved the target and lies in 
that specific range for the specific type of RPE characteristic under consideration. “% of plans achieving target” 
refers to the % of plans that have achieved some target for RPE characteristic under consideration. “No. of plans” 
refers to the number of plans that have or have not achieved the target and lies in that specific vesting range for 
RPE characteristic under consideration. “Equity Vesting Ranges” refers to the range at which percentage of equity 
vesting occurs depending upon achieving or not achieving the target after three years of the plans’ adoption. 
 
Panel A of Table 6.12 provides a breakdown of RPE characteristics and its effect on equity 
vesting. The percentage of equity vesting depends upon the extent to which these performance 
criteria are met. Firstly, it clearly indicates that a greater number of firms selecting Index peers 
achieve some form of target than the firms selecting bespoke peers. Around 26% of the firms 
achieve the minimum performance threshold for bespoke peers as opposed to 39% of firms 
which select Index peers. Those achieving the target in the latter category, 78% of the firms lie 
between the range of 50% and 75%. This suggests that firms which select FTSE Index as a peer 
group not only meet the minimum threshold but also lie at a higher percentile ranking leads 












80.01%-90.00% 0.00% 41 90.01%-100.00% 0.00% 325 
 0.01%-25.00% 1  0.01%-25.00% 0 
 25.01%-50.00% 14  25.01%-50.00% 0 
 50.01%-75.00% 2  50.01%-75.00% 135 








Turning towards target spread, another RPE characteristic, Panel B of Table 6.12 shows that 
the more difficult the target, i.e. the wider the target spread, the harder it becomes for firms to 
achieve greater equity vesting. This is evident from the 80% of firms with target spread in the 
range of 30.00% to 34.99% which have not met at least the minimum threshold. This result also 
holds true for firms where the target spread is between the range of 35.00% and 39.99%. The 
results, therefore, indicate that 40% of firms which select traditional plans with a maximum 
performance at the 75th percentile, target spread between 25.00% and 29.99%, have in some 
way met their target. Now, of those achieving the performance target, 92% of plans lie in the 
range of 50% and 75%. This result implies that easier performance targets are met with greater 
ease. 
However, we observe on Panel C of Table 6.12, that initial vesting at median percentile ranking 
are mostly concentrated in the range between 20.01% and 30%. Of these, 29% of firms have 
met the target in some way. Very few plans vest which set initial vesting between the range of 
0% and 9.99%. Overall, no fixed pattern has been observed in plans with initial vesting at 
median percentile ranking. 
Concerning upper quartile vesting in Panel D of Table 6.12, only 21% of firms meet the 
performance target which set vesting range of 60% to 80%. However, 31% of firms meet some 
form of target with a vesting range of 80% to 100%. This further strengthens our previous 
findings from target spread that softer targets are easier to achieve than more difficult targets. 
To conclude, the results show that firms which select index as a peer group achieve greater 
percentile ranking than firms opting for sector or custom peers. Although the choice of 
comparator group is of significance, nonetheless, there also exists considerable difference 









This study examines the explicit use of RPE and peer group choices in a comprehensive sample 
of FTSE 350 UK firms from 2010 until 2015. The results from the multinomial logit model 
show that common shock influences the choice of absolute measures exclusively and RPE 
measures exclusively relative to base category in compensation contracts. These findings are in 
line with the predictions of agency theory that firms implement RPE based measures 
exclusively when performance metrics contain significant shocks which are common among 
peer companies. Additionally, the marginal effects show that common risk influences the 
choice of absolute and relative measures jointly (base category) and the results from alternate 
proxies (R-squared and correlation) reinforce the agency theory perspective.  
Our findings on the choice of peer group show that firms choose broad market peers when 
external shocks are mostly dominated by market-specific shocks. On the other hand, if shocks 
are industry specific, firms prefer to employ broad market peers instead of opting for sector 
peers. Overall, we find mixed results on the associations between common risk and the choice 
of peer group.  
There exists limited research on the characteristics of long-term incentive plans set by the firms, 
such as the target spread, initial threshold vesting, vesting at upper quartile performance and 
the choice of the peer group in compensation contracts. We document that firms with higher 
level of common risk tend to set tougher performance conditions. These results remain robust 
after common risk_industry and common risk_supersector are calculated using benchmark 








related to the effect of common risk on target spread is weak but statistically significant. Taken 
together, common shocks influence the characteristics of RPE-based contracts. 
Our study is the first to provide a detailed industry breakdown of the various peer group 
categories used in relative performance evaluation, as reported in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5.  We 
find that 42%, 42% and 16% of plans select custom (self-selected), index, and sector peers 
respectively, in their equity-based pay. In addition, this study also provides a breakdown of 
various outperformance conditions, and percentage of equity vesting at the initial and maximum 
threshold by industry. Almost 35% of plans employ performance conditions that have a 
maximum reward at upper quintile or decile in RPE-based measures. In contrast to the 
descriptive statistics of Carter et al. (2009) and Zakaria (2012), we find a shift in characteristics 
and selection of RPE across long-term incentive arrangements of UK firms.  
Firms with high sales prefer to employ absolute measures which could be due to large firms 
finding it difficult to pick suitable peer groups. Furthermore, large companies also tend to 
employ a lower percentage of vesting at upper quartile percentile ranking and wider target 
spreads in RPE-based measures. 
The board size, role of independent directors, and institutional ownership in determining 
performance choices has been an unexplored area. Our study finds that firms with greater 
percentage of independent directors are more likely to employ absolute and relative based 
measures jointly in compensation contracts. Their greater presence also brings tougher 
performance conditions in the form of lower percentage of equity vesting at median and upper 
quartile percentile ranking. However, board size has a negative influence on equity vesting at 








of active monitoring by independent directors and board members. Although the presence of 
institutional investors influences the selection of RPE and absolute measures jointly, their 
greater presence is not associated with the RPE characteristics. This shows that institutional 
investors have powers to impose RPE preference in long-term incentive plans. 
Finally, for the effect of RPE characteristics on equity vesting, we detect that firms which select 
Index as a peer group achieve greater equity vesting. For other RPE characteristics set by the 
firms, i.e. target spread and equity vesting at upper quartile, the results show that the easier the 
target, the more likely it is to be achieved, implying lower target spread and greater equity 
vesting at upper quartile percentile ranking.  
The main aim of RPE is to filter out common shocks in evaluating the performance of the 
company.  RPE could also be used opportunistically when firms select inappropriate peers in 
evaluating firms’ relative performance or even firms employ RPE based contracts when 
absolute measures are more appropriate performance standards. This opportunistic behaviour 
leads executives to receive more long-term incentive CEO pay since they are picking such peers 











APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6 
Variable Definition 
This table provides a detailed description of the construction of all the variables used in this 
chapter. 
 




0 if long-term incentives consist of both RPE and non-RPE/absolute 
measures, 1 if firms’ incentive grants have only RPE condition, and 
2 if firms’ incentive grants consist of absolute measure exclusively 
 
Peer Group Choice 0 if firms choose Market Index as a comparator in RPE based plans, 
1 if firms select custom peers in RPE plans, and 2 if firms employ 
sector peers as a comparator group in RPE based measures 
 
RPE_IV (Initial Vesting) % of initial RPE payout at median performance in RPE plans 
ranging from 0 to 50% (0% being the toughest) 
 
RPE_UQV (Upper Quartile Vesting) % of RPE payout at upper quartile percentile ranking in RPE plans 
ranging from 50 to 100% 
 
RPE Spread (Target Spread) Spread is the difference between the median and maximum percentile 









Independent Variables Definition 
 
Common Risk (Beta)44 
 
 
Absolute value of the coefficient on value-weighted 
market/industry/supersector returns when regressed on firm-level returns 
over prior 48 months  
 
Alternate Proxy 1 
Common Risk (R-Square) 
R2 of the regression of a firm’s stock returns on value-weighted 
Market/industry/supersector returns over prior 48 months 
 
Alternate Proxy 2 
Common Risk (Corr) 
 
Absolute correlation of a firm’s stock returns on value-weighted FTSE 
ICB Market/industry/supersector index returns over prior 48 months 
 
Instit_Own % The percentage ownership held by the top-four institutional investors 
 
Ind_Directors % Percentage of number of independent directors over total number of 
independent directors 
 
Board_Size Total number of directors on board 
 
Ind_Con The sum of the squares of the market shares of the firms’ sales within 
each FTSE ICB Industry Classification 
 
MTB Market value of equity/book market of equity 
 
Div_Yld Average dividend yield over the prior 3 years 
 
Adj_Ret Adjusted return is the absolute difference between the firm’s annual stock 
returns and the median annual stock returns 
 
Ln_Sales Log of total sales 
 




                                                 
 
44 Note: All common risk variables are calculated using benchmark returns from the FTSE 350, appropriate 








Table A.6.1: Robustness Test 1  
 
Multinomial logit model estimating the probability of performance types in compensation 
contracts (R-square as proxy of common risk) 
 
Multinomial logistic model predicting various performance standards in compensation 
contracts with common risk (R-square), multiple plans, board size, institutional ownership, 
independent directors, multiple plans, market to book ratio, industry-adjusted returns, industry 
concentration, and corporate governance variables. Significance levels are indicated by ***p < 
0.01(1%), **p < 0.05(5%) and *p < 0.1(10%), based on robust standard errors and are reported 
in parentheses. For simplicity, we do not report results from industry and time dummies. Base 
Category: Absolute and RPE measure jointly. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  






exclusively exclusively exclusively exclusively 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Market Market Industry Industry Supersector Supersector 
Common_Risk -1.601*** 2.070*** -1.337*** 1.300** -1.491*** 1.290**  
(0.598) (0.692) (0.499) (0.575) (0.468) (0.582) 
Board_Size -0.841** 0.172 -0.801* 0.225 -0.731* 0.213  
(0.413) (0.553) (0.412) (0.543) (0.418) (0.544) 
Ind_Directors % -0.023** -0.029*** -0.024** -0.028*** -0.024** -0.027**  
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Ln_Sales 0.225*** -0.113 0.238*** -0.126 0.250*** -0.144  
(0.065) (0.090) (0.066) (0.092) (0.067) (0.095) 
Div_Yld -0.034 0.036 -0.024 0.023 -0.040 0.037  
(0.048) (0.061) (0.047) (0.063) (0.047) (0.064) 
MTB -0.014 -0.055** -0.014 -0.055*** -0.014 -0.053***  
(0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) 
Multiple -0.650*** -1.224*** -0.661*** -1.162*** -0.647*** -1.181***  
(0.189) (0.263) (0.190) (0.255) (0.189) (0.258) 
Instit_Own % -0.005 -0.027** -0.006 -0.028*** -0.006 -0.025**  
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) 
Ind_Con 0.648 -4.205*** 0.142 -3.941*** 0.649 -4.384***  
(1.137) (1.251) (1.105) (1.275) (1.105) (1.227) 
Adj_Ret 0.119 0.127 0.095 0.168 0.081 0.196  
(0.241) (0.299) (0.238) (0.289) (0.235) (0.294) 
Constant 0.398 2.593* 0.210 2.976** 0.179 3.099**  
(1.029) (1.384) (1.040) (1.377) (1.148) (1.396) 
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes   
Year-specific effects Yes  Yes  Yes   
Observations 894  894  894   














Table A.6.2: Robustness Test 2 
 
Multinomial logit model estimating the probability of performance standards in compensation 
contracts (Correlation as proxy of common risk) 
Multinomial logistic model predicting various performance standards in compensation contracts 
with common risk (correlation), multiple plans, board size, institutional ownership, independent 
directors, multiple plans, market to book ratio, industry- adjusted returns, industry concentration, 
and corporate governance variables. Significance levels are indicated by ***p < 0.01(1%), **p < 
0.05(5%) and *p < 0.1(10%), based on robust standard errors and are reported in parentheses. For 
simplicity, we do not report results from industry and time dummies. Base Category: Absolute and 
RPE measure jointly. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  






exclusively exclusively exclusively exclusively 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Market Market Industry Industry Supersector Supersector 
Common_Risk -1.605*** 1.942*** -1.343*** 1.412*** -1.301*** 1.232**  
(0.501) (0.726) (0.491) (0.493) (0.490) (0.417) 
Board_Size -0.831** 0.201 -0.821* 0.213 -0.823* 0.253 
 
(0.423) (0.538) (0.422) (0.535) (0.422) (0.531) 
Ind_Directors %  -0.022** -0.032*** -0.021** -0.031*** -0.021** -0.032*** 
 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) 
Ln_Sales 0.237*** -0.108 0.235*** -0.098 0.236*** -0.084  
(0.07) (0.079) (0.070) (0.079) (0.07) (0.079) 
Div_Yld -0.0481 0.023 -0.047 0.026 -0.045 0.027  
(0.043) (0.058) (0.043) (0.058) (0.043) (0.057) 
MTB -0.014 -0.047*** -0.013 -0.047*** -0.012 -0.049***  
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.01) 
Multiple -0.684*** -1.100*** -0.692*** -1.083*** -0.690*** -1.084***  
(0.193) (0.276) (0.192) (0.274) (0.193) (0.273) 
Instit_Own % -0.002 -0.028** -0.002 -0.029*** -0.001 -0.030*** 
 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) 
Ind_Con 0.580 -4.404*** 0.608 -4.715*** 0.598 -4.884*** 
 
(1.276) (1.440) (1.259) (1.435) (1.256) (1.433) 
Adj_Ret 0.126 0.195 0.120 0.187 0.125 0.174  
(0.239) (0.323) (0.239) (0.319) (0.239) (0.314) 
Constant 0.179 2.526* 0.115 2.713* 0.076 2.959**  
(1.148) (1.508) (1.145) (1.499) (1.142) (1.488) 
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-specific effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 894  898  894  






















Table A.6.3: Robustness Test 3 
 
Consultant specific effects 
 
Multinomial logistic model predicting various performance standards in compensation contracts with 
common risk, multiple plans, board size, institutional ownership, independent directors, multiple plans, 
market to book ratio, industry-adjusted returns, industry concentration, corporate governance variables 
and consultant dummies. Significance levels are indicated by ***p < 0.01(1%), **p < 0.05(5%) and *p 
< 0.1(10%), based on robust standard errors and are reported in parentheses. For simplicity, we do not 
report results from industry and time dummies. Base Category: Absolute and RPE measure jointly. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  





exclusively exclusively exclusively exclusively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Market Market Industry Industry Supersector Supersector 
Common_Risk -0.578*** 0.741*** -0.560** 0.750*** -0.323 0.648**  
(0.203) (0.190) (0.225) (0.265) (0.218) (0.256) 
Board_Size -1.240*** 0.404 -1.101** 0.446 -1.052** 0.418  
(0.432) (0.579) (0.437) (0.579) (0.433) (0.570) 
Ind_Directors % -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.030***  
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Ln_Sales 0.159** -0.042 0.141** -0.039 0.143** -0.042  
(0.069) (0.091) (0.069) (0.091) (0.068) (0.091) 
Div_Yld -0.022 -0.014 -0.022 -0.028 -0.034 -0.007  
(0.058) (0.055) (0.058) (0.059) (0.056) (0.057) 
MTB -0.017 -0.049*** -0.015 -0.053*** -0.014 -0.050***  
(0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) 
Multiple -0.619*** -1.308*** -0.617*** -1.224*** -0.632*** -1.238***  
(0.200) (0.254) (0.199) (0.244) (0.201) (0.243) 
Instit_Own % -0.005 -0.026** -0.005 -0.028** -0.004 -0.027**  
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) 
Ind_Con 0.618 -4.055*** 0.415 -4.471*** 0.427 -4.897***  
(1.196) (1.337) (1.181) (1.330) (1.226) (1.318) 
Adj_Ret 0.254 0.117 0.248 0.093 0.217 0.089  
(0.267) (0.304) (0.266) (0.296) (0.262) (0.298) 
Advisor 
      
Deloitte 1.607*** -0.504 1.641*** -0.533 1.612*** -0.557  
(0.262) (0.405) (0.262) (0.407) (0.260) (0.404) 
Kepler 1.175*** 0.241 1.201*** 0.199 1.185*** 0.213  
(0.314) (0.322) (0.308) (0.319) (0.309) (0.316) 
Mercer 1.712*** -13.575*** 2.121*** -13.498*** 2.048*** -13.488***  
(0.611) (0.581) (0.675) (0.600) (0.675) (0.601) 
“Others” 0.322 0.322 0.397 0.282 0.357 0.276  
(0.389) (0.406) (0.374) (0.403) (0.372) (0.400) 
PWC 0.148 -1.424** 0.138 -1.460** 0.124 -1.444**  
(0.367) (0.696) (0.365) (0.694) (0.364) (0.693) 
Towers Watson 0.757** -0.128 0.756** -0.206 0.757** -0.235  
(0.321) (0.387) (0.323) (0.391) (0.320) (0.398) 
Constant 1.918* 1.549 2.198** 1.506 1.867* 1.689  
(1.068) (1.470) (1.102) (1.475) (1.083) (1.477) 







LR chi2 331***  323***  316***  
Log likelihood -639  -643  -647  








7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents a discussion and the concluding remarks for this research. It consists of 
three sections. Section 7.1 briefly summarizes all the all the chapters of the thesis, also bringing 
together the empirical results of the studies shown earlier, recognizing the main contribution of 
this study and presents the implications for policymakers as well as investors. Section 7.2 points 
out the limitations of the present scope of the study. In the end, Section 7.3 suggests the possible 
avenues for future empirical enquiry in the area of executive compensation.  
 
7.1 Summary of the Findings 
In the recent years, a widespread concern exists about the sustained rise in executive pay that 
the media, general public, academia, and legislators argue as having been driven by a growing 
complexity in long-term incentives which deviates from shareholder interests. Presently, the 
regulatory bodies have led to the transparency in executive compensation packages, which 
gives us an opportunity to explore these complex long-term incentive plans in this thesis, also 
questioning whether these compensation contracts are designed optimally. Thus, the aim of this 
thesis is to extend our knowledge beyond the present understanding of executive compensation 
schemes prevalent in the UK by analyzing it from various perspectives as discussed below. 
Chapter 1 of the thesis introduces motivations and objectives of this study. At a later part in the 
chapter, we discuss the potential contributions of this study and also outline the structure of the 
thesis.  
Chapter 2 provides a background on the corporate governance regulations in the UK. Then, this 








of compensation differ from each other. Chapter 3 offers a critical review of the related 
literature on executive compensation and performance, discussing the choice of performance, 
and the use of relative performance condition in compensation contracts. 
Chapter 4, 5, and 6 provide an empirical work which shed light on the pay for performance 
relationship using different elements of compensation, the role of performance volatility on the 
choice of performance measure, and whether these compensation schemes are formed upon the 
informativeness principle. 
Chapter 4 examines the association between compensation and firm performance of CEO and 
CFO by investigating UK non-financial firms in the FTSE 350 Index over the period 2007 till 
2013. One of the main limitations of previous studies on executive compensation is that they 
consider only few measures of compensation in their analysis and do not employ the realised 
pay, which is what executives receive based on actual performance. In this regard, we examine 
the research question by employing four measures of compensation and also takes into account 
short-term as well as long-term performance. In investigating pay and performance relationship 
we employ fixed effect regression model to examine the impact of performance on the level of 
compensation. Our results indicate that there exists a positive association between previous 
year’s total shareholder return and different components of CEO pay except for equity pay. The 
results are similar in the case of CFO as well. There exists a positive link between all 
components of CEO pay and long-term-firm performance but coefficient on long-term firm 
performance is higher in determining the equity pay since equity pay is highly sensitive to firm 
performance. These results also hold true for CFO but the relationship is not as strong as that 
for CEO. Further, this chapter analyses the association between pay and long-term performance 








CEOs, companies that operate one, two or three plans in a compensation package, align the 
interests of CEOs with those of the shareholders. However, for CFOs, the greater the number 
or amount of LTIPs granted, the higher is the total compensation and realized pay and greater 
pay-performance responsiveness. The findings suggest that higher grants will encourage greater 
CFO effort, leading to higher compensation. Lastly, for CEO as well as CFO, adopting 
performance share plans in the companies’ compensation design leads to a greater alignment 
between manager and shareholders’ interests. The pay-performance responsiveness is, 
therefore, stronger for CEO than that of CFO. This is because the coefficient of TSR for CEO 
is greater than that of CFO when regressed against their respective compensation levels. 
Chapter 5 examines the new dataset for a sample of 3400 plans for 400 UK firms from 2007 to 
2015. The first part of the chapter explores the link between the volatility and the choice of 
performance measure in compensation contracts by taking into account the identity of a 
compensation consultant and set of industry-specific controls, following earlier studies (e.g. 
Sloan, 1993; Zakaria, 2012; Li and Wang, 2016) which suggest that firms should not employ 
volatile performance measure as it reduces the pay-performance sensitivity. More specifically, 
we analyze the impact of TSR volatility and EPS volatility on the choice of TSR alone, EPS 
exclusively, neither EPS nor TSR, and the joint selection of TSR and EPS performance 
categories. We find evidence that the firms with higher volatility prefer to select EPS only and 
with lower volatility opt for TSR only plans. However, firms with higher TSR volatility select 
plans with EPS and TSR as a performance metric. We employ different proxies of volatility, 
for example, basic volatility, cumulative volatility, and industry-adjusted volatility. These 
findings remain robust to different proxies of volatility and also after controlling for different 








on the design of compensation contracts. These descriptive statistics show that the initial and 
maximum performance thresholds targets lie in certain ranges in the absence of any government 
guidelines, representing a case of mimetic isomorphism. The empirical findings also show that 
some consultants devise specific performance metrics to their clients which represent a case of 
normative isomorphism. Additionally, firms use different types of EPS and TSR in their 
compensation contracts, vesting percentages pertaining to their initial and maximum threshold 
targets which are, nonetheless, varied. Finally, we perform a unique investigation of how 
performance measures and performance benchmarks influence target attainability in these 
contracts. Our findings indicate that some performance metrics make for “softer” targets than 
others, where “softer” implies both to EPS and TSR benchmarks. 
Chapter 6 investigates whether firms facing greater common risk influences the choice of RPE 
in compensation contracts for 350 FTSE UK firms from 2010 to 2015, following earlier studies 
(e.g., Carter et al., 2009; Gong et al. 2011). By classifying firms into “RPE only”, “absolute 
only” and “absolute and RPE” categories, we are able to show that common risk has a positive 
impact on the choice of RPE in compensation contracts. This chapter employs a number of 
different proxies of common risk, including market/industry/sector beta- when regressed on 
market/industry/sector returns against firm returns. The primary results remain robust in spite 
by using r-square and correlation proxies for common risk and are also consistent after 
controlling for the identity of the compensation consultant. This chapter also pioneers in 
providing rich and up-to-date description on characteristics of RPE plans such as selection of 
peer group, the percentage of vesting pertaining to minimum and maximum thresholds by 
industry. Further, in Chapter 6, we analyze the characteristics of plans with relative performance 








show that common shock influences the characteristics of relative performance evaluation and 
firms tend to select a tougher performance target in the form of plans with a greater spread and 
lower percentage of equity vesting at the median or upper quartile percentile ranking. These are 
in line with the view that firms which face greater common risk tend to employ tougher RPE 
conditions in compensation contracts. Lastly, we investigate the effect of different RPE 
characteristics, since there exists the possibility that some of these characteristics are set in a 
way that executives attain greater equity vesting, which eventually leads to a higher total 
compensation. These findings indicate that plans which opt for Index peers achieve greater 
equity vesting in contrast to firms which select custom or sector peers. However, results relating 
to target spread and percentage of equity vesting at upper quartile relative performance show 
that softer performance targets are met with greater ease.  
Institutional investors and regulatory bodies require CEO performance to be determined by the 
corporate performance, alongside, having concerns about the effectiveness of LTIPs in the 
compensation contract. The results in Chapter 4 addresses these concerns by showing, overall, 
that there exists a positive association between pay and performance for CEOs. The findings 
further indicate that the granting of greater number of LTIPs provides a stronger pay-
performance association and that CEOs get paid for adding shareholder wealth. Furthermore, 
this relationship strengthens as the value of the LTIP grants become more.  
The empirical results from Chapter 5 show that in regard to the choice of performance measure, 
compensation contracts are designed optimally, as firms choose a performance measure which 
is less volatile in nature. As the results indicate, relative to Deloitte, none of the other 
consultants shows a preference for the selection of EPS contingent plans. While HNBS, Kepler 








the choice of performance measure. Also. the descriptive statistics shown in Section 5.6.2.2 
reveal that minimum EPS absolute and real growth in RPI range lie in the range of 2% p.a. to 
8% p.a. and 2% p.a. to 6% p.a., respectively. While maximum threshold targets lie in the range 
of 7% p.a. to 15% p.a. Although, firms are very different and the nature of business model they 
operate upon is varied. To date, the Association of British Insurers (2004), now known as IVIS, 
has not set any specific remuneration guidelines on the way these performance targets should 
be set except that a greater focus has been given on tightening the relationship between pay and 
performance by setting sliding scale instead of single performance hurdle as a way of ensuring 
performance targets are stretching. Both the results from consultant choice of performance 
measure, along with the prevalence of certain performance threshold, offer advice to regulators 
by setting at least some form of benchmark criteria in performance measures. 
The results from the Chapter 6 indicate that firms tend to employ relative measures when they 
face greater common shocks, in line with the informativeness principle. However, results 
related to the choice of peer group in compensation contracts are mixed. IVIS guidelines 
mention very few technical elements in the evaluation of relative performance with TSR based 
measure; firms should avoid taking spontaneous or lengthy averages in the calculation of the 
TSR. Further, it only highlights that TSR can be measured against peer group or broad index 
category.45 So far, there is no position of regulators on the criteria in which firms select its peers 
for relative performance evaluation purposes. If manipulation occurs in the selection of peer 
group, then it would potentially render the RPE usage and tougher performance threshold 
targets, and lower level of equity vesting percentage meaningless. Thus, we argue that 
                                                 
 
45 Andrew Ninian (2016), The Investment Association Principles of Remuneration. 
   https://www.ivis.co.uk/media/12445/Principles-of-Remuneration-2016-Final.pdf   








regulators should provide guidelines in matters related to the selection of peer group, which 
could emerge from encouraging firms in analysing prior firm performance relative to its chosen 
peers. Additionally, the returns of peer firms’ to be highly correlated with the firm of interest. 
In a nutshell, the firms should select such peers that are exposed to common shocks and share 
a similar ability to respond to these shocks. Thus, an inappropriate selection of peers which 
does not filter common shocks or even the selection of easier threshold targets and their 
respective vesting percentages give rise to firms’ opportunistic behaviour to improve their 
relative performance of the firm while setting incentive compensation.  
In Chapter 4, we find an existence of agency theory in analysing the link between pay and 
performance in different settings. The findings in Chapters 5 and 6 indicate an existence of 
optimal contracting theory and informativeness principle/agency theory in the choice of 
performance measures and the selection of performance standards respectively, in 
compensation contracts. Optimal theory argues that compensation contracts are to be formed 
optimally. However, informativeness principle contends that firms should opt for performance 
measures which truly reflects CEO action and agency theory focuses on closely tying the reward 
to actual or perceived firm performance. Taken together, our results in Chapter 4 show that 
there exists a positive association between pay and performance. The empirical evidence from 
Chapters 5 demonstrates that firms choose less volatility performance measures in 
compensation contracts. Chapter 6 results show that firms which face greater common shocks 
tend to employ RPE as a performance standard, these RPE firms select greater spread and a 
lower percentage of equity vesting when they face greater external shocks. Therefore, these 
theories can be tied together as the results show the structure of compensation contracts is 








7.2 Limitations of the Findings 
Similar to any scholarly study, the results obtained from our empirical analysis are subject to 
some limitations. Therefore, we will discuss some limitations of this work.  
In Chapter 4, we examine the impact of performance on the level of compensation by 
considering different measures of firm performance and components of executive 
compensation. In determining the magnitude and structure of executive compensation, there 
exists the possibility that other factors, such as CEO/CFO education and qualifications, as a 
reflection of boardroom-quality, which are not employed in the current study due to limited 
data availability, might effect the outcome of results. Despite this, we factor in a range of control 
variables to account for economic and human determinants, for instance, age and tenure of 
CEO/CFO etc, in our empirical model which is in line with prior empirical research.  
In the empirical section of Chapter 5, we analyse the link between the choice of performance 
choices measure and the volatility of EPS and TSR in the construction of CEO compensation 
contracts. In our regression model, we control for the identity of remuneration consultant, plan 
types, industry, corporate governance variables and firm-specific variables. However, there 
exists the possibility that other variables such as the composition of the remuneration committee 
and CEO shareholdings in the company, which are not controlled in the current study due to 
limited data availability which could potentially influence the choice of EPS and TSR 
individually as well as jointly in compensation contracts. We consider other financial categories 
such as cash flow and NPV in our empirical analysis. One limitation is that we do not include 
non-financial KPI measures in our empirical model since there exist very few firms that employ 








will start employing KPIs in their LTIPs to analyse whether their inclusion influences the 
association between volatility and choice of the performance measure. 
The third empirical study in Chapter 6 also focuses on RPE characteristics. These characteristics 
of relative based plans may be interlinked with each other, for e.g. if firms lower their vesting 
percentage after achieving median percentile performance, they may possibly even lower their 
vesting percentage at upper quartile percentile performance, when devising long-term incentive 
plans. Hence, future research may use the adequate instruments and estimate a series of 
simultaneous equations with several RPE choices as dependent variables, examining the 
influence of common risk on these performance threshold targets and their corresponding 
vesting percentage, as set by the respective firms. 
In all of our three empirical chapters, we also employ several governance proxies, such as board 
size, non-executive directors and percentage of institutional ownership in various executive 
compensation settings. The collection of data on networks of non- executive directors, such as 
number of boards they serve and how their network could reflect their role in this firm is a time-
consuming process as it would have to be hand-collected, thus, potentially posing a limitation 
on our findings. For future research, we may examine the characteristics of non-executive 
directors and their networks with other companies which could potentially influence the level 










7.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
Inevitably, there exists limitation that could be addressed in the future with further empirical 
research.  
In Chapter 4, we study pay-performance responsiveness for FTSE 350 UK non-financial firms. 
Much time has been spent on analysing annual reports to check how many LTIPs are active and 
the granted value of these LTIPs which are awarded three-years prior to them being vested. 
Nonetheless, we would like to explore the incentive mechanisms and how strongly they are 
related with medium and small-sized firms. A greater complexity in the design of compensation 
structure and change in market and regulations also means that it is worthwhile to revisit this 
analysis at a later point to investigate whether the documented relationships have changed. 
These results would not only be of interest to academics but also provide information to 
policymakers as to whether a greater number of LTIPs or complex schemes strengthen the 
relationship between pay and performance. Moreover, this would shed light on corporate 
governance mechanisms and whether they might even have the potential to improve the design 
of executive compensation packages. 
The results of the descriptive statistics from the second part of Chapter 5 indicate that broadly 
speaking, some performance metrics make for “softer” targets than others. It stimulates further 
research on what may lead firms to select EPS growth criteria in their long-term incentive plans. 
Some studies offer empirical evidence on this issue. For instance, Kim and Yang (2010) 
investigate the influence of corporate governance variables on several characteristics of annual 
incentive plans for US firms. These annual incentive plans include selection of EPS target and 
pay-performance sensitivity. They do not find evidence that corporate governance mechanisms 








projected by analyst consensus. We would like to extend these studies and focus on whether 
previous year’s actual firm EPS, Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) EPS 
forecasts, historical actual growth of peer firms in the same sector and corporate governance 
variables impact the target setting of EPS growth figure for the next year. The limitation of data 
access to analysts’ forecast of EPS restricts us from investigating the research questions at this 
stage, but we may examine these in the near future. 
In Section 6.4, the descriptive statistics reveal that firms vary in their selection of peers in order 
to evaluate the relative performance of the firm. We analyze the impact of market, industry and 
supersector betas on the selection of industry, sector and custom peer group categories in firms 
who employ RPE conditions in Section 6.6.3. As well as looking at these categories, it is worth 
exploring in more detail the individual set of firms within these categories. Therefore, we 
suggest that future research should analyse the determinants of an individual set of firms who 
are selected or not selected for relative performance evaluation purposes from within broad 
market index, custom, and sector peer group categories. To measure the common risk of 
potential peers with RPE firm of interest, we would capture similarities between the index 
membership and industry membership. Along with this, the correlation in stock returns, 
difference in beta, and difference in market capitalization between a potential peer and the RPE 
firm of interest could also be investigated. This would shed light on the factors which lead RPE 
firms to select peer firms in their RPE pool, relative to other candidate firms which are not 
selected in RPE pool. This would indicate whether there exists efficient contracting or 
managerial self -serving bias in the selection of peer group. 
Sections 3.3.3 and 6.1.1 review some previous studies using the implicit method by utilizing 








performance relationship and pay and peer performance relationship (Gibbons and Murphy, 
1990; Janakiraman et al., 1992). The results from these studies are mixed and inconclusive. 
Later studies have employed peer group performance by matching peers using median stock 
return in the same size quartile and similar industry (e.g. Albuquerque, 2009). Employing 
industry or market peer performance may erroneously effect such studies’ results as not all 
firms select industry or market indices as their actual peer group to evaluate relative 
performance. Unlike the studies stated above, we employ our current dataset of actual peer 
group to capture peer performance instead of assuming market/industry as potential peer for all 
RPE firms. For this, we would regress executive pay on the firm performance and executive 
pay on actual peer group performance broad market index, custom, and sector peer group 
categories, indicating whether incorporating explicit details of actual peer performance 
enhances the power of the implicit test to detect RPE use. Additionally, we may compare these 
results without incorporating explicit RPE details by using combinations of industry and similar 
size matched peers and examine whether these results change by analyzing the full sample of 
combination of RPE and non-RPE firms in one sample. Lastly, we would like to extend by 
running regression models on separate sub-samples for RPE and non-RPE firms. This may 
indicate whether the RPE detection using explicit approach provides a similar evidence on 
applying an implicit approach as well. Additionally, the results from separate samples may 
point out, if in comparison to non-RPE firms, RPE firms filter out market-wide performance 
from executive compensation. If these results hold true, they would be consistent with the 
agency theory. 
Presently, standard LTIPs are three-year plans which are evaluated and awarded after analysing 








suggests that LTIPs should be five to seven years.46 Three-year LTIPs can be a small period to 
evaluate the true performance of the company, especially, if executives have just recently joined 
the company or implemented major policy changes within the organization. With the suggestion 
of longer LTIPs of five to seven years will keep executives to wait for an additional two to four 
years. With so much criticism on a standard LTIP model that they are ineffective, it is worth 
opting for longer LTIPs to see if they can better align executive pay with long-term 
performance. It could also possibly retain executives for a long-time period as well as keep 
vested interested in the company and executives can focus on enhancing the share price of the 
company which would eventually increase their wealth and that of shareholders. However, it is 
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